The end of politics: democracy bureaucracy and utopia in Lenin by Polan, A. J.
Durham E-Theses
The end of politics: democracy bureaucracy and utopia
in Lenin
Polan, A. J.
How to cite:
Polan, A. J. (1982) The end of politics: democracy bureaucracy and utopia in Lenin, Durham theses,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/7780/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
THE END OF POLITICS: DEMOCRACY 2 BUREAUCRACY 
AND UTOPIA IN LENIN 
A.J. POLAN 
-.'-.. _,_/ 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
/ 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
Abstract 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
CHAPTER 2 
CHAPTER 3 
LENIN'S THE STATE AND REVOLUTION: 
PROBLEMS OF A TEXT AND ITS DISCOURSE 
THE TEXT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: A 
SUBTERRANEAN AUTHORITARIANISM 
THE TEXT AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS: 
THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF A CENTURY 
CHAPTER 4 ~ THE TEXT AND ITS CONTEXT: A 
MICROSCOPIC UNIVERSE 
CHAPTER 5 THE TEXT AND ITS SECRET: A 
POLITICS FOR THE END OF TIME 
i 
ii 
1 
10 
68 
104 
159 
210 
. 
-1~ 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to acknowledge the help9 encouragementp and invaluable 
advice and guidance in the writing of this thesis given by my 
supervisorp Huw Beynono Thanks are also due to David Rosenbergp 
without whose constant pressure this project would certainly not 
have been started, and probably not have been finishedo Ted Jones 
was a constant source of intellectual stimulation and fruitful 
argument» and I also wish to record my gratitude for their advice 
and criticism offered by John Crook» Bob Greeuwoodp Bob Miller, 
Terry Austrin, John Paterson, David Lister, and Marilyn Polano 
~ii~ 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis is an attempt to offer a reconsideration of Lenin°s 
have failed to appreciate the centrality of its concepts to Lenin°s 
mature theory of politicsp and to the body of ideas that subsequently 
became Leninis~ It further argues that an understanding of the 
present Soviet regimep and others of a similar nature, is aided by a 
realisation that the themes of The State and Revolution are present 
in the institutional arrangements of those societieso 
The Introduction takes as a starting point recent events in 
Poland, and suggests that an understanding of those events may be 
gained by an investigation of the discourse on political forms that 
Marxism offerso 
Chapter One presents the origins of the text, its theses in 
summary form, and the reception given to the text by subsequent 
commentatorso These are divided into those taking a 8 historicalG 
and those taking a 6 political0 approacho Suggestions are made of 
the inadequacy of both approaches, reasons for such inadequacies 
are proposed, and an attempt is made to offer an alternative approach 
based upon hermeneutics, in particular Gadamer8 s concept of 0 effective-
history8 o 
Chapter Two examines the way Lenin conceptualised the problems 
of state and politics in post~revolutionary society, and the measures 
he proposed for the solution of these problemso It is argued that 
the libertarian arrangements suggested in the text in face provide a 
cultural and institutional foundation for an authoritarian stateo 
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Chapter Three attempts to investigate further the assumptions on 
the phenomena of bureaucracy and democracy that underlie the texto 
state is suggest~dp and an interpretation of Weber0 s thoughts on the 
issues is provided as a means of discovering the weakness of such 
theorieso 
Chapter Four attempts to examine more closely the elements of 
Lenin°s thought and culture that made the concepts of The State and 
Revolution both possible and necessaryo This leads to an attempt 
to elaborate the theory of political motivation that is an unspoken 
assumption in Lenin°s writingsp and criticises that theory as 
reducing politics to an ontological impossibilityo It is suggested 
that this is a necessary assumption for Lenin°s commune-state to 
functiono 
Chapter Five offers an interpretation of Sartre8 s °Critique of 
Dialectical Reason° in order to establish the paradoxical absurdity 
and inevitability of Lenin°s thesiso Sartre0 s sociology of 
revolution is emphasised for its understanding of the relationship 
between politics and timep and Lenin°s text is then finally assessed 
as an attempt to provide the constitutional arrangements for a society 
outside of timeo 
"'1"' 
INTRODUCTION 
The process that began in Poland in August 1980 and was brought 
remarkable featureso One of these was the strategy adopted by the 
leadership of the Solidarity movement~ which displayed a remarkable 
confidence and ag~essiveness in the pursuance of its demands~ while 
refusing to translate this into a 0 political0 programme or movement. 
Quite the reverse in factp with Solidarity seeming determined to 
resist any definition by the state of its activities that would 
render them 0 political9 o 
Such a stance might be open to at least two types of criticis~ 
both suggesting a problem of 0 immaturity0 or 0 irresponsibility0 o 
From one standpoint it may be argued that Solidarity's position 
exacerbated the social and economic crisis at a time when the 
union°s right to exist had already been established, and a policy of 
militant activity was no longer relevant or usefulo This stance 
can be seen as a causal factor in the military initiative, and 
indeed, might give some degree of legitimacy to that actiono 
Once the basic right to exist had been wonp it would seem that 
historical experience and practical logic should have dictated a new 
attitudeo That is~ having established an organisation that could 
claim de facto loyalty and support among a huge sector of the 
population, it was time to move from being an organisation of dissent 
and protest advancing the interests of a specific social groupo It 
was necessary for Solidarity to see itself as a partner in the power 
structure and make its own contribution to solving the social crisis 
that gripped the countryo At very leastp some kind of 0 social 
contract9 was implied whereby an equilibrium could be established 
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between the union and the Partyo Only in this way could the Party 
be provided with the necessary assurances that would allow the 
process of reform to continue and consolidateo Thus the quality of 
magnanimity was unfortunately missing from Solidarity0 s strategyo 
Thus, despite Walesa0 s assertions to the effect thatg 
00 o o o Solidarity has declared its readiness to co~operate 
in implementing any rational programme aimed at overcoming 
the crisis and reforming the existing struct9r~s of the 
social and economic life of our countryooo" \1) 
it was clear that the history of the absorption of worker0 s 
representative$by the apparatus after previous crisis showed the 
danger of a whole=hearted adoption of such a courseo 
But if magnanimity was lacking to effect the necessary comP 
promise, so also was its oppositeo For the second criticism that 
is possible is that Solidarity failed to translate its awesome 
social power into a coherent and determined struggle for political 
powero They had deprived the Party of the power to make decisions 
over vast areas of social and economic life, but they naively refused 
to openly challenge the power structure, and thus complete their victoryo 
From the standpoint of both criticismsp what is deemed to be 
lacking is politicso In the first case, politics sophisticated 
enough to establish a compromise; in the second case, politics 
tough enough to make a bid for the control of the Stateo As suchp 
whatever the risks involved in either option {absorption in the 
first case, defeat in the second)p the risk involved in opting for 
neither loomed even largero Some force would have to step in and 
fulfil the responsibilities that Solida~ty so studiously refused 9 
and thus arrived the ru. e of the Armyo 
It is possiblep thereforep to see the career of Solidarity in 
terms of the consequences of tactical decisions that went wrongp this 
itself being attributable to the lack of maturity from which such a 
new movement will suffero But Bauman has suggested that such a 
view would quite fail to grasp the originality of Solidarity0,s 
strategy~ and the clarity of mind with which they attempted ito 
He points out that the refusal to become engaged in politics was 
deliberatep {2) and involved very careful and conscious definition 
of aims on the part of the leadershipo To the claims of both 
defenders and opponents of the regime that the union°s activities 
were by their very nature politicalp the union offered a different 
definition of politicso They were advancing a concept of politics 
that was not about powerp but about representatione It rejected 
the assumption that the articulation of specific interests by a 
particular social group automatically implied a claim for control 
of the Stateo This of course is distinctly different to the 
official culture of politics within the Eastern party reg~esp 
which are built upon the assumption that there is no distinction 
between State and societyo Such a distinction is the salient 
feature of liberal democraciesp wherein politics is seen as the 
discourse of the necessary interplay between the interests and 
ideologies articulated in civil society and their representation 
in the administrative processes that are allocated to the Stateo 
The concept of politics as identical with the issue of the 
possession of State power must of course abolish politics as 
activity and replace it with politics as apparatuso 
A culture of politics as apparatus might seem to dictate an 
inevitable strategy for any who critidSe the existing regime~ a 
direct challenge to the totality of existing powero But 
Solidarity rejected this imperativeo What apparently they instead 
did was to attempt to uncouple certain areas of civil society from 
the machinery of State powero These were to constitute distinct 
and separate areas claiming rights to representation~ arbitrationp and 
necessary prerogati~es of a central administrative appa~atuso Thus 
the withdrawal from politics was in another sense a reclamation of 
politicso It was a reclamation of aooncept of politics redolent of 
the mainstream of European political theoryp that based upon the 
separation between State and civil societyo The writer, Jacek Kuronp 
in fact argued that the Government and Party should withdraw from 
certain areas of social life, while retaining control over the Army, 
police, and central administration. The vacuum resulting would not 
necessarily and automatically be filled by Solidarity members, but by 
the members of the particular social group involved ~ the professions, 
the media, the arts ~ and in the case of the trade unions, by the 
members of the working classo Similarly, the withdrawal was 
reinforced from Solidarity 11 ·s side by the ruling which forbade union 
officials to hold office in the State or municipal machineryo(J) 
This, as ·Bauman points out, was to re-establish the traditional 
distinction between State and civil society: 
89The campaign of depoliticization waged by the Polish 
workers can be interpreted as an attempt to regain the lost 
autonomy for civil society., "(4) 
This is the meaning of the emphasis upon autonomy for union 
activitieso The unionists were not by this implying an 
alterative form of State power., Their 8 autonomy0 did not 
necessarily possess implications of the Council-type State formp 
the reconstruction of the State along lines more in keeping with 
radical and putatively 0Socialist0 forms. What was involved 
instead was the rejection of a single=celled political structure 
and the evolution of a far more highly diversified organismo In 
other words" an organism that would be able to cope with the 
are the concomitant of a modernised Societyo Arato and Wajda 
prophetically made this crucial distinction between possible paths 
to reform: 
'~ile the goal of traditional Marxists ooo remains 
the negative Utopia of the politicization of the whole 
of society, the immense bulk of Eastern European dissidents (S) 
seeks the creation or recreation of civil society.," 
The nature of what needs to be created in such societies is 
summed up in their indictment of: 
" ..... the traditional indifference or hostility of 
classical Marxist theory (based on the identification of 
capitalism and civil society) to the institutions that civil 
society in its capitalist form already possesses: market, 
parliamentarism, negative rights attached to possession and 
privacy, general and formal law, freedom of speech and press, 
political pluralism, and, above all, those institutions of 
small=scale public participation which are to mediate between 
the individual and the representatives of political powere" (6) 
Thus the 0 depoliticization° strategy may represent a withdrawal 
from politics, but perhaps only from politics as it is officially 
defined by the State culture. In the long run, of course, such a 
withdrawal was bound to have political effects, of major dimensions. 
The greatest effect would be the overthrow of the discourse that 
legitimated the party regimeo Conversely, had Solidarity itself 
adopted a strategy of power, it would itself have not been immune 
to problems of legitimacyo The competing claims that both the 
Party and the union might advance to such legitimate possession of 
power might well both lack convincing authority., 
But the existence of groups within society that manage to 
establish for themselves some legitimate independence and distance 
from the state apparatus must result in the generation of a field of 
politics wherein such groups and interests operateo This is why 
the threat of Solidarity was ultimately so profoundo It challenged 
not merely an institutional structure ~ and structures may after all 
be reformed or reconstructed ~ but also a discourse. Bauman 
defines Solidarity9 s refusal to engage in politics as a refusal to 
enter a discourse within which they would be powerless and illegitimate: 
0
'ooo the rules of the political game, the grammar of 
political language, are so constructed that they automatically( 7) 
reproduce and perpetrate the party's dominationooe" 
Oppositional forces cannot win a debate upon the terrain 
prepared and mastered by the Party, because it is a discourse that 
legitimates only one concept of politicso It is a concept of 
politics that must embarrass and confuse the new participants, 
because within it their own very existence is illegitimate. 
But to establish domains outside the reign of the party is to 
subvert the official discourse by rendering its assumptions vacuous 
and redundant. The creation of the elements of civil society in 
its own way redefines the proper role and powers of the state, in 
the sense of reducing these to the representative and administrative 
functions that it possesses in democratic theory and practice. 
The argument that I will seek to develop concerns the origins 
and nature of the discourse of politics that obtains in countries 
like Polando This discourse originates in Marxism, but in some 
ways politics is an unfortunate domain to investigate from the 
standpoint of Marx0 s worko A study of his writings will find much 
analytical discussion of the nature of politics at specific moments 
of modern history. But when Althusser points out: 
"The reader will know how Volume Three endso 
titleg Classeso Forty lines, then silence," 
A (8) 
he is underlining a problem that faces any such investigation as 
thiso Marx0 s discussiom of the political domain are directed to 
specific historical eventso Not, of course, that these are devoid 
of theoretical constructs; but we are left without any rigorous 
exposition of a theory of this domain, and, most notably of all, we 
are left without a substantive discussion of Marx0 s conceptualisations 
of the institutions of an emancipated societyo 
Marx, in common with contemporary radicals, was not disposed to 
separate the problem of political institutions from the 'social question' 
which was perhaps necessarily construed as the exclusive focus of the 
struggle for emancipation. Arendt has argued that it was, therefore, 
inevitable that this should be a neglected area of discussion, that 
questions of 8 state and governroentg should be overwhelmed by this 
prior 8obsession•( 9)o The one state institution to which Marx did 
declare allegiance was the Paris Commune of 1871 and it is the image 
of this institution that has entered into the theory, the vocabulary, 
and the imagination of the Marxist tradition. Even here, Arendt and 
Anweiler have entered a reservation regarding Marx's commitment to this 
form, arguing that Marx envisaged for the Commune a role only as: 
"temporary organs in the political 
struggle to advance the revolution," ( lO) 
that is 9 ~ as the permanent organisational form for the politics 
of the future societyo 
Nevertheless, Engels ~ reporting to Bebel the conclusions to 
which he and Marx had come in the light of the Commune seems 
categorical: 
"The whole talk about the state should be droppedp 
especially since the commune, which was no longer a 
state in the proper sense of the word oee the state is 
only a transitional institution which is used in the 
~tn~ggle~ in the revolMtion~ to hold do~m onc 0 u 
adversaries by force ooo as soon as it becomes possible 
to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to existe 
We would therefore propose to replace state everywhere 
by Gemeinwesen, a good old German word which can very ( 
we 11 convey the meaning d. the French word commune." 11) 
These comments on the Gotha Programme of the German Social~ 
Democratic Party are significant not only for their insistence on 
the idea of the communeo Even more interesting is the divorce 
established between freedom and the state, and here the importance 
of the Commune to concepts of the socialist order is clearly more 
central than Arendt has allowedo What is involved, of course, is 
the assumption that the state is no more than the organisaticn 
of 'bodies of armed men'. This refusal to allow the state any more 
complex articulation and any broader role is clearly a restrictive 
theoretical step, particularly in the light of the rich tradition of 
political philosophy, at very least since Hobbes, that has inve~tigated 
the more realistic problem of the ambiguity and delicacy of the 
relationship between the state and freedom. 
For in the following chapters I shall seek to define the n~ture 
of the contemporary political forms and discourses of the 8Marxist8 
states through an investigation of that concept of the commune that 
evoked Marx's approval. In an echo of Engels' argument, the usual 
definition of the relation between these two entities ~ the 'really~ 
existing socialism' and the 0 commune-state 8 = is one of contradictiono 
The two appear to represent the antipodean forms that state 
institutions might takeo In contrast to this argument~ however, I 
shall be trying to suggest an inescapable, and probably causal, link 
between the twoo 
But the subject of my argument will be Lenin, not Marx, Such 
a substituion might ordinarily evoke a protest from those who consider 
that Leninism is but one of ma8y possible versions of Marxismg and in 
itself not the most legittmateo But in the area I shall be 
discussing such an argument is perhaps weaker than it might otherwise 
beo For Marx endowed posterity with no other theory of the politics 
and government of socialist society than the commune~state; and 
Lenin incorporated into his politics the theory of the common~state 
as elaborated by Marxp without additions and without omissionso 
Here, at least, there seems to be a processp not of revision or 
development, but of straightforward inheritance" 
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CHAPTER 1 
LENIN'S STATE AND REVOLUTION: PROBLEMS 
Ol'' A '.I.'U'i' Ai'ID A.'i'S lHSCOlft\SE 
The collected works of Lenin fill some forty=five volumeso(l) 
Yetp for the purpose of understanding Lenin and his impact upon 
the world we inhabit~ the bulk of it is redundanto It bas relevance 
only for specialist academics, traditionalist revolutionaries, and 
fastidious ideologuesQ For the rest of mankindp the importance of 
Lenin is contained in a handful of tractso These are the writings 
that have functioned as definitive elements of contemporary political 
culture, the active elements that have shaped institutions, parties, 
states, and peoples. "What Is To Be Done" ( 1902) argued the need 
for a revolutionary party to combat the consciousness of the people 
and supply them with scientific and revolutionary politics. "One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back" (1903) propounded, if only by example, 
the necessary form of this party .. tigbtp professional, disciplined, 
structured by democratic centralism. 88 lmperialism" (1916) proposed 
a specific characteri~ion and perspective on contemporary world 
society and economy, and wrote a theoretical conclusion to the 
capitalist epoch. "State and Revolution" (1917) gave a prescription 
of what a real socialist revolution would have to achieve, and a 
model of the institutions it would construct. Finally, "Left.,Wing 
Communism" (1920) articulated the approach necessary for the capture 
of power through the rest of the capitalist world, in a political 
handbook that established revolution as the highest principlep and 
flexibility as the only strategyo 
But within this group of texts, The State and Revolution stands 
aparto The unity of the other texts lies in that they are practical 
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and timelys each originated as a response compelled by a specific 
political probleme The 1902 text was a reply to the threat posed 
by the so-called 0Economist9 trendo In 1903p the proposals of 
Axelrod and Martov for a party of an open type produced the dispute 
over the Party rules that gave to history the dubiously accurate 
terms 0 Bolshevik0 and 0Menshevik0 o ijlmperialism0 was dictated by 
the need to provide a characterisation of the First World War that 
would condemn the pro-war positions of the European Social Democratic 
Partieso In 1920, it was the immaturity andcnaivety of the new 
European Communist Parties that dictated the new handbook of 
revolutionary tactics. All the texts are resolutely practical. 
They display an overriding concern for the mechanics of power, of 
political survival and success, whereby illusions are demolished with 
an instinctive realism. They assault any thought that harbours a 
whiff of liberalism, utopianism, impracticality, abstract morality~ 
or ethical motivations. 
There is no difficulty in placing the origin or import of 
these textso No so with The State and Revolutio~ As we shall 
see, it has proven difficult to explain precisely why Lenin chose 
the moment of temporary lull in the storms of 1917 to write the 
book in his enforced Finland exile. And it is even more difficult 
to discover why he chose to propound the argument it contained. 
What possible connection these thoughts bore with what subsequently 
occurred under his leadership is the most obscure question of all. 
But these problems do not confer upon the text the status of 
an aberration9 standing at odds with the rest of the opuso In 
fact the effect of the text is the reverseo The State _and Revolution 
provides Lenin°s legacy with a dimension that would otherwise be 
missingp and it is arguable that such an absence would debilitate the 
effectiveness of the artefact that is Lenin and Leninismo Without 
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it, the whole canon of his WTitings would take on an entirely 
different aspecte The existence of The State and Revolution 
suggests that the rest of the corpusp on the face of it practical 
writings with an instrumental intentp are built upon a fundamentally 
emancipatory intent; and that the subsequent history of the Russian 
state under Stalin and his heirs can reasonably be interpreted as a 
violation of both the letter and spirit of Lenin's politics. 
Openly or implicitly, State and Revolution has had a long career 
as Leninus credentials as a revolutionary humanistj allying him with 
those who reject the pragmatism and brutality of subsequent Soviet 
history. The virtues of libertarianis~ spontaneity, praxis, antio 
authoritarianism, proletarian creativity, self-emancipation, all 
resound through the writing. So at very least The State and 
Revolution may be a bait, which can lead to a consequent acceptance 
of all the less attractive elements of practical Leninism; and a 
hook, preventing or delaying the rejection of the whole Leninist 
ideology by those repelled by the ideology in actione At most, it 
lies at the very core of the effectiveness of Leninism as a mobilising 
ideology of political movements. A political ideology based only upon 
a theory of vulgar realpolitik (the rest of Lenin's writings) and a 
reality of disappointed hopes And bloody confusions (the history of 
the Soviet State) would be a weak one indeede The State and Revolution 
inserts into this unconvincing ensemble all the humanist elements 
that aremissing: the deep aspirations for a truly free society 
based upon tolerance, equalityp and fraternityo An effective .and 
practical politics which can guarantee the birth of Utopia is 
difficult to resiste 
At the time he undertook his first researches on the theoretical 
problem of the State, Lenin was living in exile in Zurich. These 
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preparations were modestp and amounted top in their published formp 
about one ·hundred pages of extracts from Marx and Engels accompanied 
by Lenin°s marginal noteso( 2) The material was written in January 
and February of 1917 and was left for safekeeping in Stockholm when 
he returned to Russia in Aprilo Later in the yearp in Julyp he 
instructed Kamenev to arrange their publication if he did not survive 
the contemporary eventso After the 0July Days•P Lenin went into 
hiding and asked for the notebook to be brought to him~ where he 
used parts 9 but not all, of it in the writing of The State and 
Revolutione 
The opportunity to complete the work on the State arose in the 
wake of the 0July Days 0 o What amounted to a popular rising began 
on 3rd July 1917, at the moment when the Government had ordered a 
large military offensiveo The demonstrations lasted four days and 
developed into a serious threat to the Governmento Although the 
Bolsheviks considered that the moment was far too premature to 
attempt to supplant the Provisonal Governmentp the Government could 
not but see it as an attempt on their part to further destabilise the 
situationo Loyal troops were drafted into the capital9 Pravda was 
suppressed, and orders were issued for the arrest of the three chief 
Bolshevik leaderso Kamenev was taken and Lenin and Zinoviev went 
into hiding and escaped to Finlando 
Although he maintained intimate contact with developments in 
Petrograd, Lenin°s return to the city was delayed until the 9th 
Octobero It was on the following day that the Bolshevik Central 
Committee was persuaded by Lenin°s urgent insistence to decide to 
prepare for armed insurrectiono A political bureau was appointed 
to carry out this decision9 although the actual task of organising 
the action fell to the Military~Revolutionary Committee of the 
Petrograd Sovieto This body predated the decision of lOth October~ 
=14= 
being a Menshevik initiative with solely defensive responsibilities., 
After the lOth October decision, the Bolsheviks converted it to their 
Left SR., This was the instrument that organised the seizure of 
power later in the montho Lenin later noted (30th November 1917) 
tb~t the completion of the work by the addition of a seventh chapter 
on 9Tbe Experience of the Russian Revolutions 1905 and 1917°• was 
interrupted by these events and commented that: 
"it is more pleasant and useful to go through the ( 3) 
experience of revolution than to write about it." 
In the Collected Works, the text is noted as being written in 
August-September 1917, although not published until 1918. This 
does not signify that the ideas contained in it were not made public 
until after the October Revolution .. It appears that the actual 
writing of The State and Revolution was in itself little more than a 
formality; the central themes had already been articulated in various 
public writings throughout the year., In the interval between the 
February revolution and his return to Russia Lenin wrote his 8Letters 
from Afar•, one of which contained the central idea of the need for a 
post-revolutionary state, but a "State of a different type",. The 
Commune is advanced as exemplaro He returned to the theme in his 
article on 8 The Dual Power• published in Pravda on 9th April, six 
days after his return from exile, and the Commune is further referred 
to in the 0Letters on Tactics 0 , written between 8th and 13th April, 
and discussed in some detail in the pamphlet 8The Tasks of the 
Proletariat in Our Revolution°, completed on lOth April, although 
not published until Septembero Lenin8 s Report to the Petrograd 
City Conference of the RSDLP(B) on 14th April presented the concept 
in some clarity to his comradeso The theme became a consistent 
note in his public and private writings and his proposed 8 Revision 
of the Party Programme' which was published in June 1917 9 makes the 
innovations officialo( 4) The most significant change Lenin proposed 
involved the removal of the clause that the: 
"., • ., RSDLP make its primary and inunediate task to overthrow 
the Tsarist autocracy and set up in its place a democratic 
republic.,.,.," 
in favour of one that stated: 
"The party of the proletariat cannot remain content with 
a bourgeois parliamentary democratic republic ••• The 
party fights for a more democratic workers and peasants republic ... 
The proposals then proceed to introduce the concepts of 
recallable delegates and elective officials, and envisages the 
emergence of the Soviet form as the structure of the State: 
"••• parliamentary representative instid!utions will 
be gradually replaced by Soviets of people's representatiVes 
(from various classes and professions, or from various (S) 
localities) functioning as both legislative and executive bodies." 
It is clear, therefore, that the ideas in The State and Revolution 
have already been propounded by Lenin some time before be had the 
opportunity to codify them in a 8 tbeoretical0 work. It should also 
not be forgotten that to attribute to him sole authorship of the 
ideas would be mistakeno It seems to have been Bukbarin6 s earlier 
work that first brought the classical Marxian concept of the State 
to Lenines attention, although be had until February 1917 displayed 
a sharp hostility towards the 9 semi-anarchism9 of Bukharin8 s call 
for the 0 revolutionary destruction° of the bourgeois state.,( 6) 
At a different level, it is likely that such libertarian ideas had 
already been given currency by the political activity of anarchist 
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and populist trends within the revolutionary movement, and it is 
quite probable that experiences since February had given rise to 
ideas, albeit imprecise, with similar libertarian and utopian 
yearnings amongst parts of the population itselfo What Lenin did 
was to take the ideas out of the realm of romantic politics and 
emotive speculation and fuse them with a practical and seemingly 
successful politicso They were transformed, as a result, from 
being the ephemera of social dislocation into the line~ges of the 
state that was born later in the yearo 
The Argument and its Significance 
The theses of the text can, without doing violence to the 
argument, be stated in summary form. 
{a) all states are an instrument for the oppression of one 
class, or set of classes, by another. They are, in the last 
resort, and in their most fund,am ental aspect, bodies of armed men .. 
{b) the state form constructed under the capitalist mode of 
production is appropriate for only that social system., For 
a new class power, it is therefore necessary that the old 
state machine be destroyed and a new one constructed. 
{c) This new state regime is termed the 8 Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat'. 
{d) The dictatorship of the proletariat will, however, involve 
less need for a state machine than any previous regime., This 
is because (i) the ruling class will for the first time be the 
majority class in the population, and {ii) the administrative 
tasks of the state have been immensely simplified by the 
development of the forms~nd forces of production under capitalism. 
{e) Nevertheless, a state of some form will be needed to 
{i) suppress the remnants of the old ruling classes, and 
{ii) regulate the distribution of economic resources and 
rewards during the transitional period leading to a socialist 
economyo 
(f) This new state will not recognise the division of tasks 
established by capitalist regimeso Distinctions between 
representati~e, legislative, executive, administrative and 
judicial functions will be removed., 
{g) The state will therefore not be of a parliamentary type, 
but of a soviet or council typee The structure of parliaments 
establishes false barriers between the rulers and the ruled: 
the political system must become delegatory rather than 
representative. Parliaments also elevate the principle of 
separation of powers, thereby reducing or eliminating the 
possibility of democratic control over the functions of the 
state. All such functions will be conferred on a single 
institution., 
{h) The tasks of running the state can be fulfilled by all and 
any member of society. To ensure maximum participation in 
these tasks, and remove the possibility of the development of 
a bureaucratic elite, the holding of office will be governed 
by the principles of rotation of office, instant recall for 
violation of mandate, and payment of average salaries. 
{i) This state will, from its very inception9 be set on a 
course of withering away, as the conflicts it exists to 
resolve are eliminated in the course of development of the 
socialist economyo 
On initial consideration, it is difficult to claim much 
significance for the work. Historians of Lenin8 s life and 
thought , of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik regime, 
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of political philosophies and practices, tend to devote little 
space to The State and Revolutiono The piece appears to offer 
little opportunity for comment or discussiono It is usually 
merely necessary to summarise itp and the value of any further 
examination is not easy to establisho It is a brief~ inelegantp 
and confessedly derivative argumento It presen~no' problems of 
interpretation: there are no ambiguities in the text, no 
opportunities for conflicting readingso In that sense» it is not 
a °Capital 0 , not even a 8What is to be Done1g Andp in contrast to 
those two examplesp it does not require 8 translation9 for a modern 
audience: despite the frequent polemical references to unfamiliar 
contemporary figures, its concepts are not strange to a modern 
readership, its arguments are anything but subtle, and its message 
is transparento As political philosophy, it does no more than 
retail the themes of a much older and richer political traditiono 
E.Ho Carr has pointed out its roots in Moorep Rousseau, Godwin, 
the early socialists, as well as Marx and Engelso( 7) 
But if a discussion of the work as political philosophy 
seems unrewarding, there is perhaps even less satisfaction to be 
derived from studying it as a historical object. Its status in 
the history of the time is unambiguous: it is marginalo It is 
not an official document, a government decree, a manifesto or a 
party programmeo It was a subterranean, not a public documento 
By the time it was published real events in the life of the new 
regime had rendered it little more than a historical curiosityo 
Such is the discrepancy between the argument of the text and the 
manner in which the Bolshevik regime actually developed that it 
appears to offer no access to understanding what happenedo Here 
were a set of utopian ideals rapidly erased by the brute necessities 
of political lifeo 
Carr articulates the most popular argument: he details the 
10 sullen obs true tion00 of the peasantry» which even °1carried a part 
of the urban workers with them into passive opposition", the failure 
of the European working class to make their revolutions which would 
rescue the new state, the siege laid by a "capitalist world united 
in its hostility to Bolshevism" o And so: 
"Lenin never openly admitted these disappointments, or 
perhaps even admitted them to himself. But they were 
responsible for the apparent contradictions between the 
theory of The State and Revolution and the practice of the 
first year of the regime." (8) 
Despite the central role which the ability to quote appropriate 
texts from Lenin: played in the inner-party disputes of the twenties, 
even here The State and Revolution appears to be absent. None of 
the major oppositions seem to have deemed the work significant 
enough = or perhaps acceptable enough - to include it in their verbal 
armoury for combatting Stalin's approach.{ 9) As history, then, the 
work seems to be of purely archeological interest. 
Yet these considerations perhaps mistake the nature of the 
object. The fact is that the significance of the text is derived 
from its contemporary political and social role, not from historical 
or philophical considerations. The significance of Marxis~ 
Leninism is as one of the most effective mobilising ideologies and 
legitimating belief-systems in the history of parties, states, and 
societieso 
It is an ideology widely subscribed to some sixty years after 
the death of its junior author, in strikingly diverse locales and 
situations around the globe, albeit often to support ideas and actions 
{10) 
that would somewhat surprise those authorso But the apparent 
huge distance between the original ideas and their contemporary 
versions does not undermine the relevance of discussion of those 
originalso Such a connection would only be illegitimate if we 
presumed a rationality of discourse in historical action that 
cannot seriously be postulated this late in the twentieth centuryo 
Ideas have careers of their own0 and if they are 0 criminalg careers 
by the lights of the progenitors they nevertheless testify to what 
elements of the initial problematic have been °found relevant 0 by 
history. And, of coursep the particular ideas under discussion 
lay more claim than most to the appeal to the judgement of the court 
of historyo 
Even if it is difficult to establish a precise connection via 
the geneaology of discourses between Lenin's interpretation of 
Marx and Engels, and the political practic·es and institutes that 
characterise contemporary party regimes, it is possible to suggest 
that more profound processes are at work that establish a link. 
Historical events can easily be explained by reference to. the most 
obvious influences: the consequences of a precisely articulated 
political programme, or a rigorously tabulated set of 8 objective1 
and 'material' conditions. But they may not necessarily be most 
adeguately explained by such means. Historical events have elusive 
causes or history would be far easier to direct than has proven to 
be the case = and historical explanations must often proceed by 
intuition rather than documentation. The IRI!) st elusive of historical 
causations is 0 culture 0 , becauseculture is both the context and the 
co=conspirator of all human actionp and the problematic thing about 
it is that the most important elements of it are by definition un= 
spoken and inexplicito The 0 ideas 6 that constitute it are obviously 
the most successful = because most influential =of all ideasp because 
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they have become 0 second natu~e• to the members of a particular 
societyo But because they are 'natural 0 , they do not pose 
themselves obviously for interrogationo 
This argument will therefore seek to suggest that the 
significance of the text is not historical, philosophical 9 or 
political as much as culturalo Its problems are cultural9 and 
its consequences are culturalo Historical accounts have failed 
to find much to say about the text because they have treated it as 
innocent of cultural determinationso Accounts of it within the 
8 political' mode have succumbed to the 'enchantment' of the text, 
and have been incapable of subjecting it to interrogation because 
they have taken as a context-free truth what is essentially a 
culture-bound artifact, as culture bound as any of the other 
political philosophies which that tradition proposes to critiquee 
I shall suggest that it is not possible to provide an historical 
explanation of the origins and consequences of the text without an 
articulation of the culture in which it arose ~ and that culture 
will be defined by its absences as much as by what is presento 
And I shall suggest that it is not possible for the radical political 
tradition to constitute the text as an object, and by implication to 
constitute Leninism as an object, unless its cultural specificity is 
understood, and unless the nature of its cultural hegemony over 
subsequent radical culture is defined o 
Cultural critique is problematic; culture is not only object~ 
it is also subjecto Culture cannot be thought of except through 
culture, through internalized norms, attitudes~ and valueso Adorno 
has argued that it ~ possible to apply a mode of critique that is 
culture-boundo That is by 0 confronting it with the norms which it 
has itself crystallized 0 (ll) 9 and pointing to the discrepancieso 
But it is possible that the critic is too deeply part of the culture 
to constitute it as culturep and not naturee This then negates the 
possibility of meaningful imminent critiqueo As Adorno cautioned: 
10Criticism retains its mobility in regard to culture 
by recognising the latter 8 s position within the wholeo 
Without such freedom, without consciousness transcending 
the imminence of cul!l.m!ep imminent criticism itseflf,_ would 
be inconceivable: the spontaneous movement of the object 
can be followed only by someone who is not entirely engulfed 
by ito" (12) 
This is what prevents the radical transition from coming to 
terms with Leninism. The tradition is itself engulfed by Leninism 
and therefore attempts at immQpent criticism merely by reproducing 
the parameters of the culture it critiques., 
The alternative mode is the transcendent critique. This 
is in contrast fully able to grasp the conflicts between the 
culture and what it seeks to represent; 
"The transcendent critic assumes al)aS it were 
Archimedean position above culture ooo"\13) 
1i:he critic stands outside that which he contemplateso 
This has indeed enabled historians to perceive the incongruity of 
The State and Revolution with the rest of Lenin's thought, and the 
distance between that text and the state form constructed by 
socialist regimes since - matters to which the political tradition 
is blind. But, 
"the choice of a standpoint outside the sway of 
existing society is as fictitious as only the construction 
of abstract utopias can be. "U4) 
Adorno held that the transcendent critique of bourgeois 
culture was suspect because of its "affinity to barbarism." A 
critique of bourgeois culture from 'outside' tended to "wipe away 
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the whole as with a sponge ... (ls) In fact, such a critique has to 
stand somewhere 9 it has to critique from~ standpoint. The 
transcendent critique of bourgeois culture therefore succumbs to 
the temptation to ground itself in the only concrete alternative 
available: that of the 1 socialist 9 regimes. Not only were the 
components of this culture so ethically suspect as to invalidate 
it as the basis for critique, the critique made such an immoderate 
and sweeping and immediate totalization of its object that no 
insights are forthcoming into its nature and complexities. 
Analogically it can be suggested that the historical school 
of writing = by the very nature of their discourse, and not due to 
any other motives - have produced transcendent critiques that have 
failed to grasp the function of culture and therefore failed to 
plumb the complexity of their object. While for the political 
tradition, the ideology of The State and Revolution is the very 
warp and weft of their own culture, for the historical analysts the 
discrepancy between author, text, and history is so obvious as to 
deprive the text of meaning, rather than grant them a true 
appropriation of the object. It should be said that this is not 
because of any affinity to a 'barbarism' in their values; but their 
very distance from being enmeshed in the ideology of Leninism makes 
it impossible for them to feel its pulse in the lifeless text they 
are examining. This has no immediate relationship to an author 9s 
ideological positions; but it is interesting that the more 
ideologically distant from Leninism that an author is, the more 
generous his comments on the text tend to be. It will be seen 
that it is the marxists Carr, Hill 9 and Bahro who see motivations 
and interests where the non= or anti-marxists like Ulam and Conquest 
see innocent emotions. 
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This would suggest an insoluble problem: a cultural object 
can only be grasped as ~object from outside, but the object can 
only be grasped from inside, that culture. But perhaps an aware~ 
ness of the existence of the dichotomy will make available insights 
that might otherwise escape. 
The Historians' Assessment 
I shall first consider estimations of the text made by 
historians: that is 9 by those seeking to account for causes and 
explanations of the Russian Revolution and its subsequent development, 
and the relation of Lenin and his ideas to that process. The authors 
are both marxist and non-marxist, but what they have in common is 
that they partake of a discourse on what happened, and why, and are 
thus distinguished from those we shall consider later as contributors 
to the 'political' discourse. They will be identified by an approach 
that, in contrast, takes the events the historians discuss as a 'given', 
and seek to determine the relevance of that complex historical 'given' 
to contemporary political problems. 
A recent work on Lenin's political thought criticises what it 
calls the ''conventional wisdom" that characterises Western discussions 
of Lenin. This is the idea that Lenin was an "instinctive politician" 
whose ability and willingness to grasp opportunities and manipulate 
situations meant that as a theorist he was "inconsistent, unorthodox, 
and vacillating, and by these tokens comparatively unimportant. 11 (l6 ) 
Harding's description is not inaccurate, although his contention 
that "Lenin's economic and social analyses provide the clue to 
coherence and consistency in his more expressly political strategies" 
is not successfully demonstrated. As we shall later see, perhaps it 
could not be. 
Conceptions of this text among the authors criticised by Harding 
vary: they range from suggestions that it is sincere but unconnected 
to anything that later transpired, to those that discover in it 
rather less sincere motives, and find that the democratic instincts 
it espouses were a mask for something less attractive. Conquest 
finds both the con~ and the intention of the text hard to fault: 
"The thesis presented in The State and Revolution is 
far from an ignoble one ooo the booklet was not published 
before the Revolution, so there can be no question of it 
being a piece of intellectual demagoguery ooo It is not 
the product of anything so crude as hypocrisy ••• but rather 
of the paradoxes, the ambivalence of Lenin's whole political 
nature." (17) 
This, despite the fact that Conquest may be considered one of the 
commentators most out of sympathy with Lenin's thought and achievements. 
Wilson's classic work on the origins and development of 
Bolshevism dismisses the piece with rather less sympathy: 
"He had given so little thought to the ultimate goals 
of socialism ••• that when ••• he tries to formulate some 
notions of the subject, he can only look it up in Marx and 
Engels and repeat the meagre indications of the 'Critique 
of the Gotha Programm~ in respect to inequality of wages 
and the withering away of the state. There is nothing in 
The State and Revolution except the qualified utopianism of 
his masters." (18) 
Ulam construes the work as more serious in its selection of 
texts and ideas than Wilson has allowed. He stresses the fact 
that this was not something carelessly 'thrown off' in the heat 
of the moment, under the pressure of events: 
"·•• the length of its preparation and Lenin's extreme 
solicitude that the work be completed even if he were to be 
0 bumped off' inaicates that this is not a mere propaganda 
pamphlet addressed to the needs of the hour." (19) 
Vet he clearly cannot locate the work comfortably in the Lenin 
he knows: 
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ooo no work could be more unrepresentative of the 
authors political philosophy and his general frame of 
mind than this one ooo The unfortunate pamphlet is almost 
a straightforward profession of anarchismo" (20) 
Ulam does not suggest that the work is 0insincere 1 o 
contrast to Harding's approach 9 he finds that the conditions of a 
particular political moment can dictate the content of Lenin's 
'theory'. Rather than his politics flowing from a consistent and 
coherent social and economic analysis, the demands of politics, of 
the imminent revolution 9 impose upon Lenin the need for a particular 
mode of theorising: 
"••• in the revolution, in the struggle for power, 
marxism subsists and conquers by an appeal to the 
anarchistic instincts ••• Such was Lenin's absorption in 
the doctrine and its psychology that upon coming to power 
he could pass, as if unconsciously, from a denigration of 
the state to its staunch defence." (21) 
Liebman seems to disagree with Ulam 1 s estimate of the importance 
Lenin attached to the work, a necessary move perhaps in a book 
which attempts a sustained defence of Lenin's politics: 
"It must be emphasised that The State and Revolution is 
an unfinished work, the writing of which was interrUpted at 
the end of the summer of 1917 so that the author might engage 
in less theoretical work and prepare for the imminent coming ( 22 ) 
of the state that would be born from the revolution." 
On the doctrine of the •smashing of the state' Lenin advances, 
according to Liebman, "nothing that was not in conformity with Marxist 
doctrine." Liebman does, however, consider that on other issues 
Lenin makes an original contributiono On the building of socialist 
society 0 Lenin "advancing beyond the realm of classical marxism 
ventured o•• into the unknown and dangerous territory in which 
criticism of society gives way to constructive work. 11 ( 2J) 
And, on this count 9 Liebman judges the work a failure, and a dangerous 
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one at thato He is a remarkably sympathetic ommentator 9 but feels 
compelled to underline the consequences of the 'unfinished' nature 
of the work: it shads: 
"••• glaring weaknesses where one of the most important 
and difficult problems is concerned, namely that of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat ••• it is surprising to see 
how lightly Lenin dealt with it ooo here was a book that 
needed to be completed and developed, since 9 as it stood 9 it 
was silent about, or else overlooked, or even dodged, the 
gigantic problems that the building of socialist society must 
necessarily encounter." (24} 
Liebman then briefly indicates what appear to him as problems 
in the application of such ideas to a complex society. But he comes 
to concur with Ulam's emphasis on the effect of the political moment: 
"~ democratic inspiration lies at the heart of Lenin's 
vision at the time, and gives it its 'immoderate' character. 
This is the mark of the period ••• " (25) 
The critics so far discussed have maintained an essentially 
generous interpretation of the worko The practical implications 
for a mass democracy, for real power to the soviets - were genuinely 
conceived by Lenin as the aim of the revolutionary process. Albeit 
the work was inconsistent with all of Lenin's thought so far, and was 
to be effectively negated by his subsequent actions, it was a simple 
response to the spirit of the times, an infatuation with the vibrant 
creativity displayed by the Russian people. 
Others have suggested more considered and less ingenuous motives 
behind the work. Schapiro baldly asserts that: 
"It is unlikely that the more utopian parts of this 
represented Lenin's convictions." (26) 
He does not attempt to define more specific motivations. 
Daniels is similarly dismissive in his concurrence: 
"The book reads like a manifesto of left-wing 8olshevism 9 
and indeed 9 that is its real significanceo To consider ]h! 
State and Revolution as the basic statement of Lenin 9 s 
political philosophy = which non-communists as well as 
communists usually do = is a serious erroro Its argument 
;·ur' ut.upieJ11 <:~lldt·..:ilisll; ;lWVI:JJ:· aetually b8t;i:iill8 uil.it:iol policy 
after the revolution, as the Soviet leadership has always 
pretendedooo" (27) 
It can 9 however 9 be suggested that the 'over-emphasis' on the 
libertarian mode in the text was deliberate. Firstly 9 it can be 
considered as part of a longstanding 1 debate 0 ~ the debate within 
the international socialist movement initiated by the 1 betrayal 0 of 
the social=democratic parties of Europe in August 1914 0 Thus 
EoHo Carr also appreciates the significance of the 1moment 0 9 but 
for him the moment is defined not only by the imminence of revolution 9 
but also by the need to settle the issues raised by the split in the 
international movemento For Lenin, these issues bore directly on the 
likely outcome of the 1917 events 9 and lack of clarity on them could 
constitute a danger to the success of the revolutiono The classical 
Marxian concept of the state had contended with two deviations since 
being propounded by Marx and Engels: the 9reformist 1 which did not 
consider that the class nature of the sta~ ~sed a problem under 
bourgeois democracy; and the anarchist, which denied any role for a 
state in the revolutionary transformation of society. The latter had 
been a minor trend; the former was a dominant tendency, responsible 
for the volta-face of 1914 9 whose dangerous nature must have been 
multiplied in Lenin's eyes by the conciliatory attitude of the 
Bolshevik Party to the provisional ffiovernment before his return in 
Aprilo Thus earr suggests that: 
" it was the loyalty of the so=called social democrats 
to the national state 9 their abandonment of the fundamental 
socialist tenet of hostility to the state,which had broken the 
international solidarity of the workers of Europe and driven 
them to engage in fratricidal strife at the behest of the ruling 
classes of their respective nationso Hence the emphasis in ( 2B) The State and Revolution o•• was somewhat one-sided o••" 
"Ti"iis in it:Jelf does not : .. mdt:.::..'lll.i.iiU i.;il8 mo:t8l ur i:ht~oretical 
integrity of the text. It does not put in question, rather it 
confirms, Lenin's adherence to the soviet form. Others, however, 
suggest that certain absences in the text, and the incongruity of the 
text itself, express a degree of 'dishonesty', and perhaps reproduce 
the consistently manipulative and opportunist character of Lenin's 
politics. The soviets are a means, and a transitory one, not an end. 
Hill places the emphasis on Lenin's clear perception of the political 
and social barriers that could obstruct the transformation of Russia 
under a Bolshevik leadership: 
"Lenin wished above all to ensure that no respect for 
formal legality, or even for a constitutionally expressed 
majority, should prevent the Bolshevik Party from seizing 
a favourable opportunity for carrying out changes which he 
regarded as essential. He was convinced (rightly, as was 
made clear in October and November) that the policy of his 
party represented the will of the majority of the population: 
and even if this had not been so he would have argued that the 
pressure of existing institutions, the ruling class monopoly 
of education and propaganda before 1917, the age-long habits 
of submission and obedience, weighted the scales unduly in 
illiterate Russia. The dictatorship was needed as a weapon 
against inertia, force of habit." (29) 
The authoritative historian of the Russian soviets, Anweiler, 
echoes the suggestion that Lenin's infatuation with the soviets 
was a short-term, tactical position derived from the necessity to 
gain state power. Previously, he had been hostile to the soviets 
in 1905: 
"Lenin was suspl.cl.ous of all spontaneous - and to him 
formless - attempts at organisation by the proletariat, (30) 
since they would threaten his party's leadership ••• " 
The change of attitude in 1917 was of a specific nature: 
"As Martin Bubar aptly expressed it, Lenin assimilated 
'the soviets into an action programme, not into a 
structural idea 1 o With all the idealized glorification of 
the soviets as a new higher and more democratic type of 
state, Lenin's principal aim was revolutionary-strategic 9 
rather than social-structural. 
That the soviets might not only exist for the sake of 
the revolution, but that, in a deeper, more elementary sense, 
the revolution might also exist for the sake of the soviets 
did not cross his mindo 
Lenin's attitude to the soviets, like Marx's approach 
to the Paris Commune, was dominated by the politics of 
revolution; his blueprint of the socialist soviet state in 
The State and Revolution was the theoretic justification of 
the imminent seizure of power 000 the slo9an of the souets 
was primarily tactical in nature ... 11 (31) 
Keep, who has retr~ed and translated the available records 
of the proceedings of the CEC of the Soviet in the first months 
of Bolshevik power, points to what he considers to be a lack of 
seriousness in Lenin's writing, and again attributes this largely 
to the demands of a strategy for power: 
"The theory ••• left many questions obscure. Lenin 
paid remarkably little attention to the operative practices 
of the soviets ••• he showed virtually no interest in the 
actual workings of the institutions upon which the socialist 
order was supposedly going to rest: how decisions were taken 
or how the various Soviet organs interacted at different 
levels. Nor was he disposed to forecast the attitude of the 
Bolshevik government to the Soviet movement's anarchistic 
features which so crassly contradicted the centralist 
principles to which his own party was committed. The 
silence was in large part tactical: Lenin realised that by 
entering into too much detail he would spoil the bright image 
of the future that he was delineating ••• this appealing 
doctrine ••• enabled the Bolsheviks to seize the initiative in 
the Soviet movement." (32) 
Bahro, the East German dissident, carries the argument one step 
fur there For him, the actual totalitarian development of the future 
Soviet state was contained in the texto The 1democratic 9 arguments 
lack significance, and convince only the naive. 
~'Lenin's The State and Revolution 9 representing his 
immediate preparation for the capture of power, was fondly 
quoted against later developments by those illusionists who 
held in their polemic to the traditional elements of the 
posit~on it developedo .su: o~ ~~e deci~~ve qu~stion ~t . . (~ 3 ) 
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For 8ahro this decisive question is Lenin's emphasis on the 
need to replace the smashed state machine with a new one 0 which will 
inherit the role of 'commanding' and 1governing 9 e In the final pages 
of the text 9 Lenin is enthusiastically concerned to stress that what 
will follow the revolution is the period of 'transition', and: 
"Until the 'higher' phase of communism arrives, the 
socialists demand the strictest control by society and by 
the state over the measure of labour and the measure of 
consumption ooo It follows that under communism there 
remains for a time not only bourgeois right, but even (34) the bourgeois state, without the bourgeoisie." 
Bahro comments: 
"Here is the unmistakeable voice of compulsion, a 
compulsion directed not against the former ruling classes, 
but one that can only be addressed to the 'backward ) 
elements' of the working class and the people itself." (JS 
It may be objected that Bahro can hardly be classified among 
the 'historians' e He is a political writer, a dissident marxist 
writing in a 'socialist' society, whose imposing book is concerned 
to approach the pressing political problems of that society. 
Nevertheless, I include him in this survey because he similarly is 
concerned to view the object - the experience of Lenin and the 
revolution - from outside, by means of an academic and highly 
theoretical mode of writingo In a sense he is transitional between 
the historical and the political mode of interrogating Lenin's te~te 
This perhaps demonstrates the way in which the two modes are forced 
to meet to give life to an appreciation of the text; and 9 also, how 
rare are the attempts to combine, reconcile, or transcend the two modeso 
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The enthusiastic reception given to Bahrovs work testifies to thiso 
Perhaps the writer best qualified to span the space between the 
historical and political was Trotskyo Indeed, he seems uniquely 
qualified for this tasko His mammoth 'History of the Russian 
Revolutionv represents an attempt by a central political actor to 
explain the experience in which he participated. But it is for our 
purposes a disappointment.~o Leninvs major theoretical work of the 
period, to the work that was later to gain wider credence than 
perhaps any other, Trotsky devotes hardly one page out of a thousand. 
He will see nothing original in the work, nothing problematical in 
its origins and intentions, nor in its consequences. Its production 
was a rational act, and the work is a rational contribution to a 
rational process; 
"With the same painstaking care which he dedicated to 
thinking about practical problems of the day, he here examines 
the theoretic problems of the state. He cannot do otherwise: 
for him theory is in actual fact a guide to action. In this 
work Lenin has not for a minute proposed to introduce any new 
word into political theory. On the contrary, he gives the 
work an extraordinarily modest aspect, emphasising his 
position as a disciple." (36) 
From Trotsky, the most ardent of Leninists, the most passionate 
propagator of the centrality of Lenin's theories to the task of 
revolution to which he, Trotsky, devoted his life, we have what 
amounts to silence: a silence which becomes all the more strange 
when it is remembered that one of Trotsky's central planks against 
the Stalin tendency was the" struggle for democracy. 
Trotsky's silence bes~eaks an embarrassment. What strange 
emotions must he have had if forced to contemplate this text from 
the historical shallows of 19327 His rigorous discourse, a discourse 
founded agonisingly upon the need to ensure the survival of the 
Soviet Union, will not allow such feelings to surface. 
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The Political Assessment 
T.here is no evidence that those who came to rule the Soviet 
Union in the decades after 1917 felt any different than Trotsky 
about the text. But 9 of course, by then the society had atrophied 
into the most hermetic of authority systemse The public writings 
and statements of the ruling group during this period have commanded 
little attention from political analysts. In a peculiar irony on 
Engels' dictum the 'government of people' had truly become the 
'administration of things'. The absolute erasure of any public 
sphere consigned all ideology to redundancy or vacuity. The public 
discourse of the ruling group no longer had a function: in any 
society but one reduced to a hermetic administrative structure, such 
public discourse is essentially a mode of negotiation: of negotiating 
and rearranging the relations between elites, interests, groups, 
classes, fractions and parties. Where no such plurality of groups 
exists, public discourse is an absurd non-sense, a ghost without 
substance, eithout connection or role within the world of material 
corporeality. 
Nevertheless the public discourse of Leninism, overflowed into 
the world of Europe and Asia, and had its own effects on political 
culture. And thus the text under discussion became public, claimed 
a much higher profile and a more elevated stature. It affected the 
destinies of nations, manipulating and restructuring political cultures 
both sympathetic and hostile. 
Colletti, in his 1967 defence of the text, testified to the public 
career of The State and Revolutiono He refers to: 
11 the success of The State and Revolution throughout 
the Stalin era, for more than a quarter of a century from 
1928 to 1953, not only in Russia but in all the Communist 
Parties of the world ••• " (37) 
This success, was in his opinion, based upon a misreading of the 
text 9 a reading which suggested only that "The Revolution is violence", 
and its essential act is the smashing of the existing state machineo 
He implies that this reading was deliberately encouraged so as to 
produce a social amnesia about the radical=democratic implications 
of the S:!viet form. It can also be argued that the inculcation of such 
an attitude toward their native state machines among Party members in 
the West was useful to the Russian government. Practieally excluded 
as they were throughout the period from negotiating their role and 
defending their interests through the channels of diplomacy, the 
existence of a proletarian VTrojan Horse' to press the interests of 
the Soviet Union within these countries was invaluablee 
The most resonant element of the argument throughout this period 
was therefore probably the term 'the dictatorship of the proletariat': 
as a slogan it matched the temper of the times, when thinking people 
could easily and reasonably be convinced of the need for 'tough' 
solutions to the acute problems of struggle and survival which were 
posed throughout Europe. 
The tradition which consistently stressed the 'democratic• as 
opposed to the 'violent' interpretation of the text was very much a 
dissident one. Within the Bolshevik Party, Bukharin continued to 
express a respect for the ideas. Cohen reports his opposition to 
Lenin's attempts to curtail factory committees and establish 
hierarchical authority in the very language of Lenin's text: 
"It is good that the cook will be taught to govern the 
state; but what will there be if a commissar is placed over ( 3B) the cook? Then he will never learn to govern the state," 
and Bukharin may be found advocating steps towards the commune-state 
as late as 1928o 
Lukacs 9 the self-appointed, if officially disparaged 9 philosopher of 
the revolution 9 found the Soviet system an apt vehicle for the 
political project of the 'subject-object identical 9 0 
"The Soviet system, for example, always establishes the 
indivisible unity of economics and politics by relating the 
concrete existence of men - their immediate daily interests, 
etco - to the essential questions of society as a wholeo It 
also establishes unity in objective reality where bourgeois 
class interests created the 'division of labour'; above all 
the unity of the 9 power apparatus' ••• and the 'peopleo ooo 
Everywhere the Soviet system does its utmost to relate human 
activity to general questions concerning the state 9 the economy 9 
culture, etc., while fighting to ensure that the regulation of 
all such questions does not become the privilege of an exclusive 
bureaucratic group ••• " 
In contrast to the problems that writers have experienced in 
relating the concepts of dire~t democracy in the Soviet form to 
other of Lenin's writings, they fit convincingly into Lukacs' highly 
developed philosophical framework. Indeed it was perhaps this con-
sistency of Lukacs at the level of philosophical logic that led Lenin 
to castigate his writings as "very left wing and very poor."( 39 ) 
to the 
Rosmer, a French syndicalist who was converted/~olshevik position~ 
and later too opposed the Stalin regime 9 has testified to the 
influence of the text in reconciling libertarian tendenciesto 
Bolshevism and the 'dictatorship of the proletariat 1.{40) 
Subsequently The State and Revolution found for itself a place in the 
radical tradition that has been sustained. Max Schachtman, in 1950 
quite distanced from the Russian experience, argued that: 
"The principles of Soviet democracy, which were set forth 
by Lenin in 1917 and 1918, especially in wttt will remain the 
classic work on the subject The State and Revolution remain an 
unassailable contribution to the socialist struggle for freedom. 11 ( 4l) 
Two decades later, Colletti expresses the same sentiments: 
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"Marxist literature since Marx knows nothing that could 
even remotely compete with the seriousness of the critique 
of parliament contained in The State and Revolution; nor, at 
the same time, anything pervaded with such a profound democratic 
inspiration as that which animates Lenin's text from beginning 
tn nnrlo" (4?) 
Not long after Colletti wrote his assessment 9 there mccurred 
developments which at once revived and problematised the arguments 
of The State and Revolution. As Colletti has indicated, the text 
set the culture of the radical camp for several decades through to 
the fifties. But by that time a process of evolution had occurred 
which had shifted the official communist movement toward a much less 
negative estimation of the institutions of the bourgeois polity. 
Various 'roads to socialism' had been legitimised which sought to 
take account of 'national characteristics•. Posed in this way, the 
change was subtle, and perhaps not total: the reassessment of 
democracy was a product of tactical necessities, and tied very much 
to the historical specificities of particular cultures. However, in 
the mid-1970's, in the light of the constant inability of Communist 
Parties to attain power in the west, and the constant inability of 
state regimes in the East to reform themselves in a democratic 
direction, a debate broke out which perforce involved an assessment 
of Lenin and Lenin's texts. This was the 'Eurocommunism' debate, 
and the argument for a time centred on whether to abandon the slogan 
and concept of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'e 
In such a climate, it is, paradoxically, not easy to escape the 
sway of Lenin's ideas. When his concept of 'dictatorship' is 
abandoned, his concepts of 'democracy' can gain in influenceo 
Colletti has provided the interpretation which can justify thise 
for Colletti, little time need be spent on the most primitive 
level of analysis and criticism in Lenin. The insistence that the 
state is in the last resort 'bodies of armed men' is worth noting 
only as a statement of fact 9 not an analytical point. To see this, 
and its prescription to 'smash the old state machine' as the nub of 
the argument is to miss the pointo Colletti himself refers to the 
image conjured up by Lenin's mode and emphasis in writing: "••• 
revolution eoe in its most elementary and external features: the 
capture of the Winter Palace, the Ministry of Interior in flames, 
the arrest and execution of the political personnel of the old 
government."( 43 ) He goes on to suggest "all this may take place, 
but it is not the essential point" .. 
What is the essential point? Colletti's argument is about 
control. And it centres on the problem of control of governmental 
institutions not simply as an ethical choice, but as an essential 
element that makes possible the conceptions of a socialist social 
organisation. for a political or technical elite to exercise control 
of the 'bodies of armed men' would fulfil the requirements for the 
termination of the old class rule: but would answer no questions 
about what was to replace ita Colletti advances a coherent and 
logically satisfying argument which bases itself on a distinct couplet 
of problems concerning the relationship between parliament and other 
anti ties. The first relationship is between par]iament and the social 
relations of production that constitute a capitalist society. The 
second relationship is that between parliament and the subaltern 
classes. The most obvious, yet most superficial, critique of 
parliament, argues Colletti, is that which concentrates on the 
relationship between parliament And electorate. This is a simple 
problem of structure: one vote every five or so years, lack of 
accountability of representatives and so on; and, by the same 
token, a problem of the corruptability of parliament - what Colletti 
describes as: 
"electoral frauds 9 trasfdmismo (absorption of radicals by 
the establishment); 9 pook-barrelling' 9 9sottogoverno 9 
(form of party control over the administrative process that ( 44 ) 
escape from legislative and parliamentary control) 9 etco" 
All that may 9 and clearly does 9 take place, but it is not the 
pointo For it would 9 for Colletti, be theoretically possible for 
a parliamentary government to exist which had recallable MoPs 9 the 
most representative of electoral systems 9 a complete absence of 
frauds 9 cheating 9 bribing and propaganda, and for this not to be 
genuine democracy but the most perfect expression of the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisieo 
For Colletti the relationship between the working class and 
parliament is subordinate to the problem of the relationship of 
parliament to the social relations of productiono The heart of the 
matter is not the independence of the state apparatus - whether in 
its repressive 9 ideological, or purely adminisbative forms - from 
parliament 9 but the independence of capital from parliament. This, 
he would suggest; is not a purely contingent independence 9 resulting 
from the manner in which the institutions may have historically 
developed. It is much rather an im~nent independenceo If it were 
purely contingent 9 parliament could by the passing of laws extend its 
domain to include capital; as it is an imm.rnent independence, ioeo 
as the inability of bourgeois democracy to dominate capital ia 
inherent in the nature of the two entities, bourgeois democracy does 
not contain the possibility of subordinating and disciplining capital 9 
and thus of running it in the interests of the subaltern classes. It 
could not do so even if it wanted to, i.e. even were there the 
equivalent of a Bolshevik government with a p8rliamentary majorityo 
For it is in the process of production that the key to capitalist 
society, the production of surplus value, lies. Yet it is precisely 
within the production process, by the very nature of that process 
itself, that the existence of exploitation is obscured. In Marx's 
words, the relationship between exploiter and exploited becomes a 
0mysterious thing 0 • Bourgeois democracy can only exist because 
capital rules social life unperceived and uncontrolled. Because 
of the fetishized nature of the production process, a society whose 
central dynamic is exploitation can convince itself that it proceeds 
by the rule of reason, of freedom, and of equality. In Colletti's 
language, the essence of the ''revisionist and reformist" prostration 
before bourgeois democracy is that: 
"For Marx, modern social inequality or capitalist ex-
ploitation occurs simultaneously with the fullest develop-
ment of juridical -political equality; here, on the contrary, 
juridical-political eq~lity - and hence the modern representative 
state - becomes the instrument for the progressive elimination 
and dissolution of real inequalities, which seem arbitrarily (4S) produced rather than an organic consequence of the system as such." 
Because of the peculiar, unique, and critical nature of the dis-
juncture between capital and democracy, the relationship between 
de,mocracy and the proletariat can for capital be quite flexible. 
Thus the parliamentary form can only reinforce capitalist power. 
That is not to deny the possibility and necessity of struggle in the 
parliamentary arena to reveal the contradictions that exist within it, 
and between it and the task of socialist transformation. But so long 
as a working class formulated its political perspective in terms of a 
parliamentary project, so long would that working class beequally 
still distant from the appreciation of its fundamental social slavery 
and impotence. The project of confronting and overcoming the 
relationship of exploitation had to, at one and the same time, be 
the project for the rejection of parliament as an adequate, or even 
useful, vehicle for this project. 
Colletti insists that The State and Revolution is essentially 
directed to a recognition of the substantial nature of this problemo 
The 'technical' problem of structure referred to above is subordinate, 
even though the answer to the problem will be found in what appear as 
technical measures: 
"What is essential to the revolution is the destruction of 
the diaphragm that separates the working classes from power, 
the emancipation and self-determination of the former, the 
transmission of power directly into the hands of the peopleeee 
For Lenin 9 the revolution is not only the transfer of power from 
one class to another, it is also the passage from one type of 
power to another: for him the two things to together because 
the working class that seizes power is the working class that 
governs itself." (46) 
And the corollary: the working class that cannot govern itself 
is a working class that is not capable of seking power. 
Parliament, because its basic constituent element is the 'individual' 
citizen, divorced from his or her position in the process of 
production, is the succinct expression of the subordination to, and 
ignorance of, the rule of capitale The Soviet form, because it re~ 
constitutes the atomised individual as a member of a class standing in 
a specific relation to the process of production, and in so doing 
implicitly and limpidly states the exploitation relationship, is 
the only form that can express the political struggle that will over-
throw capital. A socialist government whose lineaments are those of a 
struggle directed essentially toward and within a parliamentary 
institution will be the product of a struggle that has been deformed, 
directed into the parliamentary mentalityo Thus will the old circle 
of exploitation and dependence reassert itself. 
It is unlikely that an assessment could be penned today that 
found the implications of Lenin's argument so unambiguous. But many 
of the contributions to the 'Eurocommunism 1 debate take the argument 
little further than that in which Lenin was engaged sixty years ago. 
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Three texts will illustrate thjs well. The difficulty in escaping 
the hegemony of Lenin is expressed in the caution with which criticism 
is often addressed. To begin with an advocate of the Eurocommunist 
position 9 the General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party 9 Santiago 
Carillo. In 1 Eurocommunism and the State 1 he is delicate: 
11 The tendency to emphasise what is of paramount importance 
at the given moment, even with the danger of exaggerating it, 
to the extent of making one-sided and excessive generalisations, 
is 9 I believe, apparent in some of Lenin's writings, on the eve( 4?) 
of the October Revolution and in the midst of the Revolutioneee 
Carillo's argument on the substance of the issue is obscure and 
somewhat tendentious. He chooses to take issue with a minor and sub-
sidiary argument in Lenin's text, and not to confront the actual critique 
of bourgeois institutions, the purposes of this critique, and the 
alternative which is suggested. Consequently, despite his valuable 
defence of specific institutions (e.g. universal suffrage pp.91-95) 
in the light of the tragic experience mf Europe in the twentieth 
century; his argument fails to take the measure of the real power of 
the text: the way it articulates a critique of the limitations on 
human freedom and fulfilment which can, arguably, be attributed to 
the restricted nature of bourgeois democracy. 
The response to the Eurocommunist argument can not, however, be 
said to express appreciably more creativity and sensitivity. Probably 
the most authoritative defence of a traditional position was developed 
by Balibar in a book published in 1976. This was intended as a con-
tribution to the debate in the French Communist Party which led to the 
dropping of the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat'o 'The 
Oict~rship of the Proletariat' is a disappointing piece of intellectual 
work {appearing to do little more for Lenin than Lenin did for Marx and 
Engels, i.e. a rather lengthy exegesis and restatement of the original 
text in uncompromising terms). It is concerned to stress the continuing 
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relevance of the concept of 1 dictatorship 0 rather than any inherently 
democratic themeso 
8alibar 9s book is unlikely to have gained much credibility were it 
not implicitly based upon the work of Althusser that preceded ito 
Althusser had already constructed an alle~edly much more sophisticated 
analysis of the contemporary capitalist state than had been available 
to Marxists hitherto 9 and this analysis provided the intellectual 
justification for restoring the threatened concept of 'dictatorship 
of the proletariat' to its former authorityo In the essay 9 Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses•( 4B) Althusser noted that the 
classical Marxian characterisation of the state as an instrument of 
class repression, although eorrect, needed supplementing. The 
necessary supplement was the concept of 'Ideological State Apparatuses•. 
That is, if the function of the state was the reproduction of the 
conditions of production, it achieved its aims by ideological means 
as well as by coercion. 
Alongside the repressive arms stands a pano~ y of ideological 
institutions. This in itself hardly represents an original con-
tribution to political sociology. Any acquaintance with the twentieth 
century state reveals that it has developed major functions, which, 
whatever their specific role, serve to strengthen the commitment of 
the populace to that state, and thereby to stabilise the existing 
political and socio-economic structures. Leaving aside the complex 
of problems associated with representative democracy, which might be 
legitimately excluded as conceptually different, the state apparatus 
as such clearly now has a crucial investment in the areas of economic 
management and welfareprovisiono In terms of costs these outweigh 
the repressive apparatus, and in terms of effectiveness in securing 
social stability their indispensibility is obvious. 
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Althusser is, howevP.r 9 not concerned to note these developmentso 
The institutions that he identifies as the "ideological state 
apparatuses" are· quite different, being: the Churches 9 the 
education system; the family; the legal system; the political 
system; the trade union movement; the communications media; and 
the cultural domaino 
Critical thought stands somewhat benumbed by this coup de theatre. 
Refusing any intellectual discrimination or empirical verification, 
Althusser has simply included in his list practically every extant 
social institution. {His omissions are baffling. The only elements 
not included in his list are those very structures that have undeniably 
become part of the state apparatus in the twentieth century: the 
welfare system and the economic management structures). The economy, 
of course, remains an independent domain for it is the capitalist 
economy which this panoply of state institutions is intended to 
service. It would indeed be hard to conceive of a more ludicrous 
way of resolving the problems of political sociology. 
But what can be the purpose of such a ploy? Notwithstanding the 
ignorance Althusser displays of social reality, the barbarism with 
which he appreaches sociological theory, snd the disdain he bestows 
upon sociological research, the argument achieves its purpose. By 
an act of theory, he has accomplished the absorption of civil society 
into the state; he has in fact abolished civil society by the simple 
expedient of redefining the state as including everything except the 
capitalist economy. This solves a lot of problems. Specifically 
it solves the problem of the Soviet Uniono It subverts criticism 
that in the Soviet Union the state is identical with society, i.eo 
no institution exists which is not part of the state, no activity 
occurs which is not directed at the state and made to serve its 
purpose. Althusser now demonstrates that exactly the same state of 
-44= 
affairs obtains in the capitalist societies. Consequently, the 
USSR can be seen to be a superior social formation, because at 
least the economy is socialised. Thus Althusser can restrict 
his criticisms of the USSR to muted complaints about 'personality 
cults'. More significantly for his present purposes, the argument 
for the dictatorship of the proletariat is restored. The populations 
of the capitalist states must realise that they already live under a 
dictatorship; that what they thought was private is in fact public; 
what they believed to be public is in fact a tool of the state. All 
concepts of democracy, private life, civil rights, voluntary 
associations, are consequently simply false consciousness. What we 
think are ~' and therefore worth protecting, are in fact already 
theirs. There can be no purpose in seeking to maintain them. Thus 
is the totalitarian state intellectually (although hardly convincingly) 
legitimated. 
But other alternatives to Eurocommunism are similarly muted in 
their innovative attempts. Henri Weber, in "Eurocommunism, Socialism 
and Democracy" articulates a radical and anti-Stalinist tradition and 
asks: 
"Who today would deny that the Leninist theses on ( 49 ) democracy and socialism present certain excesses and lacunae?" 
He argues that Lenin's denunciation of 1 bourgeous democracy' was 
a case of 'bending the stick'. Nevertheless his judgement on the 
question of institutions is ultimately uncomplicated - and unchanged: 
"••• the historical conditions that produced the good old 
days of parliamentarism have now ceased to exist. It is 
really another institutional system which has to be built = one 
that will allow the distribution of power at the base of society 
and the active participation of the workers in managing their 
own affairs ••• In the articulation of parliamentary and council-
type institutions, the reality of power must pass to the latter." {50) 
How can Weber, from the standpoint of his tradition, so 
confidently reaffirm the heritage of Lenin? It is because he 
refuses any problems inherent in the structure of Soviet institutionso 
The problems that have in the past led to the collapse of such 
institutions into the authoritarian state are weaknesses in the 
populace 9 not weaknesses in the structures. The implications of 
this proposition are clear, as are its intimate connections with 
authoritarian practices; democracy shall not be constructed to 
meet the needs of the people, but the people shall be reconstructed 
to make possible the functioning of the selected institutions. 
This is a course simply a muted version of the account which 
attributes the disappearance of democracy in the USSR to objective 
conditions: the culture of the population could not sustain it: 
"We say (that power must pass the councils) ••• in full 
awareness of the difficulties involved in the establishment 
and functioning of socialist democracy. Such democracy 
must entail the reduction of working time by at least a half 
otherwise the workers will have neither the energy nor the 
leisure to manage the economic units and the state. It also 
entails satisfaction of the citizens basic needs; relative 
consolidations of the new social order ••• ; a high level of 
working class culture, skills, and consciousness; democratic 
traditions profoundly rooted in every sphere of social life, 
and so on." (51) 
This whole argument then begs the question as to how democracy 
is to be obtained and maintained in the period before these ideal type 
conditions are available. The argument replicates the whole problematic 
of democracy in the Soviet Union under Lenin, and fails to advance 
beyond it. Thus the potent appeal of The State and Revolution is 
once more testified. 
What is the significance of these three contemporary texts: 
Carillo's, Balibar's, and Weber's? Clearly they will not represent 
all the contributions to the present discussion, all the comments that 
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have been made 9 the criticisms advanced,the developments and insights 
achieved. The purpose of citing the texts here is not to suggest 
that contemporary debatejis limited to these parameters and no moreo 
Rather 9 they are syroptomatic: of how the text can still dominate and 
bound three intellectually respectable and seemingly distinct discourses 
on problems of democracy; and 9 further, how each interpretation, or 
appreciation, of that text, can reinforce the failure of its own 
discourse to communicate with the other two and thus reinforce what 
are essentially partial appropriations of the substantive problemo 
The three contributions are singled out as exemplary because each 
represents the way in which specifically political traditions of 
analysis (i.e. those which in some way acknowledge and seek to 
adapt Lenin's heritage for the resolution of contemporary political 
problems) appear to engage in a repetition without development. 
Each in its own way is trapped in terms of discussion and thinking 
initiated by Lenin himself: each consequently does not grasp what 
it is in Lenin that confronts their particular problematic as a problem. 
Carillo articulates a classical social-democratic tradition: he 
desires socialism and believes that possession of state power is 
necessary to achieve it. He wants, however, the efficacy and innate 
value of western European institutions to be reconsidered and 
appreciated. His argument is directed against the term 'dictatorship 
of the proletariat' with its authoritarian implications of a monolithic 
and irremovable one-party regime. But he attacks Lenin's theory on 
its weaknesses and not on its strength. He leaves untouched its 
articulation of dissatisfaction with the formal limits of parliamentary 
democracy, its expression of libertarian aspirations, its insistence 
on the state forms in which those aspirations can be embodiedo In 
this way Carillo fails to grasp and engage the issues which opposing 
radical traditions consider to be essential: the inefficacy of 
parliaments as instruments of political participation and social 
transformation, and the possibility (central to the broadest 
radical tradition) of a truly egalitarian, emancipated, and self= 
governin~ society. 
Balibar is in no less of a traps He articulates a traditional 
concept of the problem: not democracy, but power is the issue. 
The concern for institutions which can guarantee democracy, central 
to both the traditions represented by Carillo and Weber, is one he 
does not share. He represents a tradition on which the 'degeneration' 
of the Bolshevik regime has had little impact, and thus suggested no 
problems: Thus he simply refuses the problem that occupies the others: 
"••• the necessary political foundations and the 
principal aspect of all these forms is what we can call 
mass proletarian democracy. Now this kind of democracy 
cannot be decreed, it cannot be 'guaranteed', in short, 
it does not depend mainly on institutions,however much 
freedom may characterise them; but it can be won, at the 
cost of a hard struggle, if the masses intervene in person 
on the political scene." (52) 
Balibar expresses a consistent refusal to consider the impact 
of Bolshevik autocracy on European political thinking. He criticises 
the Eurocommunist position on its weak point: it does not offer a 
clear means of achieving state power, or guarantee that a party will 
be able to retain power in order to effect social transformation, and 
contain its enemies while so doing. But he fails to appreciate its 
strong point: the experience of fascism and aommunism brought a new 
respect for democracy as something not lightly to be dismissed or 
dismantled. Carillo is aware of what can be the devastating effects 
of a disregard for democratic institutions. To Balibar 9 democracy is 
still suspect, still a term with flavours of prostration before 
bourgeois ideology - or utopian leftism. 
Weber's position completes~is eternal triangle of mutual in= 
comprehension. On the issue of power, he is blind to the problem 
that his argument has displayed a record of success far less than 
that retrieved by Carillo; certainly an absence where Balibar's 
tradition registers marked success. Weber further cannot grasp the 
telling point of Carillo's argument: whereas bourgeois democracy has 
shown an ability to sustain and replicate itself in the post~l945 
period, there is no example of Soviet or council based regimes being 
capable of avoiding the collapse into the authoritarian state; 
indeed, neither is there real evidence of such a strategry approaching 
seriously the problem of obtaining power. Thus Carillo's argument 
guarantees democracy, if not power; Balibar's guarantees power if 
not democracy. Weber's promises neither - but promises both. 
This argument is not intended as a critique of radical strategies, 
and no judgement will be made between them. My point is to suggest 
the contemporary status of The State and Revolution; ohe of exercising 
a peculiarly hegemonic power over the radical debate on democracy and 
the state 2 status it has held since it was written. All participants 
feel they must acknowledge, contain, affirm, or adjust Lenin's ideas: 
none can escape them. No real rupture is possible. 
On Reading Te~s: A Hermeneutic~lution? 
It is perhaps only a human failing to believe that where there is 
a problem , there must be a solution. Perhaps a product of the 
scientific culture, and the way the methods of science have been 
somewhat vulgarly appropriated by non-practitioners, there is a constant 
temptation to assume the existence of solutions not too far from one's 
immediate grasp. This gives the whole political discourse an air of 
confidence that some would suggest is increasingly misplaced. 
Poulantzas, in a unique and moving conclusion to his last book, 
expressed in full measure the anguish that confronts those who believe 
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in a more real form of democracy and socialism, yet at the same time 
refuse to accept the traditional easy explanations and rationalisations 
of the twentieth century experience. Poulantzas lays bare the problemp 
and its~emingly insoluble conflicts: 
"Lenin's principal thrust was not at first towards a 
variant of authoritarian statism ooo the original guiding 
thread of Lenin's thought was, in opposition to the 
parliamentarism and dread of workers councils characteristic 
of the social-democratic current, the sweeping replacement of 
'formal' representative democracy by the 'real', direct 
democracy of workers councils ••• This leads me to the real 
question. Was it not this very line ••• which principally 
accounted for what happened in Lenin's lifetime in the 
Soviet Union, and which gave rise to the centralist and (S3 ) 
statist Lenin whose posterity is well enough known?" 
There is no straight road out of such a realisation. Poulantzas 
concludes his book: 
"It can naturally always be argued, in the name of realism 
(either by proponents of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
or by the others, the orthodox nee-liberals), that if democratic 
socialism has never yet existed, this is because it is impossible. 
~aybe. We no longer share that belief in the millenium founded 
on a few iron laws concerning the inevitability of a democratic-
socialist revolution; nor do we enjoy the support of a fatherland 
of democratic socialism. But one thing is certain: socialism 
will be democratic or it will not be at all. What is more 
optimism about the democratic read to socialism should not lead 
us to consider it as a royal road, smooth and free of risk. 
Risks there are, although they are no longer quite what they used 
to be: at worst, we could be heading for camps and massacres as 
appointed victiiDs• But to that I reply: if we weigh up the 
risks, that is in any case preferable to massacring other people 
only to end up ourselves beneath the blade of a Committee of (S4 ) Public Safety or some Dictator of the proletariat. 
In his preceding pages, Poulantzas discusses the way that he 
conceives the responsibility of Lenin's ideas for the Russian state 
of affairs. He suggests that the original intent of the concept 
'dictatorship of the proletariat' was strategic, and that subsequent 
interpre~ions were of a similar nature. Thus the concept was bound 
to end up an instrumental one, and no more. The Soviets were to become 
"not so much an anti-state as a parallel state".(SS) It can, 
nevertheless, be argued that however non-instrumental the purpose 
of Soviet forms may be 9 those forms themselves contain certain in-
adequacies which will subvert any particular intento These in= 
adequacies are at once more profound, and yet far simpler, than 
those suggested by Poulantzaso 
But 9 apart from anything else, the~ of Poulantzas 1 comments 
here is crucial. Its anguish is the anguish of an awareness of the 
living consequences of Lenin that confronts those with an interest 
in emancipationo It is from this that we might approach a suitable 
interpretation of Lenin's text, and escape the limitations of 
critique expressed in Adorno's concept of the immananent and the 
transcendent. 
Adorno's attempts to define an escape from the unacceptable 
consequences of both these forms of critique - dialectical 
criticism - appears unconvincing. The form of this dialectical 
criticism is vague: it must guard against 'perversion into delusion' 
and, on the other hand, 'enthrallment in the cultural object 1 o It 
must succumb to neither 'the cult of the mind', nor to 'hatred of 
the mind'. The cultural critic must 'both participate in culture 
and not participate•.< 56 ) These are precautionary admonitions that 
amount to little in the way of an alternative. 
Perhaps the weakness of Adorno's alternative may be traced to the initial 
definition ofthe immanent and transcendent. His rejection of the 
available transcendent critique is, clearly, wholehearted and sincere; 
but it is not absolute. He asserts that "the traditional transcendent 
*{57} 
critique of ideology is obsolete ; perhaps some different form of 
transcendent critique is still relevant and possible? And there 
* my emphasise 
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are examples mf its reappearance in his later work, sometimes to 
ludicrous and 0 barbaric' effect. Thus in his 1963 critique of 
existentialism he is loftily dismissive of problems considerRd by 
Heidegger and others. His response to the problem of the sheer 
contingency of the life of the individual, in the context of a 
reality that is disturbing, and ultimately fatal, is to resort to 
the most simple and supercilious of Marxian solutions. Heidegger 
proposes the ••needs for residences" as one of the great difficulties 
of contemporary man: the anguished rootlessness of the children of 
the enlightenment. Adorno responds: 
"However, that which announces itself, in the game about 
the need for residences, is more serious than the pose of 
existential seriousness. It is the fear of unemployment, 
lurking in all citizens of countries of high capitalism. 
This is a fear which is administratively fought off, and 
therefore nailed to the platonic firmament of the stars, a 
fear that remains even in the glorious tim~s of full employment.M 
What is this but an example of a 'DiamAt• reductionism that 
would have earned any other writer Adorno's rebuke? 
It is arguable that the inability to find a more comfortable and 
serious stance for cultural criticism derives from the continued 
presence in Adorno's thought of the transcendent critique as the 
final arbiter of social phenomena. The inheritance of the Hegelian 
search for absolute knowledge is arguably present at a profound and 
unstated level throughout his career. Even for a social critic of 
Adorno's sophistication, such a commitment may readmit through the 
back door a crude marxism which has been assertively dismissed via 
the fronte His profound distaste for the age in which he lived -
summed up by the 'dialectic of enlightenment' thesis and the alleged 
transformation of the whole world around him into a dull and 
manipulative positivity - leff him with a yearning for transcendent 
(58) 
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critique, a yearning that, as he himself would be the first to 
recognise 9 could not possibly be fulfilled. 
Some kind of solution to this problem may 9 however 9 be availab~ 
by moving beyond Adorno's somewhat simple dichotomy. The immanent 
and transcendent critiques may be accepted as ideal types, but may 
be supplemented by a realization that the possibility of genuine 
critique lies within the terrain that separates the two. It is 
necessary to abandon the idea of transcendent critique as a methodological 
possibility, and occupy the gap it leaves with a realization of the 
historicity of all knowledge. 
This may be appreached by the path of hermeneutics. The task 
of hermeneutics is the same as Adorno's cultural criticism: to 
interrogate texts and historical or cultural artifacts, and find 
some standards by which to assess them. The original hermeneutic 
project was itself critical. It originated in the Protestant 
Reformation 9 which was confronted by the problem of the interpretation 
of Biblical texts~ The Catholic church claimed that treoriginal 
fragmentary scriptures were obscure in their meanings. Their 
interpretation, therefore,could only be ensured by reliance upon the 
established tradition of interpretation, which was embodied and 
institutionalised in the Catholic Church. To ground their oppositional 
and critical practice 9 therefore, the Lutherans had to present a mode 
of reinterpreting the scriptures which could derive a universally 
valid interprebation from the fragmentary texts themselves. 
The nub of the problem of interpretation defined by~is historical 
conflict is this: there is a distance between the interpreter and 
his object. The initial task therefore differs from Adorno's: for 
him the problem of the immanent critique was the lack of distance 
between the two, the manner in which the interpreter was 9 engulfedr 
in the culture he investigated. But the subsequent history of 
hermeneutics revealed the proximity of this problem to the original 
The Biblical hermeneuticists attempted to provide a universally 
valid interpretation of fragmentary texts by treating a text as a 
unity. A problematic single section of a work could be interpreted 
from the intention and composition of the whole. The established 
linguistic usage of any time and place provided the key to obscure 
passages. Grammar, philology, and style could further be buttressed 
as the keys to a text by the appreciation of the text's own local 
characteristics, and an understanding of historical circumstances 
became part of the hermeneutic method. Such methods, of course, are 
not immune to problems of the historicity and distance of the 
interpreter, but aid was available in the form of 'thriving Christian 
practice' which provided the interpreter with a common and continuous 
context in which was situated both the text and the historianmmselfe 
The subsequent school of historical hermeneutics dealt with these 
problems, but they were necessarily transformed. In broad terms, the 
hermeneutic technique was an attempted empathy with cultures distant 
in time. Outside of Biblical and classical interpretation, the task 
was rarely one of the technical reconstruction of partial texts, but 
an attempt to decipher the meaning and significance and origin of 
texts that often were available in their entiretye This produced a 
concentration on the context of a text rather than its content, and 
in particular on the position of the author in historical timeo 
This suggested psychological reconstructions 9 and such reconstructions 
were possible for another reason. The 'thriving Christian practice' 
that aided the original biblical scholars could not be available to 
the interpreter of more secular texts. Where, then~ could be found 
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the continuity that would guarantee some communication between 
historian and text? This could in fact be reduced to a non-
questiono Logically, no understanding at all is possible between 
totally strange and unconnected words. Bauman illustrates this 
with a sentence from Wittgenstein: 
"If lions could speak 9 we would not understand them.''(sg) 
Some ontological continuity between the historian and his object may 
therefore be legitimately assumed, by the very act of constituting 
the text as a problematic object to be interpreted~ Thus before the 
research process is initiated, some degree of understanding is 
guaranteed by the initial understanding that that particular text 
exists as an object to be interpreted. Past and present are thus 
conjoined by some continuum which will make the meaning of the 
historical act available to the investigator. 
The consequence of this was articulated by Schleiermacher, and 
his contribution is summed up by Dilthey: 
"The possibility of universally valid interpretation can 
be deduced from the nature of understanding. In this process 
the individuality of the interpreter and that of his author do 
not face each other as two incomparable facts. Both have been 
formed on the basis of a common human nature, and this makes 
possible the common ground which all men share and which is 
necessary for speech and comprehension ••• All individual 
differences are, in the final analysis, not determined by 
t qualitative diversities between people but only by differences 
of degree in their mental processes. But when the interpreter 
tentatively projects his own vitality, as it were, into a 
historical milieu, he is able from this standpoint mementarily 
to stress and to reinforce certain mental processes, to let 
others take a less prominent place, and thus to bring about (60) 
a reconstruction of an alien life within himself." 
Dilthey speaks of the 'possibility of an interpretation that will 
be universally valid. The distance between possibility and actuality, 
however, is still present. Not all historical artifacts are accessible 
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to interpretatione There are moments of the past whose meaning we 
cannot grasp: the failures with which~istory is littered. Has a 
text which has no significance, other than the mctives and aspirations 
of its author 9 a meaning for us? Dilthey makes a crucial point when 
he asserts that "only a moment of the past is meaningful insofar as 
it binds the futuree ,.( 6l) 
Dilthey is saying that texts which have had no impact beyond their 
immediate situation, which have not entered into the tradition that is 
the channel of communication between us and the past, are dead textse 
Perhaps such a fate is inescapable for many human endeavours. There 
is still, yet, a possibility that dead texts may come to life, but 
such a successful resuscitation is the task of history, not the historian. 
The history of Marxism itself provides illustration of this. It is 
recognised that the publication of Marx's early writings some fifty 
years after his death coincided with and legitimised an entirely new 
interpretation of his whole body of work. Arguably the philosophical 
currents loosely grouped under the title 'Western 'Marxism' would not 
have struck root without these textso Their relevance to the humanist 
project of writers since Lukacs and Kersch was confirmed in Marcuse's 
exdBmation that they "put the entire theory of •scientific socialism' 
on a new footing. 11 ( 62 ) Althusser's determination, as part of the 
restoration of scientific Marxism, to establish the 'epistemological 
break' that would consign these texts once again to obscurity, is a 
further, negative, confirmation of their significance in this development. 
But the 'accident' of the absence of these texts, and the irony 
of their eventual publication by the Moscow State Publishing House in 
1932, should not suggest that their lack of significance prior to the 
first blossomings of Western Marxism was itself accidental. We need 
only ask to whom these texts would have addressed themselves before 
the 1920's and 130 1 s (perhaps Labriola? But who else?) and to~ 
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perceived and felt social, political and historical problems they 
would have been construed as relevant. Thus it was necessary for 
'history to do its work' on the available 9 consensus interpretation 
of Marx (and 9 conversely 9 for the established interpretation of Marx 
to do its work on history) before the early writings could speak. 
The scientific positivism of 'iron~law' Marxism of the Second 
International, and its disinherited child, the voluntarist real= 
politik ''concrete analysis of the concrete situation'' Marxism of the 
Third International, had to first run their course. 
Both these interpretations worked intimately with the culture 
of their times; the optimism bestowed upon the nineteenth century 
politicians by the successes of the natural sciences; and the bitter 
desperation and millenarianism born of the catastrophe that struck the 
heart of European culture, the first world war. Only subsequently 
and then only among a handful of European Marxian intellectuals who 
failed to partake of the enthusiasm for the costly march of Soviet 
socialism - was the retrieval of the themes of an earlier Marx a 
possibility. 
The argument here is not one of cause-and-effect, but of 
historical affinities. Lukacs' and Kersch's return to Hegelian 
Marxism pre-dated the publication of the manuscripts by ten years 
or more (although, given that their publication was made possible 
by the despatch of the photocopied Manuscripts to Moscow by the 
early Frankfurt Institute, it is possible that they were familiar 
to certain writers before their official publication.( 63 ) 
Obversely, it is bbvious that the texts themselves carried little 
implications for those who felt no qualms about the current state 
of the socialist movement. Clearly, if the texts were inherently 
subversive of official orthodox Marxism, the Moscow publishers would 
have thought twice about making them available. Thus, had it not 
been for the crisis of Marxian thought that spanned the period, the 
early writings would have had no more than archival signficanceo 
As indeed was the case and presumably still is with those copies that 
sit in massed numbers on the bookshelves of Party members in the party-
states. Thus 9 texts may be available in editions of millions, and 
still be dead texts. 
Of course, sven in the period of the birth of Western Marxism the 
early writings had meaning for very few. It was not until the grand 
public crisis of official Marxism after 1956 that the themes of those 
writings found a wider audience and became effective in history. They 
presented a substantial challenge,at least in the West, to the 
intellectual and ethical respectability of diamat Marxism, and 
indirectly, particularly via the work of Marcuse, fueled the radical 
movements of the 1960's. 
The story may be taken one step further. A disappointme~with 
the apparent inefficacy of humanist Marsism as a politics for the 
appropriation of power may have contributed after 1968 to a significant 
c0unter to Hegelian themes and a return to the project of a 'scientific' 
Marxism in the work of the Althusserian school. Thus, whatever the 
personal impulses behind Althusser's writings (which, of course, all 
predated the peaks of 1 60 1 s radicalism), it is probably inappropriate 
to see the brief Althusserian hegemony after 1968 as simply a 'police 
action' designed to restore the authority of classical Stalinism, as 
EoPo Thompson suggestso( 64 ) Its renaissance has perhaps more under= 
standable roots in the perceived limitations of humanist Marxism 
following the radical wave of the 1960's, and a consequent return of 
the desire for a politics that can successfully address the problems of 
power. 
~ss~ 
This story of the changing interpretations of Marxism (piquantly 
confirmed by Althusser's insistence upon his particular readings of 
texts) 9 intimately linked to the specific historical problems displayed 
by any given period, confirms the unlikeliness of readings of texts 
that will give them a final apodictically true interpretation 9 a 
genuine and final historical objectivityo 
The historian 9 therefore 9 judges and assesses from his own position 
of being a contemporary of a specific historical period, which has its 
own definition of the meaningful and meaninglesso This inescapable 
particularity of any historical age may only be overcome if one is 
willing to assume a future situation of a different order 0 that is 9 a 
situation where history itself has come to an endo From the standpoint 
of such an authoritative position, the historian would be able to draw 
up the final balance sheet of the significance of all that which is 
past. By implication, consequently, the adoption of a teleeological 
philosophy of history can provide the historian with the standpoint for 
such an operation before the final situation has itself come to pass. 
It should, however, be clear from many parts of this argument, both 
the preceding pages and those that are to follow 0 that I believe such 
an assumption to be unacceptable, both methodologically and in its 
political and intellectual consequences. I shall not here attempt 
to justify the rejection of that assumption specifically, but rather 
to suggest the consequences of such a rejection for the project of a 
historical understanding of our present text. 
If history is characterised by changing cultures, values, and 
consequently interpretations, the only possibility of an objective 
understanding of history, true for all future time and place, is the 
advent of the end of history itself. If this seems unlikely, we are 
faced with the problem: is there any escape from an undifferentiated 
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historical relativism? Gadamer has proposed thedssolution of this 
problemo He dismisses any claims that historical knowledge might 
have of an absolute natureo The romantic hermeneuticists believed 
that it was possible for the historian to gain a knowledge of a text 
that was superior to the understanding possessed by its author. They, 
after all, had not only the text to study, but also the knowledge of th 
totality of the age in which the author lived. They could draw out the 
impulses and constraints which produced the text, factors of which an 
author at the time could be only dimly aware, if at all. Gadamer is, 
however, content to relinquish any claim to 'superior understanding'a 
"It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we 
understand at all."(fiS) Thus he dismisses also any temptation for a 
philosopphy that will provide 'an end to history' and thus guarantee 
apodictic knowledge of history. 
But Gadamer does not regret the temporal distance that separates 
the historian and his text. It is not, for him, "something that must 
be overcome". For a historian to regret time and its effects is like a 
doctor r~ting the fract that the human body has a specific set of 
organs, and wishing instead that it possessed the structural smpliCity 
of an amoeba. It is the complications that produce the possibility of 
knowledge, that offer the historian something to work on, and, by 
extension provide human beings with the possibility of intellect and 
imagination., If, at some point in the future, it were to become 
possible to reveal history as transparent, no ,more than the workings 
of a single-celled uncomplicated essence or mechanism, the consequences 
for the human intellect would be truly frighteningo And if we are 
conversely tempted by the hermeneutic antipodes of such a scientific 
holy grail, we need only ask the following question: if it did become 
possible to shed all the products and prejudices of our situation in 
present time 9 and enter a dialogue with the historical text or event 
completely on its own terms, within its own culture 9 devoid of any 
anachronistic pollutions = what then would we gain? Surely, nothing 
but the collapse into immanence; surely 9 nothing that could inform 
our understanding of our presento For when the observer becomes 
identieal with the observed, he is by definition dissolved into the 
objecte It is our present that must be the driving concern of the 
historian: otherwise the historian is a poor substitute for the time= 
travellers of science-fiction, and our best hope is to await the 
development of the appropriate piece of technology. 
Thus the attempt to completely recapture the spirit of a past 
age and to erase the preconceptions of the contemporary age from 
our questioning, is unnecessary: 
"In fact,the important thing is to recognize the 
distance in time a~ a positive and productive possibility 
of understanding."l66) 
That distance is not an empty gap, a 'yawning abyss', but is filled 
with historical continuity and custom, that is, that which has produced 
the object that now presents itself to us in a specific and contemporary 
way. By the passage of time, the investigation of the text is 
protected from possible sources of 'error' - those revealed by 
straightforward historical research, as well as those born of an 
excessively close subjective involvement with the text and its timea 
But, valuable as these gains are, they do not thereby convert a text 
into a pristine object safely located within a securely defined 
context, the 'past'~ This would simply return us to the comfort of 
a traditional and unreflective objective history, facing an object 
safely dead in the past, devoid of any ability to influence and subvert 
our understanding through its effect on our tradition and inheritanceo 
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Thus Gadamer insistently reasserts Dilthey's theme: a text can have 
meaning only to the extent that it, itself 9 addresses us. Its 
ability to do so derives from its vitality as a livinq ~nd creative 
element in our tradition; and inasmuch as it is 9 therefore 9 part of 
the subject (the historian) as well as the object (the text), it will 
refuse all claims of those who would reveal and possess its meaning ~s 
absolute knowledge. 
Gadamer thus suggests that the passage of time may diminish the 
problems described in Adorno's version of immanent critique: 
"It is only this temporal distance that can solve the 
really critical question of hermeneutics, namely of 
distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, 
from the false ones by which we misunderstand." (67) 
But there is no final escape from prejudices. True historical 
knowledge is that which takes account of its own situation in 
history, its inevitable saturation with its own contemporaneity. 
Historical objectivism may indeed claim some superiority to versions 
of a hermeneutic method which results only in arbitrary "cosy 
recreations of the past."(fiB) But to fail to recognise the 
existence of historically produced presuppositions in our own thought 
is to "fall short of reaching that truth which, despite the finite 
nature of our understanding, could be reached." 
Gadamer is in this way arguing for what he calls 'effective-
history 1 • Effective history escapes the complacency of the immanent 
critique and the barbarism of the transcendent by being prepared to 
accept the costs that follow from not adhering to eithero The cost 
of rejecting the immanent critique is a loss of intimacy with the 
object: but it is not a total loss, because such a total loss only 
occurs if one instead adopts the transcendent critique. The cost of 
rejecting the transcendent critique is the abandonment of the 
possibility of absolute truth: but it does not amount to the 
absence of all truth 9 because such an absence will arise only if 
we capitulate in the face of the object 9 if we are ready to accept 
it in its own terms 9 if we relinquish the entire project of critique 9 
if we submerge our reason in immanence. Effective history is 
capable of providing a limited truth. "To exist historically 
means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete" 9 but "every 
age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way 9 for the 
text is part of the whole of the tradition in which the age takes 
an objective interest and in which it seeks to understand itself ... ( 6g) 
This does not solve Adorno's problem of the criticism of 
contemporary cultural products. Lacking any separation in time 
from his object 9 he cannot find satisfactory criteria by which to 
judge it. Time has not had time to elect the important and 
disenfranchise the meaningless and ephemeral. It is almost in-
evitable, therefore that the cultural critic shall confuse the 
important with the trivial and arrive at judgements that later will 
seem eccentric. But the cultural critic has no choice but to take 
this risk. The historian's situation may provide more comfort. 
The effects of history will have done their work, and separated the 
meaningful from the meaningless. 
But history does not write itself. Historians disagree about 
interpretations 9 and a large part of this argument is a disagreement 
with accepted interpretations. Can one interpretation - the one that 
follows - claim any privilege over the others? It is my contention 
that existing interpretations have failed to trace the effect of The 
State and Revolution in history 9 and therefore its complicity in 
contemporary culture. If we return to Diltheyvs axiom that "a 
moment of the past is meaningful insofar as it binds the future", we 
can identify the mystery of Lenin's text in the corrollary: we may 
only grasp the meaning of the past by identifying how it bound the 
future 9 i.e. our present. Now 9 in both schools of interpretation 
that we have examined, such a binding is lacking. The text does not 
enter into history 9 either due to its absurdity - an impossible 
utopianism ~ or its innocence =a valid libertarianism betrayed by the 
brutal necessities of subsequent history, or the bad faith of historical 
actors. Consequently the text is either meaningless - dead 9 historical, 
objective = , a moment in one man's biography, or excessively 
meaningful, saturated with meaning - in fact, sacred. 
The 'meaningless' interpretations fall into two categories. 
Firstly, the absurd, whereby not only can no connection be established 
between text and consequences 9 no connection can even be established 
between text and author. Thus Conquest ascribes it to the 
'ambivalence' of Lenin's whole being. Wilson attributes its form 
to 'little thought', Ulam regards it as 'unrepresentative' and 
'unfortunate', Liebman identifies 'glaring weaknesses' that reveal a 
'surprising' lack of thought. Shapiro and Daniels reinforce this 
version. The text consequently had no meaning for its times or 
even for its author. The second version may be described as the cynical. 
This interpretation puts the author back in control of the text. The 
text could not mean what it said, but was a ploy directed to another 
end than that revealed in the text itself. It was designed to win 
the debate with the 'revisionists' (Carr), to legitimate the 
dictatorship necessary to overcome the inertia of Russian society 
(Hill), to legitimate the seizure of power itself (Anweiler), to 
garner the political support necessary for that seizure (Keep), to 
justify the subsequent compulsion of the population (Bahro). Thus, 
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in the first interpretation 9 the text is opaque 9 allowing no meaning 
to shine through; in the second 9 the meaning is distorted 9 but may 
be deciphered by attributing deliberate and rational motivations. 
By contrast 9 the 'meaningful' interpretation asserts the 
transparency of the text 9 meaning shines through it. Put differently 9 
there is no meaning that is separate from the surface of the text 
itself 9 and the text escapes interrogation because of its honesty. 
The text is unassailable, and consequently 9 sacred. Lenin is the 
channel by which the truth may express itself. And because the 
truth has not yet come to pass 9 it is not in history. And thaLwhich 
is not in history cannot be examined as an historical object. It has 
the status of a myth 9 and a myth may only be ~· It may not be 
examined. We may remember Levi-Strauss' definition of a myth as a 
machine for the suppression of time. The mythical status of The State 
and Revolution within the ~adical tradition has been effective in 
suppressing aspects of the nature of Soviet authoritarianism9 and 9 
indeed 9 the myth of The State and Revolution has ensured that the 
history of The State and Revolution remains unwritten. The 'his tory' 
of the State and Revolution has very little to do with its origins 9 
its motivations 9 or its intentions. It must be realised that its 
history is temporally situated after the appearance of the text 9 not 
prior to and simultaneous with its production. Only if we can read 
the history of The State and Revolution in the subsequent history of 
the USSR and of mankind will it have a history that contains any meaning. 
Thus 9 sixty years later 9 we have the benefit of temporal distance 
from the historical text. What is more 9 that distance will give us 
access to the effective-history of the text; if 9 that is 9 it can be 
suggested that the text has participated in creating our contemporary 
reality. If this proves possible 9 then it may be possible to 
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resist the efforts of the historians to turn the text into a dead 
and alien object. The next chapter, therefore, will attempt to 
suggest the continuing effectivity of The State and Revolution in 
the Russia of the Gulag. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE TEXT AND ITS CDN~~NT 
ll. is iH:lt;I;J~!><:n'y dl:. i.;lli8 ~ol11t i-u consider the content of Lenin's 
text in detaiL The purpose will be to reveal the effect of Lenin's 
arguments in reality: for I believe that those arguments had effects 
that are demonstrable and consequences that were profound. In effect, 
the Soviet state that emerged after 1917 bore the stamp of The State 
and Revolution in all its subsequent phases, before ~after the 
Bolsheviks secured the monopoly of power, before and after the decline 
of the Soviets as signficiant institutions, before ~after the rise 
of Stalin. In this my argument differs from the interpretations 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
This will be a selective consideration; and it will hope to 
'attack' Lenin's position on its~rong points and not its weak ones. 
The 'weak' points are those whereby Lenin implcitly gives some 
credibility and authority to subsequent authoritarian developments: 
the phrase 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and its consequences: 
the insistence on the temporary need for the state as an instrument 
of repression; the acceptance that 'bourgeois' norms of distribution 
will temporarily continue and have to be enforced. All these are 
largely specific to the Russian situation, or at least they are in 
the degree of their intensity. Lenin's theses retain their power 
at least to some extent because it is always possible to conceive 
of the attempt at socialist construction taking place in conditions 
much less chaotic and underdeveloped than post-Tsarist Russia. 
The arguments I present will not deal with the openly 
authoritarian echoes that are occasionally present in the text. 
Similarly, the evidence I will seek to present from the history of the 
Soviet state are intended to have general impltations. The evidence 
itself must of necessity refer to a situation where Utopian ideas 
were implemented in an almost 'worst possible case' situationo 
But it E my contention that the arguments this evidence seeks to 
illustrate are in no way confined to the exigencies of such a 
difficult situationo What follows may be read as relevant to 
utopian politics under~ conditions 9 even the 'best possible case 9 9 
and the reader is invited to bear this consideration in mind at all 
points. 
The Problem of Bureaucracy 
The State and Revolution argues that it is possible to establish 
a state which will be more democratic than any previously conceived. 
Partly this will derive from the fact that the state will be for the 
first time the property of the majority, not a minority. But this 
assumption alone will not produce the profoundly radical concept of 
democracy that Lenin has in mind. It will, perhaps, make possible a 
state that is less repressive, less secretive, less manipulative, less 
repulsive, and the implications ofthat change might in themselves be 
profoundly emancipatory. But such a limited conception of the new 
regime was not Lenin's; in fact, the reformist Social Democratic 
parties already adhered to such a vision. They anticipated the day 
when the mass working class parties would attain control of the state 
by means of the franchise. Lenin, it is well known, rejected their 
perspective by insisting on the unreliability of the bourgeois state 
machine: it would resist, sabotage, and destroy social=democratic 
movements that appeared to be within reach of majority office. It 
was consequently, he argued, necessary to 'smash the state machine'o 
But Lenin does not recommend the most straightforward alternative: 
that would necessitate little more than replacing the staff of the state 
apparatus with those loyal to the new regimeo It is unnecessary to 
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limit the aim to this$ The conditions are present that make it 
possible to reject the very idea of the modern state. 
His fundamental assumption concerns the functions of the state: 
a socialist society will cause a radical reduction in those functionso 
This, then, is the conceptual starting point for the model of the 
radical state that will be elaborated in the pages of the text: 
"Capitalist culture has created large scale production, 
factories, railways, the postal services, telephones, etc., 
and on this basis the great majority of the functions of the 
old 'state power' have become so simplified and can be reduced 
to such exceedingly si@ple operations of registration, filing, 
and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate 
person ••• A witty German Social-Democrat of the seventies of the 
last century called the postal service an example of the socialist 
economic system. This is very true. At present the postal 
service is a business organised along the lines of a state 
capitalist monopoly. Imperialism is gradually transforming all 
trusts into organisations of a similar type ••• Once we have 
overthrown the capitalists ••• and smashed the bureaucratic 
machine of the modern state, we shall have a splendidly equipped 
mechanism ••• which can very well be set going by the united 
workers themselves, who will hire technicians, foremen, and 
accountants, and pay them all workmen's wages." (1) 
Only a minimum of the functions that the capitalist state performs 
are therefore actually necessary. The greater part of that apparatus 
is devoted to a task that will clearly be redundant in the future 
society: the oppression of the working class: 
"The imperialist war has immensely accelerated and 
intensified the process of transformation of monopoly 
capitalism into state monopoly capitalism. The monstrous 
oppression of the working people by the state, which is merging 
more and more with the all-powerful capitalist associations, 
is becoming increasingly monstrous. The advanced countries ••• 
are becoming military convict prisons for the workers." 
Thus 9 when Lenin ~ later confronted with the fact of 
bureaucratisation in the state that he established after the revolution 
he attributed it to a specific cause that had nothing in common with 
the capitalist ~tate regimes. The soviet bureaucracy was the product 
of economic badkwardness: 
(2) 
11 ln our country bureaucratic practices have different 
economic roots, namely the atomised and scattered state of 
the small producer with his poverty, illiteracy, lack of 
culture, the absence of roads and exchange between agriculture 
and industry , the absence of connection and interaction between 
Lenin's argument stands in contrast to other work on the problem 
of bureaucracy that was developing during the same period. Lenin is 
not noted as the most penetrating theorist of this problem; that 
mantle must fall to Max Weber. Weber's work took a contrary line 
to that of Lenin. He suggested that the phenomenom of the state 
had taken on a new complexity, not simplicity. Weber postulated a 
link between development and bureaucracy by suggesting the extension 
of administrative tasks in qualitative and quantitative forms. The 
1 qu~litative 1 argument proposes that: 
them •• 
"It is obvious that~chnically the great modern state is 
absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basiso The larger 
the state, and the more it is or the more it becomes a great 
power state, the more unconditionally is this the case. The 
United States bears the character of a polity which, at least 
in the technical sense, is not fully bureaucratized. But the 
greater the zones of friction with the outside and the more 
urgent the needs for administrative unity at home, the more 
this character is inevitably and gradually giving way formally 
to the bureaucratic structure. 11 ( 4) 
Lenin's argument may be considered immune to this thesis. It 
was no part of his conscious aim to achieve 'great power' status for 
Russia and his vision of a socialist and fraternal world system, while 
naive, cannot be accused of any lack of coherence with his theory of 
the declining tasks of the state. This, however, will not prove to 
be the case with the other core of his thesis: the effect of 
industrialisation and modernizationo Weber's argument on the 
'qualitative' development of administrative tasks suggests that: 
(3) 
"••o increasing bureaucratization is a function of the 
increasing possession of goods used for consumption 9 and an 
increasingly sophisticated technique of fashioning external 
life - a technique which corresponds to the opportunities 
provided by such wealtho This reacts upon the standard of 
1 i_11i ng "1nrl mal-':as fnr :.n incrsasing suLjtH.;tiv(;l llil.lispensibili ty 
of organised, collective, inter=local 9 and thus bureaucratic~ 
provision for the most varied of wants, which previously were (S) 
either unknown, or were satisfied locally or by a private economy." 
The disagreement between the assumptions of Lenin and of Weber 
could therefore not be sharper. For Weber, the space for bureaucracy 
is provided by the disappearance of the 'small-scaled and scattered 
producer', the increase in literacy and education, the rise in the 
general level of culture, the extension of methods of communication 
and the growing interdependence of the various sectors of the economy. 
It is now perhaps easy to assert the superiority of Weber's 
diagnosis over Lenin's. But it is also clear that the evidence for 
this argument was already present at the time both men were writing. 
The governments of all re~ively modernised societies were coming to 
a real~tion thBtthe traditional and limited tasks of administration 
were being replaced by something rather more complex and intractable. 
These traditional tasks indeed amounted to little more than 
'registration, filing, and checking' in the performance of 
essentially limited tasks. But the nature of the new administrative 
problematic was charactecised by a change in function: the 
administrative machine would have a much greater role in the guidance 
and resolution of conflicts of competing interests, and of performance 
of problematic t~ which had previously been the domain of the 
automatic and unconscious processes of culture and civil society. 
Family and community had performed the tasks now undertaken by the 
nascent welfare systems of Britain and Germany, had performed them 
according to norms and calculations unquantifiable in terms of rational 
administrative processes. Similarly, Lenin mistook his object when 
considering the 'economic system' itselfo Functionallyp an economic 
system, capitalist or socialist, is a mechanism for the allocation 
of economic resources and the distribution of rewards from those 
resourceso Lenin seems to suggest that the economic problem that 
can be resolved by the adoption of the model of the 'postal service' 
is simply one of efficiency: where the multi-faceted confusions of 
the competitive mechanism have been removed, there is no 'economic' 
problem of organisationo However,the problem remains that the 
capitalist mechanism, in the form of the market, accomplished the 
task of allocation and distribution of rewards and resources which 
still remains as a task to be performed, in the absence of the marketo 
Confident assertions of the possibility of extending the 0 postal 0 
model to embrace the whole of the economy ignore the fact that the 
absence of a market forces the state to inherit a task of immense 
complexity a Again 9 it is the case that such problems were already 
being presented to the European capitalist states 9 not least in the 
problems of economic management arising from the experience of total waro 
The fact that all these tasks had been autonomously fulfilled by 
family 9 community 9 and market did not make their execution one whit 
less complicated once they became the province of the rationalised 
procedures of administrative processeso Lenin's framework was not 
equipped to cope with these considerations; and it is of course 
arguable that precisely these considerations made themselves very 
strongly felt in short order, playing no small part in the multiplication 
of tasks that was to fall to the Soviet government in its formative 
years. The process of industrialization updn which all Russian 
revolutionaries were determined to embark could not but emphatically 
contribute to the decisive destruction of non-administrative means of 
social provision, involving as it did large-scale rural depopulation; 
destruction of traditional forms of social organisation, and rapid 
occupational mobility. And the allocation of resources to competing 
interests within the fields of social provision and economic activity 
is a decision~making process: it is more than the simply mechanical 
processes of 'registration, filing, and checking.v 
Weber believed that the nature of even the simple and routine 
tasks provided a basis of power for the administrators that was 
potentially dangerous. If it can be further established that the 
complexity and technical content of these tasks increases to the 
point of transformation as development proceeds, such dangers are 
obviously mangified. It is necessary at this point, therefore, to 
take note of these dangers as Weber initially defined them. 
Weber's Bureaucracy 
Weber defined a series of features which gave his concept of 
bureaucracy a specific character. The following account of these 
features is by no means exhaustive, but provides the elements that 
this argument will attempt to bring to bear on Lenin's model. 
According to Weber, a modern state exists where a political community 
possesses the characteristics of an administrative and legal order 
that is subject to change by legislation; an administrative apparatus 
that conducts official business in accordance with legislative 
regulation; binding authority over all persons and over most actions 
taking place within its jurisdiction; the legitimation to use force 
within this area if coercion is permitted or prescribed by legal authoritye 
The legal authority of the modern state thus implies that: 
(i) Any norm may be enacted as law ~ith the claim and 
expectation that it will be obeyed by all those who are 
subject to the authority of the political community. 
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(ii) The law as a whole constitutes a system of abstract rules, 
and governmental administration is bounded by rules of law 
and conducted in accordance with generally formulated 
principles that are approved or at least accepted. 
(iii) The people who occupy positions of authority are not 
personal rulers, but superiors who temporarily hold 
an office by virtue of which they possess limited authority. 
(iv} The people who obey the legally constituted authority do 
so as citizens, not subjects, and obey the law rather 
than the official who enforces it. 
Where the rule of law thus pre~ils, a bureaucratic organisation 
is governed by the following principles: 
(i) Official business is conducted on a continuous basis. 
(ii) It is conducted according to the rules that (a) the duty 
of each official to do certain types of work is delimited 
in terms of impersonal criteria, (b) the official is given 
the authority necessary to carry out his assigned functions, 
(c) the means of compulsion at his disposal are strictly 
limited, and the conditions of their legitimate employment 
are clearly defined. 
(iii) Every official's responsibilities and authority are part 
of a hierarchy of authority. (fi) 
Weber then analysed the dangers presented by this social 
institution: the institution itself has certain regrettable features. 
Bureaucracy is part and parcel of the process of 'dis-enchantment' 
that was central to his work. Bureaucratic decision-making tends, 
by definition to be 'inflexible'. It is difficult to adapt the 
processes of rationalised thought to particular cases of particular 
individuals, when this might be precisely what is required if a humane 
and sensible decision is to be reached. We might consequently feel 
ambiguous about: 
" the ~ld-typc r~l8r who ~3 mo~ad ~y 
favour 9 grace, and gratitude ••• " 
when faced with the modern bureaucrat who adheres rigidly to 
established rules andthe principle of calculability 9 sometimes to 
the point of obvious absurdity. This 'depersonalization' of 
decision-making underlies the common complaints about 'faceless 
bureaucrats'. 
A further regrettable 9 and at times apparently irresistable 9 
feature of the bureaucracy is the tsndency to "the concentration of 
the means of administration." The general tendency for pre~modern 
forms of social provision and decision to be 9 on their own direction 9 
replaced by bureaucratic forms may sweep up in its flood such forms 
that are still viable and should not be relinquished. Not all 
administrative functions must by their nature be performed by state 
officials; many may reasonably be claimed by those involved in the 
institutions of a local, voluntary or autonomous nature. But the 
bureaucracy has an impulse to absorb all these 9 an impulse which it 
may be difficult to refuse because that bureaucracy can so often do 
the task more efficiently and cheaply. Or at least, it can pretend 
so 9 even if its real colonising power derives only from the momentum 
of the already established bureaucratic machine. 
These two problems are inevitable when a bureaucracy does no 
more than strictly follow its prescribed and legitimate role. 
However, we are faced with a far greater set of problems in the 
possibility of the bureaucracy overstepping the boundaries that a 
democratic society would wish to set for it. Bureaucracies may 
move into a realm where they have no right to be: they may aggregate 
to themselves powers of political decision-making. 
If there is any normative content to Weber's work on bureaucracy 
it must be understood as a theory of appropriate limitations. Weber's 
work does not propose a rejection of the bureaucratic insttiution: 
such a rejection would be an impotent gesture 9 and he had anyway clearly 
spelled out that bureaucracy cam as p8rt of a historical 1 package 1 o 
Modernisation brings improved health 9 genuine popular access to 
education, a standard of living previously denied to all but a small 
majority, a rise in the level of culture and opportunities, and so on. 
It also brings bureaucracy. This is, at least in part, a coste But 
before the cost is judged, the value of the commodities it pays for 
must be appreciated. Of this basic value, Weber seems to have had 
little doubt. 
Weber also pointed out that the rise of bureaucracy was associated 
with the rise of democracy. Bendix summarised the argument: 
"Bureaucracy developed with the support of democratic 
movements that demanded equality before the law and legal 
guarantees against arbitrariness in judicial and administrative 
decisions ••• In meeting these demands bureaucratic organisations 
had a levelling effect: the people subject to the law and the (B) 
officials who exercised authority under the law became formally equal." 
This did not tempt Weber to anodyne and vacuous conclusions about 
the innocuous nature of bureaucratic power. Weber's theory establishes 
two symbiotic but distinct domains. As we shall see, problems ominous 
for democracy arise from the blurring of divisions between these domains, 
or the colonising of one domain by the other. One domain is that of 
bureaucratic administration, which is ruled by the considerations of 
rationality nnd calculability: it is the domain of instrumental values, 
and its responsibility is to seek the most effective and economical 
implementation of policies and decisions that have been arrived at 
elsewhere. It coexists with the public, or political, domain. 
This domain cannot expect its policies to arrive from elsewhere. 
Those decisions are the prerogative of the political domain and of 
no other. It is here th~the basic value-orientations of the 
society must be determined, and this 9 ideally 9 is achieved by a 
process of 'discursive will-formation 9 9 as Habermas has termed ito 
This distinction is an important one for Weber, who speaks to 
the widespread fear of bureaucracies that exists in the modern world. 
It is common in popular culture and in radical political theory to 
conceive of bureaucracy only as a standing abuse to the principles 
and practice of democracy. For Weber, it is the relationship between 
bureaucrat and politician that is crucial. For while the latter is 
legally master, the relationship is easily tilted. Experts de facto 
carve out for themselves spheres of discretion and control despite 
their formal subordination to a political will: 
"Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully 
developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political 
master' finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante• (g) 
who stands opposite the 'expert' •••" 
Given that day-to-day authority rests in the hands of the 
administrators, every public political struggle in which a politician 
engages - election, parliamentary vote must, if successful, be 
followed by a private struggle to ensure imple~entation by the 
bureaucracy. If the politician is the loser in such a struggle 
and it is, as we have pointed out, often an uneven one - then the 
bureaucracy has usurped the process of political decision-making. 
Bureaucracies have a "fundamental tendency to turn all problems of 
politics into problems of administration."(lO) 
Gouldner has attempted to elaborate more fully the source of 
the bureaucrat's power over the politician: this power may be seen 
as undergoing subtle but profound changes as the bureaucracy responds 
to changing tasks. The ability of the traditional bureaucratic 
official to eseape from political control was a function of the 
complexity of the tasks assigned 9 however routine and mundane the 
skills involved in the performance of those tasks might have been. 
In most instances 9 the old bureaucrat conformed to Lenin's picture 
of the regulator 9 the filer, the checker. He was: 
" ••• designed to be an agent 9 uncritically obedient to the 
organisation's top managers ••• the old bureaucrat's skills 
are often little more than being able to read, write, file, (ll) 
and are limited to their employing bureaucracy." 
But the rise of the 'modern' bureaucracy makes it less and less 
a clerical phenomenom, and increasingly part of an intelligentsiae 
This 'technical intelligentsia' possess 'extensive cultural capital 0 9 
which 'increases their mobility', and thus their potential independence 
from and lack of subordination to the specific norms of a bureaucratic 
culture: 
"The technical intelligentsia .... is controlled by those 
incompetent to judge its performance and whose control, 
therefore, it experiences as irrational ••• In contrast to 
the bureaucrats ••• the intelligentsia seek nothing for its 
own sake, gives reasons without invoking authority, and regards 
nothing as settled once and for all. To them, nothing is 
exempt from re-examination. Unlike the bureaucrats, the 
intelligentsia are not 'ritualists' pursuing something without 
regard for effectiveness." 
If the power of the old bureaucracy rested on its 'mystery', 
its detailed knowledge of the procedures and possibilities, the 
history and the complexity, of the administrative apparatus, the 
power of the new bureaucracy derives from contrary themes. The new 
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bureaucracy possesses an interrogative capacity. This perhaps makes 
it less susceptible to the routinism of formal rationality and 
secrecy that Weber identified as the inherent failing of bureaucracy; by 
the same token, however, it describes an administrative machine that 
can possess an ethic of independence and decision-making that is 
strongly counterposed to the idea of control by political masters. 
Indeed 9 Gouldner sees this new potential as intimately connected with 
the attempt of a new ruling class to establish itselfo Prerogatives 
of political=decision-making will be claimed with increasing openness 9 
and not just assumed by stealth. The viability of this prognosis is 
a matter for debate 9 but it is clear that if Gouldner's typology of 
the new bureaucracy is close to the truth 9 the problems of democratic 
control can only be intensifiedo 
Bureaucracy in The State and Revolution 
For Lenin economic development demanded a reduction in the tasks 
and responsibilities of the stateo It is then perhaps not surprising 
that to the developments in the European state form in the early 
twentieth century 9 which included the first major attempts at welfare 
provision 9 economic management and planning 9 and political 
participation 9 he can only ascribe a uniformly negative charactero 
But if it is accepted that Lenin's conception of the tasks that any 
state must at a minimum perform is inadequate, the consequences must 
be examined. Such a weakness must put in question the integrity of 
the model of the radical state that he expoundedo We must consider 
whether Lenin's prescriptions for democratic control 9 for policing 
the power 9 and the boundaries 9 of the bureaucracy, are rendered 
unacceptably naive by this growth of the administrative functione 
Despite his extremely modest assessment of the functions of the 
modern state apparatus 9 Lenin ~aware of the tendency of the 
administrative organs to establish their own autonomy - whether in 
their separate territories or over society as a wholeo However 9 
when he turns to this it appears that it is the issue over which he 
feels least impelled to extend or improve in the writings of Marx 
and Engels. He gives a lengthy quotation from Engels: 
"Against this transformation of the state and the organs 
of the state from servants of society into masters of society 
an inevitable transformation in all previous states - the 
Commune used two infallible means. In the first place, it 
filled all posts = administtative 9 judicial 9 and educational 9 by 
;:Jlcction and on the b<:J::;i;;; uC UlliV8J.·::>etl suffrage of all cont;er·ned 
subject to recall at any time by the electors. And 9 in the 
second place, it paid all officials 9 high or low 9 only the wages 
received by other workersooo In this way a dependable barrier to 
place-hunting and careerism was set up, even apart from the 
binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies 9 (l3 ) 
which were added besideso••" 
The theme of 'careerism' and 'place-hunting' is a pregnant one: 
it replicates the mistaking of the object that Lenin's critique of 
bureaucracy has already shown. After Engels' comments Lenin 
underlines the centrality of this problem for him: a career in 
bureaucracy is no more than an avenue to economic gains of the most 
vulgar kinds: 
"••• if careerism is to be abolished completely, it must 
be made impossible for 'honourable' though profitless posts in 
the Civil Service to be used as a springboard to highly 
lucrative posts in banks or joint-stock companies, as (l4 ) 
constantly happens in all the freest capitalist countries." 
It is in fact remarkable that the only prescription for the 
control of officials that receives detailed attention - some two 
full pages is that of the reduction of "the remuneration of all 
servants of the state to the level of 'workman's wages'" (20). 
The unquestionably more complex issues of the election of all officials, 
the constant right of recall, and the necessity for binding mandates 
for delegates, receive no further elaboration. Lenin's 
thought in this whole area is constantly voided of relevance to the 
real problem by the re-emergence of a theory of motivation cast solely 
in terms of casho 
It is of some interest that Trotsky's theory of the bureaucracy, 
markedly more sophisticated in its argument and elaboration than 
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Lenin's, written in the middle of the '30's, replicates t~is basic 
fallacy. Trotsky, in his concern to pronounce anathema on the 
Soviet bureaucracy, stressed the 'parasitic' nature of that bureaucracy. 
It had, he stressed, no necessary role in the process of production, 
no economic role at all. Its interests were divorced from its 
function: that is, it had a natural interest in maintaining its 
privileged access to consumption in a situation of grave material 
scarcity, and to secure this practically 'invented' a job for itself. 
Mouzelis has summed up the thesis: 
"Trotsky holds to the basic Marxist position: a social 
class always has its roots in the sphere of production, the 
domination of one class over another is essentially an economic 
domination which reflects itself in the legal, political, and 
ideological sphere. If" this is so,the Soviet bureaucracy does 
not constitute a social class, and its domination has a purely 
political non-economic character. Indeed, the economic roots 
of the bureaucracy are very weak. If the bureaucrats regulate 
the distribution of income, they are very far from regulating 
production. Thus the function of the bureaucracy in the 
productive process is not organic. It disposes of the means 
of production only by delegation. And this fact makes the 15 
situation of the bureaucrat uncertain and his domination precarious."( ) 
It is difficult to conceive of what the Soviet bureaucracy were 
doing during Stalin's 'second revolution' which launched the 
collectivization and industrialization processes if they were not 
'regulating production'. 
It is not intended here to engage in the dubiously useful debate 
as to whether that bureaucracy actually constitutes a class. What is 
interesting is, again, how Trotsky's immense labours on the problem, 
and indeed, the sincerity with which he condemns the bureaucracy for 
its gigantic 'betrayals', and later 'crimes', end up in a minimisation 
of the problem itself. Lenin's solution to the process of 
bureaucratisation is modest: maintain standards of behaviour until 
rescued by the development of the forces of production and the elevation 
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of the nation's culture. When the bureaucratic corruption of the 
USSR was finally borne in on Lenin, his only solution was to intensify 
the concent~ation of power • It was impossible to distribute power, 
.Lnasmuch as the source of the corruption came from sources external 
to the state machine itself. We can recall Lenin's definition of 
the roots of the bureaucratic problem: economic underdevelopment. 
Translated into political sociology, this meant the penetration of 
the administrative strata by the 'low cultural level' of the populace, 
in particular of the peasantry. In such a situation, Lenin's answer 
to the problem of bureaucracy was, in Lewin's words, that: 
"It was necessary, therefore, to fall back on the more (l 6) 
advanced workers, on the proletarian elite, or rather, on the Party." 
In the light of our previous argument, this was, of course, 
to make the cure worse than the disease. 
Trotsky made a defence of the Soviet a central part of his 
programme for combatting bureaucracy, and as such the institution 
occupies an important place in the 1927 Platform of the Joint 
Opposition. Yet what is clear is that Trotsky can propose no 
constitutional or institutional changes to the existing state of 
affairs. The oppositionists are reduced to anod~1e suggestions 
whose guarantee of implementation lies only in willpower and good 
faith. It is necessary to "adopt a firm policy of struggle with 
officialdom", to wage this struggle on the basis "of a consistent 
development of workers' democracy in the party, trade unions, and 
Soviets" ("as Lenin would"); it is necessary to "adopt a slogan", 
to "heighten class activity", to "draw the broad mass of people in", 
to "bring it about" that the working people are "convinced by 
experience" that the State institutions are on their side. Even 
the constitutional demand for "a complete stop to the removal of 
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elected Soviet officials" is rendered vacuous by the proviso 
"except in the case of real and absolute necessity."(l]) 
Trotsky'S solution later became profoundly radical: a political 
nuL cl ~ulutiwt uf ~uch 
magnitude is, paradoxically, just as simple as Lenin's ~and as mis-
directed. Such an act of brutal rupture could certainly have removed 
that specific bureaucracy at that specific time; but only if that 
bureaucracy is seen as the unique product of a unique conjuncture will 
such a solution satisfy. For if the re-establishment of a stable 
situation were once again to present complex tasks which demanded the 
operation of those necessary functions which the bureaucracy had indeed 
performedp the situation returns to square one. The inadequacy of 
both Lenin and Trotsky's solutions is perhaps voiced in the failure 
of either to take root in the USSR. 
An unsophisticated anti-bureaucratism ends up conspiring with the 
bureaucracy in the maintenance of its power. Lenin sees bureaucracy 
in terms of careerism, which allows the bureaucrat to 'cash in' his 
service to the state through directorships. Trotsky sees that the 
bureaucracy of an administered society has direct access to material 
privilege. Both construe the ;motivation of the bureaucrat as economic 
gain. Their inability to avoid this reductionism of the bureaucratic 
interest to somethhg outside the specific function of the bureaucrat 
robs them of the insight that has made an alternative body of work, 
from Weber to Habermas, so fruitful. That insight involves the 
recognition that the bureaucrat, - expert, administrator, or 
intellectual technician - derives a motivation from the function he 
performs, and a power from the necessity of that function and the skills 
that he possesses to fulfill it. Thus a reasoned understanding of 
the problem of bureaucracy depends upon an acceptance of the necessity 
of the function of that group, rather than an assertion of it as an 
unambiguous evil. 
-85-
Lenin's "right of recall" will not overcome the power and moral 
authority granted to the bureaucrat who can lay claim to some measure 
of expertise. If the power of the bureaucrat comes from knowledge, 
procedures designed to monitor a situation where the only commodity 
involved is power itself. Power» construed as simple authority 
deriving from the holding of office, can easily be transferred from 
one holder to the other. Power deriving from the possession of 
knowledge and skills may exerciGe two defenses against such simple 
control procedures: the bureaucrat has the power of 'sabotage' in 
its widest sense, i.e. he can extract concessions in return for the 
obedient fulfillment of his functions; and the citizen will be 
vulnerable to an awareness of the imbalance in the power relationship 
he inhabits with the bureaucrat, and thus grant to the bureaucrat 
licence to perform his tasks without constant supervision. Thus to 
set up crude mechanisms of control as a result of seeing the bureaucrat's 
power as deriving only from authority is to allow the genuine power of 
the bureaucrat to garner strength unchecked by realistic balances. 
Only as a result of conceeding to the bureaucracy its genuine, 
legitimate, and distinct functions, can one begin to determine the 
boundaries of its powers and construct political control procedures 
that may successfully police those boundaries. It is this concern 
with 'bureaucratic forms' as necessary objects of analysis which is 
almost entirely absent from the work of Lenin and Engels. The 
Engels/Lenin model has further problems. I have just suggested that 
the misunderstanding of the nature of bureaucratic power is likely to 
result in the mechanism of recall, etc. P falling into disuse. This» 
as everp is not ah absolute case. We can consider the possible 
effects where such measures do in fact become the norms of political 
practice. 
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It is worth noting, to start with, that the consequent 
instability of office-holders will obviously hinder the smooth working 
of an apparatus whose functions are by definition continuous. It will 
:i.un.her seL l1.mits upon the fr-eedom of action of the official - indeed 
it is designed to achieve precisely that. Clearly the possibility of 
a conflict between the general interest and the particular interest, 
however these are construed, does arise. A state machine that is 
avowedly charged with the task of administering a transition from an 
old way of life to a new one will face this problem rather acutely. 
The industrialization process itself unfortunately has the character 
of a 'command' situation, just as does any attempt to affect radical 
social and cultural change in an already developed economy. To 
propose no judgements on the moral acceptability of such attempts; 
the attempt itself simply raises issues of conflict between the 
interests on each side of the attempt. It should be recognised that 
when the position of the bureaucrat is unstable and temporary, as it 
would inevitably be under the Commune formula, the curse of 'careerism' 
could become a genuine one. I have suggested that such concepts are 
not very helpful in understanding the culture and motivation of an 
established administrative stratum. But a situation where position 
is constantly threatened could well have the consequence of making the 
official constantly concerned about how to maintain his position; his 
knowledge of the indispensibility of his particular skills in the face 
of popular ignorance could only reinforce an opportunist and populist 
attitude to those who held power over him. 
He are thus faced with the possibility of corruption becoming an 
institutionalised practice: by corruption I mean a tendency to give 
undue weight to the interests of prominent and powerful in the decision-
making process. The removal of the membrane between the world of 
rational administration and the world of value-laden practical interests 
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which is involved in Engels' proposal harbours the risk that the 
latter will overwhelm the former: not by a considered process of 
political change, but by counterposing opinion to legality. 
Bureaucrats may by such means be prevented from actions which their 
electors find unpalatable. They may also be induced to initiate 
actions which their constituents find desirable, but are not in fact 
within the powers granted to them by whatever constitutional processes 
the society has seen fit to construct. 
De Tocqueville noted such possibilities in his study of the 
society which makes the widest use of the principle of election to 
administrative office: 
"In general the American functionaries are far more 
independent than the French civil officers within the sphere 
which is prescribed to them. Sometimes even they are allowed 
by popular authority to exceed these bounds; and as they are 
protected by the opinion and backed by the cooperation, of the 
majority, they venture upon manifestations of their power as 
astonish a European. By this means are formed habits in the 
heart of a free country whUch may some day prove fatal to its 
liberties." (18) 
Such weaknesses in Engels' scheme can only be dismissed in a model of 
society which presumes a degee of conflict far more limited than is 
reasonable. It rnus t presuppose within the citizenry the existence 
of a single will, with conflict arising, if at all, only between 
citizenry and bureaucracy. 
Rousseau asserted the existence of such a 'general will'. 
However, the general will was an entity apparent only in the 
functioning of small-scale city states like his adopted Geneva; and 
the larger a state or nation became, the more likely was the 
possibility of 'dysfunctional' dissidence arising. For this purpose 
it was necessary for Rousseau to make a distinction between the 
'general will' and the 'will of all'. The latter is the sum of 
'particular wills', which may be misled, while the 'general will' 
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derives only from an original contract and from the subsequent 
accumulated wisdom of a developing society, which cannot fall into 
error. Nuch has been made of the ambiguity of Rousseau's legacy 
the Soviet regime's legitimation process 
The history of the Soviet regime is the history of the 
construction of a general will. It had to be constructed, it was 
not given. The general will was constructed by firstly defining 
certain classes of people as non- citizens i.e. class enemies, and 
then emodying in the B olshevil< Party the quality of the 'accumulated 
wisdom' which constituted the general will as against the 'will of 
all' that might arise from the 'contradictions among the people.' 
This derived from the possession of 'scientific' marxism. Differences 
within the leadership of the Bolshevik regime in its early years were 
disagreements over the interpretation of the general will, not over 
the legitimacy of such a concept as the basis of the state. It may,however, 
be argued that the usurpation of power by a bureaucracy was rooted in 
their substitution of an incorrect version of the general will for a 
correct one. 
Lenin's strictures on the grm.;th of a bureaucratic culture, and 
Trotsky's later attempts to attribute the consolidation of bureaucracy 
to a matter of self-interest of a mattrially privileged stratum are 
examples of such arguments. But such views simply continue the 
legitimation of the bureaucracy: it possesses the general will, it 
assumes omniscience in the determination of values as well as 
techniques. Lenin and Trotsky criticise the bureaucracy for mis-
interpreting the general will, (i.e. l.'larxism), or reading their self-
interests as identical to the general will. But the real error lies 
in their possession of the right to determine the general \vill at all, 
and that error is inescapable as long as the idea of a general will 
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itself is not rejected as politically authoritarian and sociologically 
nonsensical. 
A bureaucracy that has acquired illegitimate power is one that 
nas short:-circui ted the normal processes of the articulation and 
resolution of conflicts that are properly the domain of a public 
sphere. We have seen that bureaucracies contain natural tendencies 
to this as a result of wider developments in t~..rentieth century 
economy, society, and culture. But for such tendencies to be con-
summated, other determinations must be present. One such tendency 
is simply the cultural legitimation of such a domination. Whatever 
the material and conjunctural conditions that constrained Soviety 
society in its early years - and much has been made of this by 
observers - the weight of this cultural legitimation must be appreciated. 
It was not the bureaucracy that had to provide this culture legitimation, 
it was provided in full measure by the culture of Bolshevism. 
The Bolsheviks had a particular and specific theory of political 
differences. Political differences among the citizenry were defined 
as either the rem1ants of alien class forces, or as symptoms of in-
adequate political culture demanding educational correction, or as 
historical 'contradictions among the people' which in time would find 
a suitable 'aufhebung' at the hands of economic development. At 
various times in the early history of the USSR the response to 
political problems in the public sphere involved one, or a combination, 
of these three options. If particular initiatives were identifiable 
as directly or indirectly the product of bourgeois forces, repression 
provided a straight-forward answer: as with non-Bolshevik parties 
and institutions from the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 
onwards. Krons tadt is the most obvious example. With issues where 
the enemy and source was not so immediately personally identifiable, 
as with the situation resulting from 'War Communism' Qnd leading to 
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the N.E.P., the problems we~e handled with a combination of direct 
repression, educational initiatives, and administrative and policy 
adjustments to ameliorate the conditions of the unhappy peasantry. 
An ex~..:eption to tins 'admin.Lstcatlve pol1tics' may be tound in 
some of the arguments of Bukharin. It may be significant that 
Bukharin was one of the few Bolsheviks who had any acquaintance with 
contemporary developments in European social theory. He was clearly 
familiar with the work of Michels and ~~eber, and was prepared to quote 
Weber in support of his arguments in 'Historical Materialism', albeit 
only in the more academic parts of his argument. Tbe last pages of 
that work take the form of an attempted refutation of f'.1ichels' 
theories of bureaucracy. (l9) Clearly Bukharin would have had only a 
hostile response to suggestions that the problems these writers 
discussed were relevant to the problems of the USSR. But it is 
perhaps not too much to assume that Bukharin might have from this 
encounter absorbed some of the important and relevant insights 
embodied in their work. 
For it is only in Bukharin that we faintly hear any echo of 
the real problems cr bureaucracy, politics, and industrialisatinn. 
Those who are commonly regarded as the natural and democratic 
opponents of Lenin's bureaucracy shared the same naive assumptions as 
Lenin, demonstrating a resurgent intolerance. The Workers' Opposition 
of 1921 stressed heavily the need for a purge to effect the wholesale 
removal of non-proletarian elements from the Party; the Democratic 
Centralists proposed measures to guarantee high proletarian 
' . (20) 
representat1on on party comm1ttees. Their analysis of the 
problem of bureaucracy here foreshadmved Lenin's: the guarantee of 
democracy lay in the preservation of the purity of an elite, albeit 
an elite as widely defined as consisting of a whole class. 
In the wal{e of the Kronstadt revolt, the Bolsheviks solution to 
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political crisis was, in Daniel's tvords "both repression and compromise"; 
" compromise with the non-proletarian elements whose 
interests had suffered most under War Communism, but a 
campaign of extirpation against the critics on the Left ••• " (21) 
The compromise involved was that of NEP. For Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, these compromises were of a specific kind. They involved 
the exchange of political rights for economic ones. The peasantry 
would be allowed a degree of freedom of action in selling his surplus 
to markets, and even determining the fate of that surplus, in return 
for accepting the Bolsheviks' monopoly of political power. These 
were concessions granted as purely tactical steps, a retreat in the 
face of necessity, and nothing is clearer in the thoughts of the 
leading Bolsheviks than the understanding that these were temporary 
compromises which would be dispensed with as soon as possible. 
Bukharin's appreciation seems to have been different: 
"Bukharin did not interpret the granting of rights .to 
the peasants as 'concessions', as purely tactical steps. 
In Bukharin's implicit and explicit interpretations, both 
the NEP and the market ceased to be seen as tactical retreats; 
they were good strategy for the entire 'transition period', if 
not longer ••• " (22) 
Such a position, once thought through, would have had major 
implications for the political processes of the Soviet regime, Time 
continued existence of NEP would surely have meant the emergence of 
definite interest groups which would at some point have been able to 
articulate positions - of whatever sort - which \..rould have o:::ntested 
the Bolsheviks claim to define the 'middle-range' objectives and 
policies cf the society. 
The problem at the end of the twenties \..ras that not only were the 
Bolsheviks thus forced to rapid collectivization, the previous policy 
of NEP had generated a distinct interest group - if not a class -
against whose bitter opposition collectivization would have to proceed. 
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The consequences of the decision to resolve this problem are well known. 
But it can be argued that the path that Bukharin suggested would have 
obviated the fantastic human - and economic - losses sustained during 
c> pulicy of fusr:ering agrarian 
capitalism was not incompatible with some degree of diremptive 
industrialisation; nor was it even hostile to the lang-term strategy 
of a socialist society. It was, however, utterly incompatible with 
the maintenance of the Bolshevik monopoly of political power. A group 
as powerfully based economically as the capitalist farmers would have 
become 1-/0uld have demanded some participation in the policy-formulating 
processes of the government. But it is unnecessary to assume - and 
Deutscher points this out in his discussion of the 1928 crisis - that 
such a political group would necessarily have been committed to the 
ending of the socialist project: 
" the peasants had no clear political motives. 
They did not aim at the overthrow of the soviets ••• the 
mass of peasants were driven to apply that peculiar form 
of sabotage (refusing to deliver food to the towns) by 
economic circwnstances." (23) 
It is difficult to knm-1 what might have become of the Soviet 
regime had Bukharin's conception of NEP been accepted, and the 
development of the Soviet economy allowed to proceed in a different 
direction to that imposed on it after 1929. Lewin argues that NEP 
1-1as bound up with certain 'nonstatist' consequences: cultural and 
relative political pluralism, curtailment of the terror apparatus, 
the absence of a too rigid ideology. More definitively: 
"1.Jhereas NEP had erected an elaborate legal edifice 
and seriously strived to achieve 'socialist legality', during 
the Five Year Plan this framework was utterly destroyed and (Z 4) 
replaced by a system of extralegal, crude coercion and mass terror." 
This may well be an overstatement of the benefits that NEP brought; 
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compared with the period of War Communism that preceded it and the 
'Second Revolution' that followed, it is bound to appear as an oasis 
of legality and civilization in a desert of arbitrariness. Even in 
NEP we are still tcillQng about a political process almost hermetically 
confined to the Bolshevik Elite. Nevertheless Bukharin's model of 
NEP in the 'transition' underlines the 'elective affinities' between 
the existence of differing interest groups and the viability, even 
necessity, of relatively open and democratic political processes. It 9 
conversely, underlines the consequences of the orthodox Bolshevik 
interpretation of NEP: just as in the economic field any concessions 
Here merely temporary 'retreats', so in the political field any 
cm1sequent liberalisation was counted as a clear cost, not a gain. 
The contrast between Bukharin and mainstream Bolshevik thought 
is nowhere clearer than in the discussion of the problem of bureaucracy. 
l3y the end of the twenties, Lenin's primitive analysis had become an 
article of faith. In 1929 the Central Committee submitted to the 
16th Party Congress the first - and probably the last - resolution 
specifically devoted to the problem of combatting bureaucratism, 
In presenting it to the Congress, Yavkovlev, the Deputy Commissar of 
the Rabkrin reaffirmed the m1alysis of the problem: 
"He who is against industrialization, he who is against 
collectiv~tion, stands, whether he means or does not mean to,( 2S) for the perpetuation of the roots of bureaucratism." 
Lewin expounds Bukharin's analysis, which was counterposed to 
such "nonsensical ascription of every unpalatable fact of life to 
"bourgeois survivals" or to "petit bourgeois pressures", ( 26) Bukharin 
\'llanted to defend the craftsrnen 9 small merchants, small industrialists, 
and small agricultural producers, as well as cooperative and 
governmental small-scale enterprises and services, against their 
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'crushing' and absorption by the state. For the state to take on 
these tasks unnecessarily, along with the tasks which of necessity 
it had assumed due to the government's long term project, was to fuel 
the source of bureaucracy. Bukharin thus made in passing a silent 
acknowledgement of Weber's connection between bureaucracy and 
industrialization 9 and this was clearly connected with his far more 
subtle appreciation of the complexities of Soviet problems. His 
argument, however 9 was subject to furious rebuttals, and what might 
have been the consequences of the insights he uisplayed about NEP 
and about bureaucracy can only be a matter for speculation. It must 
be remembered that it was Bukharin 9 of all the Bolsheviks, who held 
faith with the model of the 'commune state'. In 1928 he reiterated the 
theme: 
"We are far too centralized ; we must ask 
ourselves whether we cannot take a few steps ( 2?) towards Lenin's state of the Commune." 
1-Jhether, given time and experience, he would have arrived ata 
more sophisticated and appropriate model for the correction of the 
mistakes and problems that he saw must similarly remain a matter of 
speculation. For us, the real educational value of Bukharin's 
protests is the light they throw on the a&guments he was opposing. 
None of these responses crossed the threshold that divides 
administration from politics. Administration concerns the carrying 
out of an already determined policy; politics involves the discussion 
and negotiation of such policies. The Bolshevik government de-
legitimised politics within the citizenry. Such differences were 
either criminal (bourgeois class rerrmants) 9 ignorance (low political 
rulture of the masses) 9 or transitory (the peasants were a historically 
doomed class, therefore their grievances had to be catered for, but 
not legitimised). What the Bolsheviks could not do was accept a 
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characterisation of any political differences as genuine, i.e. an 
opinion which a person or group had a right to hold and negotiate 
There 
could be only one genuine politics amongst the masses 9 a politics 
which coincided with the politics of the government, and consequently 
with the administrative bureaucracy. 
Clearly, this is the path to the authoritarian state. Because 
the government and the bureaucracy were already the expression of that 
one genuine politics, and by definition a more coherent and profound 
expression than could be found among the people themselves, the politics 
of the people were rendered redundant. Politically, the people were 
abolished. Thus the analysis suggested here is not the classic model 
of a bureaucracy establishing itself as a ruling class or caste over 
subaltern classes. Such subtle concepts of hegemony are not necessary. 
The bureaucracy necessarily became, not the ruling class, but the only 
class. 
It was, after all, the case that the bureacracy/Party/government 
was the only location where differences could in fact be debated and 
discussed as differences, i.e. debates on practical questions, rather 
than as deviation from an increasingly narrowly constituted and defined 
general will, at least until the logic of domination finally worked 
itself out in the dictatorship of Stalin. Surely the submission of 
all oppositions to the concept of the single party, and, even more 
fatally, the illegitimacy of taking discussions beyond the Central 
Committee, let alone the Party, indicates a tabu whose strength cannot 
only derive from some misguided sense of loyalty or group solidarity. 
To appeal to the masses is to implicitly revive them from the mortuary 
whence they have beenmnsigned by the dictates of the general will: 
it is to call in question the viability of such a general will itself. 
And that is to bring down the whole edifice of legitimation which 
sustained the Bolshevik regime, not the Stalinist faction alone. 
Thus Lenin's possible response to \ueber's problems, his 
simple mechanisms for control of the state 9 are profoundly flawedo 
Instant recall~ administrators initially dissolves the administration 
into the people, and makes them subject to the same norms of political 
interest as obtain in the public sphere. The consequence of that is 
corrupt administration 9 where instrumental rationality is prevented 
from applying in the areas where its writ must 9 for the sake of even~ 
handedness and stability, run. This threatens not only the performance 
of the necessary functions of administration, but, further, the safe-
guarding of the access of minority opinions to the decision-making 
process. If this problem is overcome by the denial of the existence 
of such minority opinions, i.e. by denying the legitimate existence 
of political differences, then the rights of not only minorities, but 
also of the majority are threatened. Only the existence of minorities 
gives meaning to the concept of a majority. A citizenry which 
displays no special and particular interests separate from and even 
discordant with the general interest has no need of politics. And 
thus the rule of the bureacracy is logically ensured and embedded in a 
nation's culture. 
Lenin's Democracy 
Lenin's model does not, however, lack putative institutions for 
the expression of the will of the citizenry. So far 9 the discussion 
has dealt with the administrative machinery and the relationship of 
the citizens to ito Lenin also discusses directly political forms of 
confronting the problem, a substitute for the parliamentary form which 
attempts to fulfill that task in bourgeois democracies. His theme is 
once again taken directly from Marx: 
"'The Commune 1 9 wrote Marx 9 'was to be a working not 
a parliamentary body 9 executive and legislative at the same timeo" 
Lenin expands into a critique of parliamentarism: 
"The way out af parliamentElrism is not 9 of course 9 the 
abolition of representative institutions and the elective 
principle, but~ conversion of the representative 
institutions from talking shops into 'working' bodiesooo 
•A working, not a parliamentary body' = this is a blow 
straight from the shoulder at the present day parliamentElrians 
and parliamentary lap-dogs of Social Democracy! Take any 
parliamentary country, from America to Switzerland, from France 
to Britain 9 Norway 0 and so forth - in these countries the real 
business of state is performed behind the scenes and is carried 
on by the departments, chancelleries and General Staffs. 
Parliament is given up to talk for the special purpose of fooling 
the 'common people'." 
But this criticism applies to radical democratic forms as well. 
Even the Soviets have reproduced the problem: 
"The heroes of rotten philistinism ••• have even succeeded 
in polluting the Soviets after the fashion of the most disgusting 
bourgeois parliamentarism, in converting them into mere talking 
shops. In the Soviets, the 'socialist• Ministers are fooling 
the credulous rustics with phrase-mongering and resolutions. 
In the government itself a sort of permanent shuffle is going 
oo in order that, on the one hand, as many Socialist-
Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as possible may in turn get near 
the 'pie', the lucrative and honourable posts, and that, on the 
other hand, the 'attention' of the people may be 'engaged'. 
Meanwhile, the chancelleries and army staffs 'do' the business 
of 1 state'o (28) 
Lenin proposes an alternative that will negate the possibility of such 
deceptions: 
"The commune substitutes for the venal and rotten 
parliamentarism of bourgeois society institutions in which 
freedom of opinion and discussion does not ~egenerate into 
deception, for the parliamentarians themselves have to work 9 
have to execute their own laws, have themselves to test the 
results achieved in reality, and to account directly to their 
constituentso Representative institutions themselves remain 9 
but there is no parliamentarism here as a special system, as 
the division Of labour between the legislative and the (29 ) 
executive, as a privileged position for the deputies,." 
There is here an intimate connection with previous elements 
of the discussiono If the 'parliamentarians' of the Soviet system 
have to 'execute their own laws' then we are here talking about the 
same people as in the discussion of administrators and bureaucratso 
The section of Lenin's work cited above 9 titled 'The Abolition of 
Parliamentarism 0 is in fact composed mainly of the discussions on the 
'postal service' concept and the payment of 1 workmens wages' etco 
There is clearly no conceptual distinction in Lenin's mind between 
the nature of the 'representative' institutions and any other branch 
of the state apparatus. Lenin is talking about deputies as much as 
about functionaries when he pauses to remind us, immediately after the 
paragraph containing the above quotation, that: 
"It is instructive to note that, in speaking of the 
functions of those officials who are necessary to the 
Commune and for proletarian democracy, Marx compares them 
to the workers of "every other employer'', that is of the 
ordinary capitalist enterprise, with its "workers, foremen, 
and accountants." 
There is no trace of utopianism in Marx, in the sense 
that he made up or invented a 'new' society. No, he studied 
the birth of the new society out of the old, and~e forms of 
transition from the former to the latter, as a natural- ( 3D) historical process ••• " 
This is certainly no utopianism, if Lenin is serious in 
recommending the relationship of wage labour as ideally suited to 
effective democratic institutions. Baudrialard has elaborated a 
persuasive argument here, insisting that Marx's thought ultimately 
fails to be radical because it is no more than the 'mirror of 
production': that is 9 all the fundamental categories upon which Marx 
chose to construct his theory of emancipation were simply the 
categories of the capitalist mode: production, value, humans as 
tool making and labouring animals, t (31) 8 c. His mature criticism 
of existing society was based not upon the rejection of such 
conceptualisations of humanity, but upon a demand that they be allowed 
to speak liberated from the fetters that bourgeois society hypocritically 
laid on them. Baudrillard would argue that it came as no surprise that 
a new society constructed upon such estimations of the human subject 
turned out to be the most obsessively 'productivist' and 'reductionist' 
imaginable. Whatever the virtues of Baudrillard's argument, it is 
certainly striking to note how Lenin's ideas are permeated with, 
firstly, a concept of people as helplessly programmed for the pursuance 
of cash and acquisitions; and, secondly, an admiration of ~e most 
instrumental elements of industrial and factory production as the 
condign mode for the management of human affairs. This most 
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emancipatory and optimistic of documents is based upon a vision of 
human beings perhaps more bleak and demeaning than can be found in 
any previous work of political theorising. 
To return to the substance of Lenin's new version of parliamentarism: 
the suggestion that this is a formula for succesful democratic control 
of governmental machinery is quite vacuous. The elected deputies are 
to be civil servants, ministers, and representatives of their constituents 
at one and the same time. They have to make the laws, carry them out, 
and criticise them. Here Lenin summarily overthrows any previous claim 
he might have had to treating bureaucratisation as a serious problem. 
If he is accepting that there ar~dangerous potentialities in the roles 
of a representative, of a legislator, of a civil servant, and of a 
minister, his answer to those dangers borders on the absurd: conflate 
all these roles into one, embody them in a sjngle individual. No 
grounds are offered for presupposing that the norms of the representative 
would win out against the norms appropriate to the other functions 
allocated to the individual. The only question seems to be of what 
such an individual would die: overwork or multiple schizophrenia. 
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Further, of course, and the implications are major, there is 
here no conceptual space for a parliamentary opposition. Delegates 
are described as being representative 9 leqislators. and executivesa 
A delegate who is only a representative 9 who wishes to bear no 
responsibility for legislation with which he or his constituents 
disagree, but claims the right for his opposing and critical arguments 
to be heard, who refuses both a legislative and executive role, is not 
catered for within such a system. In fact he is specifically ruled 
out: he it would be who conceived parliament as a 'talking shop' and 
his job to go there and talk very sharply against those who were 'doing'. 
So here again we have the insistent emergence of the theme of the im-
possibility of divisions amongst the people: the people must have a 
unitary set of interests and the possibility of political conflict 
which can only come from representatives becoming careerists - is to 
be avoided by the tight bonds between representatives and electors. 
Here the very possibility of party - that is of organisations expressing 
diverse views and value orientations - is abolished long before any 
exigencies of the 'particularly hostile' conjuncture persuaded the 
Bolsheviks to get round to it in practice. Liebman has constructed an 
apparently painstaking account of the reluctant process by which the 
Bolsheviks eradicated the Mensheviks, S.Rs., and anarchists, tragically 
forced to by the pusillanimous and hostile activities of those groupso 
The existence in Bolshevik theory and culture of the norms we have just 
discussed indicates that such an account should be treated with 
considerable caution.( 32 ) 
As Lenin's hermetic model slowly seals itself before our eyes, we 
should perhaps take into account one possible objection. It is wrong 
to consider the Soviet as a single institution on the model of bourgeois 
parliaments. The Commune is after all a local body, both in linguistic 
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origin and arguably in Marx 0s original intent. Is there not therefore 
a possibility of oppositional politics proceeding through local 
oppositions to central authority? 
But Lenin is concerned to specifically deny that possibilityo 
The commune=state is emphatically not a federalist state. Bernstein 
had so characterised the Commune, and criticised Marx's adherence to it 
on those grounds. Lenin will have none of it: 
"Federalism as a principle follows logically from the 
petty-bourgeois views of anarchism. Marx was a centraliste 
There is no departure whatever from centralism in his observations ••• 
••• if the proletariat and poor peasants take state power unto 
their own hands, organise themselves quite freely in communes, 
and unite the actions of all the communes in striking at capital, 
in crushing the resistance of the capitalists, and in transferring 
the privately owned railways, factories, and land and so on to the 
entire nation, to the whole of society, won't that be centralism? 
Won't that be the most consistent democratic centralism, ( 33 ) 
and moreover, proletarian centralism?" 
Bernstein's objection was that the decentralisation of power and 
administration inevitable in a commune-state contradicted the necessity 
for centralised state action, which he construed to be essential for 
socialist development. Lenin does not disagree with Bernstein over this 
aspect of socialism. He is simply insistent that the commune-state 
itself~' nevertheless, be centralised and unitary. What Bernstein; 
fails to see with, one might add, good reason - is that the communes, 
with all their local powers, interests, and differences, will voluntarily 
transform themselves into a single-willed pervasive state structure, 
abandoning any federalist pretensions that might be suggested by the 
commune form itself: 
11 Berstein simply cannot conceive of the possibility of 
voluntary centralism, of the voluntary amalgamation of the 
communes into a nation, of the voluntary fusion of the 
proletarian communes, for the purpose of destroying ( 34 ) bourgeois rule and the bourgeois state machine." 
Perhaps caution is necessary here, as Lenin's points seem to 
deal exclusively with centralised action to effect the 
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revolutionary act itself, i.e. destroying bourgeois rule. This could 
be a transitory need, still leaving open the possibility of a 
1 voluntary 9 reclamation of local powers and interests by the local 
communes once a relatively stable situation is established. Lenin 
himself 9 however, nowhere makes such a point, and the discussion of 
the federalist commune state is practically concluded with the above 
quotation. Other parts of the text, in fact, leave no room to assume 
that Lenin entertains any reversal of this 'centralism' and 
'amalgamation' of the communes. Chapter 4 9 Part 4, attempts a 
refutation of the virtues of federalism under any circumstances, apart 
perhaps from being a temporary stage in the 'transition from a monarchy 
to a centralised republic.•( 3S) Otherwise, a federal republic, even 
under bourgeois rule, is definitely less preferable than any centralised 
form: 
"It is extremely important to note that Engels ••• disproved 
••• the prejudice that is very widespread ••• that a federal 
republic necessarily means a greater amount of freedom than a 
centralised republic. This is wrong. It is disproved by the 
facts cited by Engels regarding the centralised French Republic 
of 1792-98 and the federal Swiss Republic. The really democratic 
centralised republic gave more freedom than the federal republic. 
In other words, the greatesr-;mount of local, regional, and other 
freedom known in history was accorded by a centralised and not by 
a federal republic." (36) 
Whether Engels' facts really disproved this 'prejudice' is none 
of our concern. The quotation simply illustrates Lenin's own 'prejudice' 
against federalism and reinforces the assumption that his commune-state 9 
even in a situation of established proletarian power, would be devoid of 
federalist featuremo 
Thus does Lenin rescue his commune-state from the one remaining 
threat to its effectivity as a monolithic authority structure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TEXT AND ITS ASSUNPTIONS: 
THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF A CENTURY 
This argument has deliberately treated the field of political 
practices and institutions as a distinct and relatively independent 
domain. This approach departs from the standard interpretations of 
Soviet history; it is also open to accusations of an 'idealist 
approach to a problem whose determinations must be found in more 
profound roots, notably the economic sphere. I have dealt in passing 
with the arguments that attribute to the decay of Soviet democracy to 
economic practicalities: the low productivity of labour, the atomisation 
of the working class; the desperate administratii.rn· needs of a disrupted 
economy. Despite the undoubted relevance of such factors, I have sought 
to argue a distinct» specific and major responsibility to another domain, 
that of the theoretical assumptions and cultural norms of the Bolsheviks 
with regard to the question of state form. It seems to me that unless 
the question of political» institutional, and constitutional forms is 
regarded as a distinct and separate subject for examination, there is 
an oven.,rhelming tendency and temptation for the very significance of 
the question of political forms to be forgotten. This applies as 
much to critiques that reject the Leninist inheritance as to those that 
are complicit in it. The approach adopted here may be further justified 
by a consideration of a recent argument that attempts a new critique of 
Leninism • This argument attrributes the authoritarian outcome of 
.. 
Lenin's activities to an insufficiency of radicalism at the core of 
his thought» in his conception of the economic. Such writers do not» 
however, question the position of such a domain as the organising 
principle of a radical politics. 
Coletti argues that the conservative nature of the politics of the 
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parties of the Second International was due to their appropriation of 
a positivist version of !vlarxism \vhich sought to reduce all phenomena, 
social and natural, to the abstract laws of a 'dialectical materialism'. 
Such a i'Iarxisrn was resolutely determinist, and could contain no element 
of the dialectic of subject and object. It consequently founds its 
paradigm in the 'base-superstructure'. 
In this context, the economic activity of human societies was 
reduced from a p:r_•oblem of social relationships to one of more technique. 
Colletti argues: 
"Social productir.n is thus transformed into 'production 
techniques'; the object of political economy becomes the 
object of technology. Since this 'technique' which is 
material production in the strict sense of the term, is 
separated from that other simultaneous production achieved 
by men, the production of their relations ••• the materialist 
conception of history tends to become a technological conception 
of history. "(l) 
Subsequently, Santamaria and Nanville ( 2) and Corrigan, 
Ramsay and Sayer, among others, have rooted the degeneratimofthe 
Russian revolution in Lenin's adopticn of capitalist industrial 
technique and management methods. ~Vithin a 'positivist' Marxism, 
such capitalist innovations Hould be regarded as unproblematic. 
Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer attempt a radical critique of Bolshevism 
by opposing this version of ~1arxism. Their thesis is suitably bold : 
all radical critiques of the contemporary Soviet state fail, because: 
"Bolshevism as such is rarely invoked, anywhere on the 
left, in the explanation of the alleged Soviet malaise. ( 3 It figures solely and monotonously as that which was betrayed." ) 
Citing the "vulgar and naive conception of the 'economy'" that 
Colletti has identified, the authors find the source of Bolshevik 
failure in the fact that: 
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" the emancipation of labour within production was never 
contemplated by the Bolsheviks. Their programmes on the 
contrary without ~xception enforced various relations, and 
experiences, of production reminiscent of the regime of capital: 
experiences that replicated capital's division of labour, capital's 
hierarchies of tpr.hnir.rtl .::~nrl rn::u'laf',eri.::t.l 'expf>rti~P' 0 f'?f!-it-."ll's 
divisive 'incentives', capital's inequalitiesll and 9 by no means 
leastll capital's coercion of surplus labour and appropriation of(') 
its product to fuel an incessant and insatiable accumulation." 4 
Much of this is valid. The whole of the Narxist movement to Lenin's 
time partook of the same naive approach which held science, technology 9 
production, efficiency, and rationalisation, as unambiguous in essence 
and open to criticism only in terms of their use or misuse by specific 
social agents, But does this really identify the differentia specifica 
of Bolshevism as a state philosophy? That difference, >-lhoever the author 
and whatever their standpoint, must have something to do with Bolshevism's 
ability to bring about the physical liquidation of problematic social 
classes a11d political oppositions in very large numbers, and to the 
present day deny to the average citizen the protection afforded by the 
basic democratic freedoms and human rights, the rule of law, the right 
to travel, etc. 
It is, therefore, a serious assertion when the authors attribute 
to the theoretical error outlined in the quotations above those aspects 
of Soviet political system to which they object: 
"In short, and unsurprisingly, to foster capitalist forms of 
productive activity eventuates in the reprodu,-.tion of various 
defining relations of the bourgeois state form that is their 
cood:t ti on and consequence." C S) 
This seems to be a fine lack of conceptual discrimination. It 
is of course possible to see the political norms that prevail in the 
Soviet Union as identical in essence to those of a 'bourgeois stateform', 
but only if certain major assumptions are made. It is necessary to 
assume that the particular form of the state is immaterial, epiphenomenal 
and insigid::ficant, and 1-1hat counts is a supposed essence. This assumption 
-108-
constitutes all non-Soviet regimes within the twentieth century 
world system as unified by their essence as bourgeois regimes, 
•.,rith the essence being the subordination of certain specific classes 
LO one specific class, By this assumption it is possible to elide 
the differences between liberal democracies and other more authoritarian 
and repulsive regimes of a fascist or totalitarian nature. No daub t 
such a distinction is heuristically viable, focussing as it does on 
the putative alternative of the transparent and self-governing society 
of the radical vision. But such an approach is intellectually dubious, 
leaping as it does to the most general level without seriously pausing 
to consider the particular. For what is this concept of 'bourgeois 
stateform' that is introduced so diffidently into the discussion? 
There is at least an argument that the distinguishing features 
of the bourgeois state form are precisely those that are most absent 
from the Soviet regime. To \vi t: the separation of state and civil 
society: the competitive electoral process inscribed in the norms of 
social life; the right to form political - m1d other - organisations 
without obtaining permission from the state apparatus; the right 
within very broadly defined restrictions on obscenity and libel to 
publish m1d distribute material without lsanction of the state apparatus; 
the formal and actual separation of powers; the absence of a single and 
hegeemonic ideology and restricted political process embodied in a 
unique ruling institution; the protection of an independent judiciary 
tmder legislation duly and constitutionally established. It is in 
fact the case - and the case is presented by t•iarx among others - that 
it Has the introduction of these forms that marked the specifically 
bourgeois form of the state - not the simple rule of one class over 
another. This latter, of course, is a fairly common characteristic 
of state forms thro~ghout history - and nowhere is this point made 
more strongly than in the t•larxiilll cm1on. 
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The authors thus fail to grasp the real object of their study~ 
the very thing they are at such pains to explain. Before it is 
regimes of a socialist type fail to achieve the radical vision of 
freedom, it is logically a prior necessity to explain how those 
regimes fail to provide a system of juridical and political freedoms 
to any degree equivalent to those prevailing in the Hesten1 capitalisms. 
It is~ after all, the absence in the USSR of the latter, and not the 
former, political forms that creates among the populations of con-
temporary capitalist societies a hostility to radical political change. 
Arguably, capitalism has been able to utilise all of the productive 
practices itemised by Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer, and utilise them to 
a far greater and more effective dgree than the Soviet Union. While 
the brutal history of various capitalist regimes gives proof enough 
that there is J10 guaranteed connection bet1-1een contemporary industrial 
technique and political liberties, there is enough evidence to suggest 
that they are not incompatible. There is a lack of evidence to support 
the author's theory that the existence of such techniques can account 
for the dege11eration of the Soviet regime. 
This argument has implications which Corrigan, Hamsay & Sayer 
have since made explicit. This is despite the fact that these 
implications~ once made clear, Hill illustrate how this critique of 
Bolshevism ultimately justifies the Bolshevik regime. The authors 
buttress their demonstrated indifference to the institutional specifics 
of the bourgeois state by defining Soviet polidcal processes as~ in a 
distorted form, superior. 
"The empty and ritualistic character of much 'official' 
Soviet political life - single candidate elections, a 
rubber stamp 'parliament' (the Supreme Soviet)- is ••• 
double edged in its significance. Too often it is taken as 
simply another index of the Soviet worl,ers' pm,;erlessness. 
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~fuat this ignores, in the simple-mindedness of the search for 
equivalents of 'our' institutions» is that the formality of 
Soviet politics also testifies to a diffusion of politics 
throughout the society and a partial overcoming of capitalism's 
separation of the political sphere. Soviet politics is largely 
ritual because most areas of Soviet life are subiPct tn cli_rp~t, 
though not necessarily democratic» political discussion and ( 6) 
control. There is less place for a separate polity." 
The lack of discrimation referred to above is here applied to 
the Soviet regime. The authors believe that a distinction between 
the democratic control of social life, and direct state control of 
the same can be in good conscience passed over in a subordinate clause. 
Nevertheless the argument does derive from a proven feature of Soviet 
society that this argument must take into account. Lane has argued 
that the actual degree of participation and involvement in organisations 
on the part of Soviet workers is far greater than any comparable 
phenomenom in the \.~est. He cites ~ources to the effect that the 
average amount of time spent on 'socio-political' activity has increased 
seven times over the period of Soviet rule, and the proportion of working 
people involved has increased by eighteen times. Given the rather low 
base line for such comparisons, this indeed may not amount to very 
much in real time. But Lane points out 1vhat is anyway missing in 
such a situation, The political influence of the Soviet worker is 
categorically limited: 
"He participates in improving production and he is closer 
to the administration both socially and politically than the 
worker in a capitalist society, But he does not actively shape 
the overriding values of his society, which are largely (?) 
determined by the ruling political elite," 
In fact, he or she does not even participate in improving 
production in any meaningful Hay; control over even this limited 
domain is successfully w1dermined by the political structure. 
Ostensibly, the most pmverful of lmv-level control structures l·Wuld 
be the Party committees and cells. Lewin has discussed the roots of 
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their impotence. Firstly, he concurs with Lane: 
"At best (the criticisms of the ordinary party cell 
mo~bcr) could be di~act~~ ufficidlly only against marginal 
phenomena 9 because the party has asked for criticism only 
to expose defects in the implementation of plans not in 
the plans themselves, so that such critidSm may be turned 
exclusively against nonpolitical officials. The party 
simultaneously has erected barriers against more 
effective and broader criticism." (8) 
But even the second-order tasks of monitoring implementation of 
policy are rendered unachievable: 
"On paper, {the party cells) are supposed "to supervise 
the administrations" and to mobilize party members and the 
masses for the implementation of plans. However, it is quite 
obvious that they are not in a position to 'supervise' because, 
in fact, they are asked simultaneously to support the 
administrations they are supposed to 'supervise' to strengthen 
their authority, and to help them fulfil those plans by dis- g) 
ciplining the workers. And this happens to be their real task."( 
These points hardly amount to a revelation, and doubtless Corrigan et 
al could embrace these points as supporting their critique of Soviet 
political processes. But such a response is hardly legitimate. 
Corrigan and Sayer would attribute these deviations to contingent 
causes derived from the illegitimate political power of the ruling 
eliteo On the contrary, the power of that elite must be seen as 
deriving fvom the ability of the institutional form of the Soviet 
regime to render democratic processes impossible. 
Corrigan at al identify political participation with a right to 
partake in the monitoring of administrative processes. In this manner 
they simply replicate Lenin's fatal conflation of~e political and 
administrative domain and the reduction of the former to the latter. 
It is then a simple step to perceive in officially sanctioned processes 
of participation in administration a genuine process of political will= 
formation. If a distinction can be recognised within this model, it 
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will be one of degree. A discussion of the problems in meeting the 
quotas for the production of pig-iron can therefore be supplemented 
hy arldino to thR ~nRnrle nf the meeting an item on the nrinrities nf 
the plan, the inadequacies of the government, or whatever the members 
feel inclined to discuss. This is only prevented by the political 
determination of the rulers not to allow it. 
On the contrary, it must be stressed that the difference between 
politics and administration is most fundamentally a matter of available 
sites. Administration is a process that exists internal to a 
particular institution, be it factory, office, college, regional 
planning authority, or whatever. The political struggles that Corrigan 
et al refer to are internal structures: they are the offspring of 
institutions already present and formed. The issues that the worker 
is empowered to discuss are consequently determined in advance by sheer 
contingency: it depends upon which institution they happen to find 
themselves working in. Thus the pig-iron worker cannot discuss what 
is happening in the cutlery factory across the road, as he suffers 
from a lack of rights to do so reinforced by a lack of knowledge and 
information to make such a discussion possible. The most basic 
processes even of administrative monitoring may be rendered impossible 
by this. But if administrative control is eviscerated by the division 
into separate institutions, what of political control? A politics 
can be defined as the consideration of a particular problem in the 
light of all the other social institutions, factors, forces, interests 
and problems extant in society; or, conversely, the consideration of 
the general direction of society in the light of adequate information 
about the relevant component parts of the organism. Above all, of 
course, it involves the ability to judge and select those elements of 
information, those forces and factors, which are considered relevant to 
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the issue under discussiono Such a right is not denied simply by 
the absence of a free press, although that perhaps constitutes a 
necessary component of the control mechanism. It is denied by the 
entrapment of politics in disparate and isolated institutionso A 
politics that is registered within separate institutions and which 
lacks any mode of articulation beyond the hypostatized and frozen 
boundaries of those positive institutions is not a public politics. 
And a politics that is not sited in a public domain, and which is not 
empowered to transcend the institutions of the status quo, is one that 
lacks the most basic means of reflection on the status quo. Politics 
can only, therefore, be a reflection of the status quo, not a reflection 
A reflection £r a phenomenom is simply a mirror image of it, a 
reflection on it is a critical process. 
The Soviet state does, of course, include institutions which over-
come the limitations of the single factory or authority. These are the 
public political structures, notably the Soviet structure itself. A 
Supreme Soviet formally therefore fits my prescription of institutions 
possessing the locational ability to o~ a unified overview of a 
reality that, for the lower level structures, is fragmented. From 
this therefore may derive a genuine political process. But this is 
not the case, and not only because the supreme Soviet may be elected 
by a deformed political process wh~ch ensures that its members will be 
those most uncritical of the status quo. Again, it is a matter of 
institutions. Official institutions are part of the status quo; 
therefore their definition of re~lity coincides with the status quo. 
They are denied a critical access to the existing arrangements because 
they lack a stance from which to grasp the whole, or elements of it, as 
something other than themselves. At best, therefore, they are condemned 
to an 'immanent' critique, which must concentrate on details of 
discrepancies between plan and performance. Political institutions 
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which can genuinely bring to bear a critical edge on the current 
situation 9 must, therefore, be allowed to claim a distance between 
itself and what is. Such a distance can only be embodied in a oublic 
sphere separate from the official structures 9 a public sphere which is 
constituted by voluntary associations. If official bodies can only 
replicate the official reality = and this is a structural fact, not a 
contingent situation derived from the attitudes of the rulers - any 
differing reality that will provide the foundation for a genuine 
criticism of official reality must lie outside the control of that 
reality. Citizens must be entitled to form associations articulating 
their alternative reality - otherwise called a political party and 
programme - in a space between the fragmented ignorance of the work-
place and the unified positivity of~e governmental authority. In 
fact, not only is this a fundamental precondition for safeguarding any 
form of popular and democratic power, it is 9 as we have already 
suggested, an inescapable condition for sensible administration. 
Relevant here is Piccone's concept of artifial negativity, which will 
be more fully discussed later, but which suggests that if criticism 
does not exist, then governments will have to invent it if they are to 
fulfil their function. Otherwise they are blind, and the problems of 
the contemporary Soviet government, the gross costs and wastages it 
produces in managing only very inadequately to administer and steer 
the Soviet economy, are example enougho 
We thus experience once again the effects of the hegemony of 
Lenin's constitutional discourse. The collapse of politics into 
administration, is repeated in the Corrigan thesis. Their assertion 
that "there is less place for a separate polity" in socialist society 
expresses a signal failure to transcend the crudities of Lenin's thesis; 
indeed, they dignify it. In the light of the terrorism of this concept, 
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it cannot be repeated too often that without a genuine process of 
discursive will-formation, there is no politics that merits the 
name, and there is no democracy that is not a travesty of the 
meaning the concept holds for ordinary men and women. And such a 
process of will formation can only take place in a polity that is 
composed of voluntary associations of individuals who are legally 
constituted as trans-situational citizens, entitled to a framework 
of legally safeguarded institutions wherein a public sphere may form 
reinforced and sustained by informal and myriad modes of communication 
and publicity. To argue for anything else would seem to be a new 
version of the 'trahison des clercs'. 
The purpose of this latter discussion has been twofold. Firstly, 
to indicate some points of refutation of the Corrigan analysis, and 
thus strengthen the case for the treatment of the political and con-
stitutional sphere as not reducible to determinations of another domainG 
Secondly, it is an instructive example of how such theories can be not 
simply wrong, but can themselves conspire in that which they genuinely 
seek to oppose: the authoritarian state. It is an example of how the 
discourse we are examining manages to police itself. The discourse 
instructs that liberal democracy might be no worse, but it can certainly 
never be any better, than the political instituti~ born of the 
discourse. Like Oedipus, the discourse blinds itself so it may not 
see the offences that it has unwittingly committed. The discourse 
will entertain no difference between the 'really existing' freedom 
and the 'really existing' authoritarianism. Certain things cannot be 
thought of, certain phenomena will not be legitimised as 'facts'. 
How else can we explain this enormous lapse at the heart of a serious 
work of emancipatory theory written in 1978? 
Corrigan and Sayer have made an effort to confront the 
degeneration of Soviet democracy. It is ultimately a sorry effort 
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because 9 despite their intentions 9 they fail in their efforts to 
reject Leninism. Their model of socialism remains polluted with 
Lenin's heritage at the most fundamental levelo They are not the 
first to make such an attempt and register such a failureo Radical 
critiques that have directed their fireagainst both the dictatorship 
in the USSR and problems of politics in the West have been crippled 
by this same unconscious Leninist burden. At least a part of this 
hegemony is not attributable only to the power and simplicity of 
Lenin's theory; it is also due to a serious failure to grasp the 
distinctness of the model of the modern state constructed by Weber, 
and to an attempt to subordinate Weber's model to a Leninist logic. 
Only if we truly appreciate what sets Weber's model profoundly apart 
from Lenin's,will we be able to define the true nature of the 'problem 
of bureaucracy' in the USSR. 
After Weber, After Lenin 
Weber's definition, the tendencies of bureaucratics to escape 
and nullify democratic control proved an indispensable and influential 
source for subsequent theories of the contemporary state. The period 
after his death was dominated by the rise of state systems whose central 
integument appeared to be an exceptionally powerful bureaucracyo The 
most extreme and brutal examples of this phenomenom may now be seen to 
have possessed a more temporary charActer than analysts at the time con= 
templated. But the examples that still exist, while certainly less 
randomly brutal, are characterised, after the disappearance of the 
apparatuses of mass extermination, by an apparently undiminished role 
for the bureaucracyo 
The existence of bureaucracy as a common feature of modernised 
societies provided the opportunity for the school of Critical Theorists 
to identify a commonality between contemporary state systems. It also 
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allowed such writers to minimise important distinctions between 
state regimes. It is, possibly, an example of the 'barbarism' 
of the transcendent critique that elides vital features and differences. 
I will argue that the theory of the authoritarian state as 
developed by the most influential body of Frankfurt theorists -
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse commits this unacceptable elision, 
and this is made possible by their reading of Weber. Weber became 
a central figure in their writings to an extent greater than any 
contemporary or subsequent Marxian school, and ultimately Weber's 
complex concept of 'rationalization' was transfigured into the ground 
for a universal critique of the 'dialectic of enlightenment'. It 
is my contention that this development was based upon a reading of 
Weber that may be seriously chalienged. It was a reading polluted 
by Leninism. While the Frankfurt theorists certainly rejected 
Lenin at a conscious level, this rejection perhaps involved only 
the transparent and public face of Leninism, particularly the 
concept of the Party. There remains at the core of their thinking, 
if not the fundamental themes of Lenin, an acceptance of the same 
traditional themes that give The State and Revolution the character 
of such a dangerous document. 
Horkheimer's 1940 article on 'The Authoritarian State' was 
one of the first attempts to suggest that the three major state 
regimes that dominated in Europe were variants of a common model. 
The fascist state, the totalitarian socialist regime, and the 
remaining liberal-democratic states differed only in the position 
along a broadly similar line of development. All three state forms 
seemed to have many features in commons the manipulation of the 
masses, the demise of genuine democratic processes, the expansion 
of bureaucratic power, the technolagization of social life and 
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culture, the aggressive extension of the prerogatives of the state. 
But this argument amounted to a theoretical conflation that violated 
the actual distinctiveness of the three state regimes in reality. 
References to the •authoritarian state' are present in Frankfurt 
writings from some five years before Horkheimer's article, but 
exclusively referring to German fascism. Initially, the Nazi regime 
was represented as the naked terroristic dictatorship of monopoly 
capital, the final and barbaric stage of capitalist society. Such 
an analysis was not dissimilar to that of the official Comintern 
position. But Horkheimer, rapidly moving away from the orthodoxies 
of Marxian political economy, in 1940 identified the organizing 
principle of the new epoch of domination as technology and its 
consequences on culture and understanding, rather than on the 
imperatives of capital and its needs for coercion and open forcec In 
t~s light, the German version wasdn imperfect and prototypical attempt 
at a form of domination much better represented by the USSR. The 
crudeness and internal conflicts that characterised the process of 
domination in Germany stood in stark contrast to the relatively 
better ordering of matters that prevailed in the USSR. The threat 
to the future of humanity now derived, at least to some, and an 
increasing, extent, not from the commodity economy, but from the 
political plan and the state that promulgated and guarded it. Thus: 
"The most fully developed kind of authoritarian state, 
which has freed itself from any dependence on private (lO) 
capital, is integral Etatism, or state socialism." 
This reassessment of the German and Russian regimes made possible 
a different analysis of the liberal-democratic state form, one that 
was bound to be markedly pessimistic. Horkheimer was well aware 
that the difference between living in a fascist or 'reformist' 
state was of considerable importance to the individual; but from 
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the standpoint of human emancipationD all contemporary regimes were 
almost equally ominous. Bureaucratic domination existedp or was 
imminent in each regimep and those where frP.P.rlom w~~ the most 
distant prospect were not necessarily those where domination was 
most terroristic. 
Horkheimer suggested that little distinction remained between 
the openly authoritarian regimes and the liberal democracies. He 
gave a scathing description of the relationships of domination that 
existed in Weimar GermanyD between the political and bureaucratic 
elites and the masses. This relationship was replicated within 
the workers' movement, which "•oo negatively reflects the situation 
it is attacking. "(ll) Capitalism bad evolved into its monopoly 
form. The institutions of the liberal state were increasingly 
evacuated of real content, and ultimately became a mere facade for 
the introduction of the irrational authority of the fascist regime. 
For Marcuse, there was an organic process involveda 
" we can say that it is liberalism that 'produces' 
the total-authoritarian state out of itself, as its own(l2) 
consummation at a more advanced stage of development." 
Jay reports Horkheimer 's own argument as stressing "the end 
of the liberal mediations, economic, political or legal, that had 
previously forestalled the realization of the domination implicit 
in capitalism." ( 13) Thus while the transition to fascism may not 
yet have been effected in the western democracies, it was argued 
that the continued existence of liberal institutions signified little 
in terms of real democracy and, anywayp the actual disappearance of 
these institutions was probably imminent. 
For our purposes, it is this estimation of the institutions of 
liberal democracy that is important. The 1940 article is seminal 
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in the development of the Frankfurt theorists, or more precisely 0 
in the careers of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. 
Othersp particularly Pollock and Neumanng at the timeregarded 
these institutions with less pessimism 9 with consequences that we 
shall see. But for the most renowned of the Frankfurt writersD this 
original pessimistic estimateg the identification of liberal democracy 
as a society cast in the same mode of bureaucratic domination as 
Nazism and Stalinism was fateful. Technological dominion by a 
bureaucratic apparatus as the generic quality of both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes mapped out the path to the argument o.f the 
'Dialectic of Enlightenment•, wherein European rationality inevitably 
produced a society of total and hermetic domination. The most 
influential version of this thesis was ultimately expressed in 
Marcuse•s analysis of 'one-dimensionality•. The combination of 
mass consumption, government regulation, and the culture industry had 
finally transformed an outmoded entrepreurial capitalism into a totally 
administered society characterised by a simultaneous process of 
atomization and homogenization of the populace. In 1965 Marcuse 
discussed: 
"• •• the tendencies that linked the liberal past with its 
totalitarian abolition. This abolition was not restricted 
at all to the totalitarian states and since then has become 
reality in many democracies (and especially in the most 
developed one) ••• Today total administration is necessary, 
and the means are at handa mass gratification, market 
research, industrial psychology, computer mathematics, 
and the so-called science of human relations. These take 
care of the non-terroristic, democratic, spontaneous-
automatic harmonization of individual and socially necessary 
needs and wants, of autonomy and heteronomy. They assure the 
free election of individuals and policies necessary for (l4) this system to continue to exist and grow ••• " 
Thus, in a startling phrase, he summed up the paradox and the 
pessimism of this world as the "frantic expansion of totalitarian 
mass democracy." (15) 
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The thesis of the 'totally-administend society 0 was briefly a 
persuasive one. But the events of the 1960•sg in which Marcuse's 
ideas themselves played no small partp served to undermine its 
viability. This was the period of large-scale popular movements of 
protest which effected, or at least contributed to, political change 
by utilising a combination of conventional and innovatory political 
channels. Aware of this, Piccone, has attempted to amend the theory 
from a position basically sympathetic to Marcuse. 
He holds the thesis to be valid, but only for a distinctly 
limited historical period; a transitional period between classical 
capitalism and contemporary capitalism. The drive towards one-
dimensionality was, he argues, a necessary part of the introduction 
of a state-regulated capitalism. Without such massively increased 
intervention by the state, the conditions of existence of capitalist 
society could not be secured: its rampant crisis mechanism would 
have brought about the conditions for widespread social dislocation; 
the position of the subaltern classes in their nan-integrated state 
would have made them available to oppositional political doctrines. 
But the process of bureaucratic extension must, he argues, have its 
limits. The sbift from entrepreneurial capitalism to the New Deal 
may be necessary, but so is the shift from the 'New Deal society' to 
a subsequent arrangement. An administrative process that has absorbed 
the whole of society will be bereft of the critical inputs which are 
necessary if it is to successfully fulfil its functions of rationally 
steering the society. 
The administrators must therefore provide 'artificial negativity'. 
In order to avoid the consequences of administration without 
informative and critical input from outside the apparatus, the 
apparatus is driven to create opposition to itself. This could be 
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an interesting line of researchg there are certainly examples of 
contemporary administrations providing funds and personnel with 
which citizens may be encouraged to criticise and point out the 
inadequacies of policy decisions and implementation. This is 
particularly relevant in attempts to maintain the integration into 
the body politic of the more marginal and anomie groups of 
contemporary society. In connection with discrete problems of 
modern administration, 'artificial negativity• is an evocative thesis. 
But is it really adequate as a 'grand theory• of the current state of 
western society? Obviously, if 'artificial negativity•_ is to be an 
'important' theory, it must explain important things. And so it 
does. For example, it can explain the Vietnam War, and, more 
importantly, the ending of that war. Piccone derides the way in 
tlfhich: 
"the US "defeat" is still celebrated in conventional New 
Left nostalgia as the g~eatest achievement of the student 
movement and the successful mass mobilization that it 
provoked. But what was the Vietnam War other than the 
extension of the logic of transition (i.e. of the totally 
administered society TP) after that logic had become 
historically obsolete?" (16) 
Thus those who actually fought against the war deceive 
themselves if they believe they played a signficant political role 
in that conjuncture. For Piccone, the reality is either that the 
war was ended when the 'progressive• sector of the capitalist class 
won out against the 'backward' sector, or, at most, the anti-war 
movement was created and manipulated to a specific end by the 
capitalists who realised that a United Vietnam would be easy to 
exploit via the terms of trade, whatever the government in power. 
The same logic applies to the removal of Nixon over Watergate, 
the reduction of the powers and apparatus of the CIA and 'strong 
state', and the Civil Rights movement. The dismissal of those who 
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actually struggled in these issues is rather regrettable. But the 
revealing aspect of this analysis is what it says about the one-
dimensionality thesis itself. One possible explanation of the 
events that Piccone cannot discuss - even seems unaware of - is that 
th~y had something to do with the existence of a constituttanal stateg 
fundamental democratic freedomsg and a functioning public sphere of 
debate and dissent. Piccone seems to retain the traditional Marxian 
dismissal of these concepts as not only bourgeois~ but vacuous and 
in reality nan-existent. He is bound to do this by the one-
dimensionality thesiss if this regime actually existed for a periodg 
and if dissent must now be manufactured by the ruling classg it follows 
that at some point these elements of democracy disappeared - if they 
ever had any real existence. 
As a mode of historical explanation 9 the thesis of •artificial 
negativity' quickly reveals itself as rather ludicrous in its crudity. 
In a weird Hegelian inversion 9 it presents the 'capitalist class'g or 
at least one section of it 9 as a version of the 'sUbject-object 
identical' 9 manipulating political movements to its own desired end 9 
and doing so successfully. In a model of breathtaking simplicity 9 
it reduces all the complexities of the political sphere 9 even the~r.eady 
simplified version expounded in some Marxian versions of political 
science 9 to the maneouvrings of an ~!-powerful ruling group. It is a 
condign fate for Horkheimer and Marcuse's original theory. Piccone 
has the intelligence to realise the inadequacy of the Marcusian vision 
of the contemporary scene. His discomfiture arises from his attempt 
to redeem aspects of that model are irredeemable 9 because they are 
based on a profound aporia. This is the misappropriation of Weber's 
theory of bureacracy that entered into the theories of the authoritarian 
state from the 1930's onward. 
The developments that Piccone attempts to explain in his theory 
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of artificial negativity are evidence of the fact thatthe liberal 
democracies have not, and did not, enter the state of total 
administration. Once this fact is grasped Piccone's tortuous sub-
Hegelian schemes are redundant. But both Marcuse and Piccone are 
forced to such resorts by the misuse they make of ~eber. 
In fact, a reinterpretation of Weber is the pivot upon which 
Marcuse•s argument shifts. In 1941 Marcuse was still analysing 
bureaucracy in liberal democracy in a positive manner which echoes 
certain of Weber's themesa 
"In the democratic countries, the growth of private 
bureaucracy can be balanced by the strengthening of the 
public bureaucracy ••• In the age of mass society the 
power of the public bureaucracy can be the weapon which 
protects the people from the encroachment of special 
interests upon the general welfare. As long as the will 
of the people can effectively assert itself, the public (l7) bureaucracy can be a lever of democratization." 
But by 1964 Marcuse's reading of the Weberian mod~ is crucially 
different. Contemporary industrial society tends towards the absolute 
power of the bureaucracy: 
"bet us ••• present the connection betwean capitalism 
rationality, and domination in the work of Max Weber •••• 
the specifically Western idea of reason realizes itself in 
a system of material and intellectual culture ••• that 
develops to the full in industrial capitalism and this system 
tends towards a specific type of domination which becomes the(lB) 
fate of the contemporary periods total bureaucracy." 
Piccone's discussion of 'steering problems• offers a convincing 
refutation of the possibility of a totally administered society. But 
he falls into error by trying to maintain that for a time this 
represented an accurate description of the tendency of western society. 
To do this, he~lieves that he must correct Weber. 
"Contrary to the Weberian vision of a constantly rationalizing 
and bureaucratizing process of capitalist development, 
bureaucratization becomes counter-productive when it successfully 
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penetrates what it seeks to rationalize. What makes its 
fragmenting formal mechanisms successful is the lingering 
resistance of that yet-unrationalised specificity which it 
ccnstantly destroys. u(l9) 
Piccone here canflates Weber with Marcuse. Marcuse may indeed 
have taken from Weber a terminally pessimistic vision of social develop-
ment; but that vision is not necessarily Weber's. The delicate and 
crucial distinction that is possible here is put thus by Salvador Giner: 
"Although he viewed the advance of this complex process 
(bureaucratization) with resigned pessimism, Weber nevertheless 
refused to identify 'rule by officials' and a~nistrators with 
political power, so that a view of contemporary society as a 
bureaucracy appears nowhere in his work ••• Weber recognised 
a threat, which is serious en~ugh, and which no observer of 
the modern outlook should ignore, but he was at pains to express 
it in the conditional- 'if and when', 'perhaps•. Moreover, he 
was also at pains to explore the many mechanisms through which 
the excessive power of bureacracies is or can be curtailed, such 
as political democracy, collegiality of decisions, decentralization, 
and the separation of powers ... (20) 
Weber did not need to explain in detail why bureaucracy could 
not take over the whole of society, as Piccone attempts to do. The 
reason for this is simply that the possibility was unlikely to occur 
to him. This is not due to naivety or lack of insight into the 
horrendous state formations that the future held in store. It is due 
to the fact that the bureaucracy that he was describing and analysing 
did not, in reality, contain that possibility. In the event of the 
disappearance of the 'checking' mechanisms on bureaucracy that Giner 
refers to, the consequence is ~ a society ruled by the norms of 
bureaucratic rationality, but something quite different, where formal 
rationality all but collapses under the pressure of illegitimatevalue 
considerations. 
Such an argument involves an aspect of Weber's analysis that 
appears to escape the Frankfurt theorists. Surprisingly enough we 
shall once again, even here, encounter the corrupting influence of 
Lenin's model of the radical democratic state. 
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It has been established that bureaucracy contains problems 
and threats. But the political domain also contains problems and 
threats. If the discussion of these is less developed in Weber's 
writLngs. this is doubtlP.ss attribut."'bl~ tr. his experience of !4i1helminc: 
Germany 9 where an excessively powerful bureacracy treated an inadequate 
and powerless parliament with scant regard. But we can nevertheless 
construct from his writings a theory of political d~rs relevant to 
the issues under discussion. 
Mass democracy contains one great danger: the predominance of 
emotional over rational elements in the process of political decision-
making. This is not meant to imply a pe\jorative view of the capacities 
of the citizenry. The political realm has to deal with questions to 
which so far no answers have been found that have the status of 
absolute truth and can command the assent of an entire populace. 
Politics, therefore, is fundamentally the contest of conflicting value-
orientations. The answers to these fundamental issues can never be 
derived and formulated in the language of rationality, calculability 
and scientization that is the proud possession of the administrators. 
The struggle against the 'bureaucratization of the world' is presumably 
a struggle to retain for the citizenry the right to debate and decide 
issues according to standards other than that that guides the 
administrators& instrumental efficiency. Now, if a political domain 
is considered desirable, it makes no sense to assume that such a domain 
will always produce the 'right' i.e. ethically acceptable value 
orientations. Politics is the name of the field defined by the 
absence of such certainties. As Habermas summed up Weber's basic 
thesis on this domains 
"In the last analysis political action (2l) 
cannot rationally justify its own premises." 
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Thus while many of the forms of thought - value orientations -
which a political sphere contains may be repugnant, and demand 
refutation and vehement opposition, those who would combat 
defend will contain a multiplicity of ideas 0 approaches 0 and 
perspectives. It is not possible to achieve the same standards of 
certainty as obtain in the administrative realm. The only exception 
to this lies in the possibility of discovering an ethics which is 
irrefutably grounded in an ~ictically true science and philosophy 
that reveals the pristine essence of society, humanity, and history. 
In the light of contemporary experiences such a possibility is at 
least distant, and at most unlikely. And, be it understood, such 
a discovery would truly mean the end of politics and the advent of 
the age of total bureaucracys for there would be nothing left to discuss. 
What, then, is the precise nature of the danger that emanates 
from the political sphere? It is that it may seek to colonise the 
administrative sphere. This is no new phenomenom; it is in fact 
the very situation that the establishment of bureaucratic organisation 
sought to supersede& a situation wherein administrative decisions are 
taken on the basis of grace, favour, influence, prejudice, and even 
corruption. The extent of tbis problem will become apparent in a 
discussion of the Soviet Union. What will also become clear is 
that the necessary division of labour, the necessary balance and 
equilibrium between the two domains of administration and politics 
must be carefully prescribed. This task cannot be ignored by 
clinging to either of the naive assumptions that underlie the theories 
that construe excessive bureaucratisation as the only danger,that 
ignare the complexities of the political field that is supposed to 
act as panacea to this threat. It is equally as naive to assume 
that bureaucracy can ~will be banished from the face of society, 
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leaving nothing but a political sphere bathing in limpid clarity and 
mutual enlightenment; as to assume that politics can be sufficiently 
rationalised and scientized to make the relationship between the two 
domains a perfect fit 9 devoid of conflicts and permeated by fraternal 
deference. 
This, of course, is precisely the naive assumption of the model 
constructed by Lenin in the pages of The State and Revolution. It 
is also the assumption upon which Horkheimer based his critique of 
state regimes in 'The Authoritarian State' in 1940e This first article 
to unequivoeally include the USSR in the collection of authoritarian 
regimes expresses a faith in the regime of the workers' councils. 
Horkheimer's touchstone, therefore, is still the possibility of the 
transcendental class subject of traditional Marxism. His critique of 
the Weimar republic derived its sweeping character from the actual 
absence of this subject: 
"Insofar as the proletarian opposition to the Weimar 
Republic did not meet its downfall as a sect, it (22 ) fell victim to the spirit of administration." 
The tiny oppositional sects or the mass Social Democratic and 
Communist Parties offered no hope of the emancipated society. But 
here Horkheimer drew no conclusions about the viability of the project 
of emancipation; on the contrary, the Marxian subject is still present, 
and provides the foundation for a conception of the post-revolutionary 
state that, while allusive in keeping with Horkheimer's style~ expresses 
the same assumptions as Lenin: 
"After the old positions of power bave been dissolved, 
society will either govern its affairs on the basis of free 
arguments, or else exploitation will continue ••• the future 
form of collective life has a chance to endure not because it 
will rest upon a more refined constitution but because 
domination is exhausting itself in state capitalism ••• in a 
new society, a constitution will be of no more importance than 
train schedules and traffic regulations are now." (23) 
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It should perhaps be remembered that train schedules are promises 
that the relevant authorities rarely manage to fulfil, and that traffic 
regulations are often treated by the citizenry with a fair degree of 
selectivity or indifferenceo This does not seem to be a promising 
metaphor for the political processes of the future societyo 
It is clear that Horkheimer still shared with traditional Marxism 
theory a great deal of ground; in particular he still believed in the 
emancipatory potential of Marxism. This led him to surmise that the 
USSR 9 while being the most efficient example of the authoritarian state, 
was also the one most prone to overthrow in an emancipatory direction. 
This was due to the fact that the legitimating ideology of the ruling 
group was Marxism itself. The naivety of this position has been 
summarised by Arata: 
"••• the assumption of Horkheimer's immanent critique that 
the admittedly most consistent form of the authoritarian state 
was because of its working class ideology the most open to 
liberating, cataclysmic social change {based on a new council 
movement) derived from an inadequate analysis of Soviet conditions 
and of the nature of Soviet Marxism as a pseudoscience of 
legitimation.," (24) 
This dubious assessment of the nature of Marxian ideology was 
presumably a major cause of Horkheimer's weakness for the traditional 
council-type solutions to the problems of politics and administration. 
In contrast to the theories of absolute bureaucratization, 
Weber's far more modest model of fue bureaucracy is relevant to, and 
revealing of, the fundamental nature of the 'authoritarian state•. I 
have referred to the less pessimistic attitude to the institutions of 
the liberal state that was adopted by Neumann and Pollocko These 
theorists stress the juridicial-legal protection of civil rights and 
the survival of some forms of popular political participation under late 
capitalism. Pollock announced the advent of a new socio-economic 
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formation termed 'state-capitalism', which was applicable in a generic 
form, just as was Horkheimer's, to the varied regimes of advanced 
capitalismo But he maintained a distinction between the totalitarian 
and democratic forms, and the democratic form enjoys a profound 
superiority: 
"Under a democratic form of state capitalism, the state 
has the same controlling functions but is itself controlled 
by the people. It is based upon institutions which prevent 
the bureaucracy from transforming its administrative position 
into an instrument of power and thus laying the basis for ~e 25 transshaping the democratic system into a totalitarian one." ( ) 
Pollock's recognition of the still profound difference between 
authoritarian regimes and the liberal democratic state led him to a 
series of questions which he could only pose speculatively. But 
these questions, it may be suggested, have a vibrancy and relevance 
forty years later, which (for all their profound insights) is lacking 
in the political writings of Horkheimer and Marcuse: 
"What measures are necessary to guarantee control of the 
state by the majority of people instead of by a small minority? 
What ways and means can be devised to prevent the abuse of the 
enormous power vested in the state industrial, and party 
bureaucracy under state capitalism? How can the loss of 
economic liberty be rendered compatible with the maintenance 
of political liberty? How can the disintegrative motive 
forces of today be replaced by integrative ones? How will 
the roots from which insurmountable social antagonisms develop 
be eliminated so that there will not arise a political alliance 
between dissentient partial interests and the bureaucracy aiming 
to dominate the majority? ••• " (26) 
It is precisely these problems, and developments of them, that 
have provided the complex of issues th~t Habermas' work has sought to 
i nves tiga te. The period of European totalitarianism has, at least 
for now, receded into the historical past, and taken with it the 
viability of the inevitable grand generalisations and horrific 
prognostications a We may consider Habermas 1 work as an example of the 
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fruit to be gathered from Weber's basic model; a contrast to the 
barrenness of the Leninist heritageo The starting point must surely 
be a realisation that it is false to present the dangers embodied in 
the modern state as consisting only of the tendency of the bureaucracy 
to conquer the rest of society. That such dangers exist, and constitute 
an ominous threat to civilized society is hardly worth repeating. My 
argument assumes this, and certainly does not seek to contest its 
significance. But if the cure is not to be worse than, or identical 
with, the disease, the other dangerous tendency we have described must 
be appreciated. The theorists of absolute bureaucracy are too extmme: 
the problem is the existence of any bureaucracy and the only answer is 
zero bureaucracye Weber's crucial insight consisted run understanding 
that, while the political sphere acts as a restraint on the administrative, 
the administration is also necessary to defuse the dangerous tendencies 
of the politidans {a term which may mean the whole of the citizenry). 
Habermas has a typology of problems that Weber's model points 
to in contemporary society; he has also opened a discussion that 
gives Weber's distinctions their true weight, by ontologising the 
distinction between politics and administration. 
This latter theme occurs in the first Chapter of his 'Theory 
and Practice', published in 1971. Here he defends the assumptions 
of the classical doctrine of politics, with its origins in Aristotle. 
This doctrine asserted a distinction between forms of human knowledge. 
One form is that of techne, "the skilful production of artifacts and 
the expert mastery of objectified tasks"; politics ia the field 
ccnstituted by a different type of knowledge 9 
"Aristotle emphasises that politics, and practical philosophy 
in general, cannot be compared in its claim to knowledge with a 
rigorous science, with the apodictic episteme. For its subject 
matter, the Just and the Excellent, in its context of a variable 
and contingent praxis, lacks ontological constancy as well as 
logical necessity. The capacity of practical philosophy is 
phronesis, a prudent understanding of the situation, and on this 
the tradition of classical politics has continued to base itself.G"( 27) 
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Habermas contrasts the classical doctrine of politics with 
attempts to define a science of politics, initiated by the work 
of Hobbes and Machiavelli. From Hobbes emerges a quite different 
set of principless firstly it is deemed possible to devise a 
scientifically grounded social philosophy whose assertions will be 
valid independently of timei place and circumstances; secondly, 
the translation of this knowledge into practice is a technical 
problem. Prudence can be replaced by calculation. Thirdly, 
human behaviour is now considered to be the proVince of science, 
which will recommend the necessary conditions and institutions 
that will ensure that humans behave in a 'calculable' manner. 
Politics is separated from morality; if the task of preparing 
individuals for life in the community was previously that of the teacher 
and moralist, it now becomes the job definition of the social engineer 
and administrator. 
We have here, therefore, in this modern political science, 
a fundamental confusion and canflation; the technical is presumed 
to fulfil the responsibilities of the 'practical'. That in 
contemporary parlance there appears to be little, if any, distinction 
between the two terms is evidence of the degree of success attained 
by the scientizers of social thought. As Bernstem says: 
" our very difficulty in grasping the differ,ence 
between the two - for we now commonly think of the practical 
as being a matter of technical application or know how-
helps underscore Habermas• point. We not only confuse the 
practical with the technical, but in both thought and 
action tend to reduce distinctively practical issues to the 
matrix of technical application." (28) 
The consequent tendency to reduce all questions of 'action' 
to issues of technical control and manipulation clearly underlies 
the threat of bureaucracy. Habermas grounds this threat separately 
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and more fundamentally than in the bureaucratic power=complex itself. 
The problem arises from the hegemony of contemporary thought exercised 
by sciencep its methods, and its practitioners. In the light of this, 
Habermas can then provide us with his models of possible relations 
between 'expertise and political practice•. 
He describes firstly the 'decisionistic' model 9 the pure form of 
Weber's theory, whereby there exists a strict division of labour 
between experts and politicians, the former pursuing by means of 
rational calculation the ends prescribed by the latter. These ends 
themselves are not subject to the dictates of administrative 
rationality. But for Habermas this situation leaves much to be desireda 
"Rationality in the choice of means accompanies avowed(29 ) irratimality in orientation to values, goals and needs." 
While politics certainly has, and must retain, its own modalities 
of thought that are quite distinct from those of administration, it is 
difficult for Habermas to accept that these must continue to take the 
form of irrationality. In the last section of 'Legitimation Crisis' 
Habermas acknowledges the contradiction and difficulty in which he 
finds himself. A 'partiality for reason' is a partisan position 
which cannot itself be made the object of rational will-formation 
that depends upon the assumption of reason. He is forced to an 
admission of his 'irrational' starting points a passion for 'old 
European human dignity'. (JO) 
Nevertheless a clear distinction exists between the 
'decisionistic' model and the more contemporary 'technocratic' ones 
Technical and intellectual developments have made an alternative possibles 
"Systems analysis and especially decision th«ry do not 
merely make new technologies available, thus improving 
traditional instruments; they also rationalize choice as 
such by means of calculated strategies and automatic decision 
procedures."(31) 
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The 'technocratic' model is that where the politician becomes 
dependent on the expert for definition of aims and ends, as well as 
means. The extension of rational techniques and calculations into 
the options available in the social world itself (Weber's 
"disenchantment" writ large) 9 and the ability to prognosticate the 
long-term consequences of the selection of any set of goals meansa 
" the politician in the technical state is left with 
nothing but a fictitious decision-making power." (32) 
As I have already indicatedp Habermas suggests neithertbat 
this state of affairs is inevitable, nor that it can resolve the 
problems it is designed to tackle. These new methods still cannot 
impinge upon the fundamental problem-complex from which political 
decision ultimately derive, from value systems. In the light of his 
belief in the inadequacy, both descriptively and, of course, 
normatively, of both the decisionistic and the technocratic modes, 
he suggests a model that may counter the weaknesses of both. This 
is the •pragmatistic' model, whereby he attempts to replace the 
relationship of domination between politician and expert by one of 
•critical interaction'. His argument benefits from the fact that 
this is not a purely speculative models 
"Despite the technocratic view, experts have not become 
sovereign over politicians subjected to the demands of the 
facts and left with a purely fictitious power of decision. 
Nor, despite the implications of the decisionistic model, 
does the politician retain a preserve outside of the 
necessarily rationalised areas of practice in which 
practical problems are decided upon as ever by acts of 
the will. Rather, reciprocal communication seems 
possible and necessary ••• " (33) 
Tbe formulation is arguably optimistic. The pragmatistic 
model is at least on one level a response and reply by Habermas to 
those visions of a 'totally administered' society that were 
articulated by Horkheimer, Adornop and Marcuse. He both rejects 
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the possibility of the development they predicted, and manages to 
indicate that such a rejection opens up equally fruitful approaches 
to the problems that do undeniably exist. But, operating in the 
Weberian mode, Habermas has clearly constructed only ideal types; 
he has not described anything that in reality and as yet exists. 
He will, therefore, be aware that just because neither the decisionistic 
or technocratic model in reality have occurred, it must notbe assumed 
that the pragmatistic model prevails. The degree of decisionism 
and/or technocratism which is necessary if a democratic project is 
to be thwarted is not an absolute. These tendencies need not be 
present in gigantic and publicly transparent form; contemporary 
society abounds in examples of them frustrating the possibility of 
a genuine democratic society. In his later work, Habermas has 
demonstrated the difficulty involved in defining the conditkns that 
would make possible a model of politics and administration based upon 
'free communication between equals'. But that difficulty is a 
necessary difficulty, one that is contained in the reality of the 
problem, and it magisterially corrects the themes of Lenin, Horkheimer, 
and others which reduce the problem to removing simple barriers to the 
democratic control of administration. Rather, a remarkable job of 
philosophical, cultural, and institutional construction is involved. 
Weber and Lenina The Problem of the Rule of Law 
The Weberian model cannot describe the state regime of the 
Soviet Union, although it will help to explain it. The USSR cannot 
be read through Weber's fundamental categories or through the typology 
that Habermas has derived from them. The USSR is neither of the two 
extremes that might evolve from the regime Weber describeds political 
power developing into the hands of the apparatus, or administrative 
process corrupted by political interference. The puzzling thing is 
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that it appears to display the symptoms of an extreme case of both 
diseases. At one and the same time it is an all-powerful, rigid, 
and highly structured administration unconstrained by normal modes 
of political controlp and a totally politicised structure wherein 
norms, laws, regulations and procedures may be overturned at a moment's 
notice by political decree. Perhaps Serge's Comrade Tulayev is the 
victim of the former, Koestler's Rubashev of the latter. Yet both 
are victims of the same instrument at the same hour of its power. 
How may this be explained? Does not the reality here point to in-
adequacies in Weber's model, inas much as it appears to be unable to 
bring its explanatory categories to bear? 
The authority of Weber's model is in fact restored by a dis-
tinction that is crucial to my argument. This distinction has been 
indicated abovea Weber never constructed a model of totalitarian 
bureaucratic society because his bureaucracy contained no possibility 
of achieving total power and consumating the expropriation of the 
political domain. He recognised regrettable costs, the costs of 
modernity and he recognised possible corruptions. But every system 
that contains human beings is open to corruption, and perhaps Weber's 
willingness to reconcile himself to the bureaucratic age came from the 
appreciation that these corruptions took the form of possibilities, 
not inherent qualities in fixed quantities. Countervailing tendencies 
could limit these possibilities, but only so long as it was possible to 
maintain the two domains of politics and administration as distinct 
and separate. 
Thus Weber's bureaucratic society is not a totalitarian one. 
Although totalitarian regimes depend upon a vast bureaucratic 
apparatus, any similarity this suggests with the society that Weber 
was analysing is superficial. What emerges from a proper understanding 
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of Weber's model is the momentous aspect wherein the two regimes have 
nothing in common. This is what Weber defines as 'the rule of law•. 
The existence of the rule of law is the primary precondition for the 
;:;x.is~c:nc:e ui ~iw mullei.·H ::;lal.:~::~ an administrative and legal order that 
is subject to change by legislation and an administrative apparatus 
that conducts official business in accordance with legislative 
regulation. The rest of Weber's model is built upon this simple 
assumptionp and if this assumption does not apply, all of Weber's 
comments on politicians and bureaucrats» on norms and authority» on 
domains and responsibilities» on citizens and officials, are simply 
irrelevant. They are tools too sophisticated to apply to the brute 
structure of a totalitarian regimes it is naive to expect them to 
have any relevance. It is like trying to understand the workings of 
a bicycle by reading the workshop manual for a car. A categorically 
different object is under discussion. 
There are certain situations where the rule of law cannot 
exist. Clearly, the rule of law cannot be assumed in a society 
undergoing revolutionary reconstruction. As Bendix put its 
"Where norms can be changed at a moments (34) 
notice, the rule of law is destroyed." 
Revolutionary regimes by the very act of the seizure of power 
dismiss the existing structure of law and its processes; and it is 
unlikely to restore that old structure once the new regime is secure. 
The norms embodied in that old system of law will have been a primary 
motivation for the revolutionary initiative itself& revolution is a 
statement that existing procedures of enacting and changing legislation 
have been found ineffective or inadequate. The new regime must 
perforce construct its own legal assumptions anew, in line with its 
ideological preconceptions. This reconstruction is at very least a 
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time-consuming and complex process. A multitude of contradictory 
interpretations of the newly dominant ideology will for some time 
obtain, until the features of the new culture are firmly established. 
Competing versions will abound~ both publicly and privately. The 
political struggle of the Bolsheviks against all other political 
tendenciesg from liberals to anarchists, is the evidence of this 
public struggle. No less important, although certainly less 
apparent, will be the conflict between the new public norms and the 
assumptions upon which the everyday private lives of much of the 
population will continue to be ordered. 
Consequently, the law becomes a more overtly political 
instrument. Law may follow in the trail of new social arrangements, 
often to confirm them, but perhaps as often to contradict them, as 
with the decree on 'One-Man Management' that opposed the popular 
syndicalist control that to some degree existed. Additionally, 
the law becomes an instrument by which attempts are made to undermine 
and destroy old social relationships, and thus clearly come into 
conflict with majority norms, as in the prolonged conflict between 
the Soviet government and the peasantry. Law, therefore, in a 
revolutiunary regime, may be very far from being based upon an 
acceptance, let alone an understanding, of the norms that lie behind 
it as far as large sections of the population are concerned. Even 
if it may be asserted that consultation would in fact reveal a 
coincidence of norms between the government and the majority of the 
populace, the process of enactment of such norms is problematic. 
Revolutionary governments legislate by decree not by debate. A 
vast new legal edifice must be established in a brief time-span; 
all the greater is the task if the new regime is distinguished from 
the old by its belief in modernization: a process which I have 
already indicated produced a huge increase in the areas of society 
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that are considered as the legitimate sites of government intervention. 
The sheer magnitude of the tasks allows little room for the deliberative 
delays of due process. The habits consequently inculcated 5nto ad= 
ministrative officials will be such as to aggrandise their powers 
considerably. 
All these are perhaps inevitable costs of situations where the 
crisis of a social formation forces revolutionary change. It would 
be foolish to suggest that such situations do not occur, and that the 
problems posed by them can be avoided. But if the process of change 
inevitably undermines and banishes the rule of law, the question 
remains as to the possibilities of, and the conditions for, a return 
to a regime of the rule of law once the immediately transitional 
situation is passed. How is the ruling party, for whom the law has 
become an instrument in their own possession, to return to a situation 
where they themselves are once again subordinate to that law? 
This problem exercised previous revolutionary actors. All 
revolutions are made in the name of some kind of freedom, and a common 
core of these various definitions of freedom is the freedom from 
arbitrary rule. The problem for the makers of constitutions is how 
such a freedom may be established out of an act which is itself 
arbitrary and necessarily repressive, which had observed no laws 
and has exercised violence against 'legitimate' rulers. The new 
laws cannot be written before the new-lawmaking body of the 
revolutionary regime is constituted. The authority of that body 
cannot therefore derive .from the law; but if it does not possess 
this necessary authority, how can the laws stand above man? 
Rousseau described this as: 
"The great problem in politics, which I compare to the 
problem of squaring the circle in geometry •• (~:How to (JS) 
find a form of government whtch puts the law above man." 
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Apart from any putative corruptionD therefore, which a 
revolutionary government might suffer (reluctance to relinquish the 
' . potvE::I"") t.ner l: .L.t:.» .:. genuine conceptual problem. 
How are those who have placed themselves above the law to subordinate 
themselves to the law? The legitimations that previously applied 
can no longer satisfy. An appeal to a transcendental authorityg 
or to the authority of tradition and custom are clearly not available 
to revolutionaries who have proceeded against precisely those 
legitimations. The concept of the 'General Will' , a more 
appropriate foundation, reveals itself, if attempts to determine that 
will are genuinely made, as, in Arendt's words 'built on quicksand'& 
"The constitutional history of France, where even 
during the revolution constitution followed on constitution 
while those in power were unable to enforce any of the 
revolutionary decrees (indicates) ••• that the so-called 
will of a multitude (if this is to be more than a legal 
fiction) is ever-changing by definition ••• " (36) 
In the absence of any alternative firm foundation, there exists 
simply the constant temptation - and often demand - for some 
individual to embody the general will and impose its interpretations 
upon the rest of the societya 
"Napoleon Bonaparte was only the first in a long series 
of national statesmen who, to the applause of a whole 
nation, could declare a "I am the pouvoir constituent." (37) 
An appeal to the authority of the revolution contains no 
solution to this problem. The revolution can only legitimise the 
power of those who made it, of those of its heirs who are considered 
to be the most legitimate claimants to its tradition. The authority 
of the revolution legitimises exclusive power, not the transfer of 
power between competing parties in the consequent regime. Those who 
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were not instrumental in making the revolution, or more precisely in 
leading it, are de facto deprived of the credientials it bestows. If 
the appeal is to the authority of the revolution, the Mensheviks have 
no right to dispute policy with the Bolsheviks in the new USSR. 
The American revolutionaries managed to avoid these consequencesf 
by virtue of an remarkable stroke of good fortune. Thomas Jefferson 
pointed to it in his explanation of how America was able to maintain 
the republican form of government when the French revolutionaries lost 
ito Republican government in France failed, he argued, because "the 
party of "un et indivisible" had prevailed." There existed no other 
organs of authority to which the people might have turned to combat the 
dissolution of democratic forms. 
"But with us, sixteen out of seventeen states r1s1ng in 
mass, under regular organisation, and legal commanders, united 
in object and action by their Congress ••• present such obstacle 
to a usurper as forever to stifle ambition in the first conception 
of that object." (38) 
The point is not simply that power was decentralised,but that 
legitimate authority lay at this level, and any central power could 
only derive its right to rule from the local institutions. But even 
this does not fully account for the resilience of American democracy. 
The local institutions embodied the continuity of the rule of law. 
Authority, not least the authority of the men who drafted the 
Declaration and the Constitution, derived from the complex of bodies 
that pre-existed the revolution - the districts, townships, and countiesG 
And their authority derived from the 'constitution 9 which the 
Mayflower colonists agreed •mongst themselves for their own security 
in the 'state of nature' that awaited them. The American ffevolution 
was made in the name of established legal conventions, and not against 
them; the revolution was against what were interpreted as attempts to 
impose a tyranny upon a previously free society.( 3g) Few creators of 
modern states have been able to draw upon such clear and incontrovertible 
=142= 
lineages of legitimacy, deriving from a 'free contract' arrived at 
in a territory previously without government. But the example is 
relevant for those who would attempt similar tasks in less favourable 
conditions. 
For it may be that neither the problems that the Russian 
revolutionaries were attempting to solve 9 ~ the fundamental 
assumptions with which they approached these problems, were profoundly 
different from those of the American revolutionaries. Here, of course, 
I am minimising the differences that are often held to separate and 
distinguish 'bourgeois' revolutions from 'proletarian' ones. I am 
particularly concerned to set aside arguments that would attribute to 
the thinkers of the American revolutions no other motive than that of 
establishing a new class power, the power of the indigenous bourgeoisie, 
in its own right. Similarly, I am similarly concerned to avoid 
attribution to the Bolsheviks of fundamental motivations in specific 
class terms: either the determination to establish the class power of 
the proletariat 9 or, more deviously 9 to establish the power of a 'new 
class', -bureaucracy, state bourgeoisie, intelligentsia or whatever. 
Instead, it is worth suggesting that both bodies of revolutionaries 
partook of a fundamental ethical aim, and drew in significant measure 
upon a common intellectual tradition. 
I want to present two sets of themes that our revolutionaries 
appear to possess in common. Firstly, that involved in Jefferson's 
concept of 1 self=evidence' and the Marxian concept of its own status 
as a science; secondly, the possible congruences between Lenin's 
concept of the commune-state and the American concept of 'public 
happiness'. On the first theme, I have previously commented on the 
manner in which the Bolsheviks 'constructed' a 'general will'. The 
attribution of a scientific status to Marxism provided the Bolsheviks 
with a ready-made and almost automatic method of excluding various 
forces from the political process, and relegating political problems 
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to the status of conflicts between those who knew the truth and those 
who 9 out of ignorance, malice, or self-interest, refused to acknowledge 
that truth. But in this context the words of the American Declaration 
of Independence are evocative: "We hold these truths to te self=evident." 
It was upon the assumption of self=evidence for certain rights that the 
case against British tyranny was built 9 and the revolution made. 
Jefferson's choice of words is crucial, because it is an assertion 
of John Locke's epistemology of self=evidence against the doctrine of 
innate ideas. The concept of innate ideas, it was held~was a secure 
buttress for 'dictators'. It was necessary to admit the use of reason 
into the process of the judgement of political institutions, for the 
use of reason would persuade everyone of the precepts upon which 
democratic government was based. It was therefore self-evident that 
all men were created equal, entitled to inalienable rights including 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that governments were 
instituted to secure these rights, and that citizens had the right to 
overthrow such governments as failed to discharge satisfactorily their 
obligations. 
But the political consequences of such philosophical assumptions 
may prove problematic. Has every citizen the right, simply by 
claiming to be moved by reason, to reject the legitimacy of the 
government if he so wishes? It was necessary for the sake of political 
stability to introduce certain distinctions: 
"When we speak of a tyrant that may lawfully be dethroned 
by the people, we do not mean by the word people, the vile 
populace or rabble of the country, nor the cabal of a small 
number of factious persons, but the greater and more judicious 
part of the subjects, of all ranks." (40) 
Locke's arguments were therefore called on to stress that reason 
was a faculty, and one which it was entirely possible that ~eople might 
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fail 9 or refuse 9 to useo There are those: 
11
oee whose opportunities of knowledge and inquiry 
are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their 
undnr~tnndings are but litt!e instructnd 9 ~hen n!l ~hei~ 
whole time and pains is laid out to still the croaking of 
their own bellies, or the cries of their childreno 11 
This may appear to be an elitist attempt to exclude the labouring 
classes from the democratic political process; but Locke does not 
confine himself to such classeso There are those 9 morally inferior 9 
persons who have the opportunity to use reason 9 but lack the will 9 
"Their hot pursuit of pleasure 9 or constant drudgery 
in business 9 engages some men's thoughts elsewhere: laziness 
and oscitancy in general 9 or a particular aversion for books 9 
study and meditation 9 keep others from any serious thoughts at 
all; and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not 
favour those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives 
and designs 0 content themselves, without examination 9 to take ( 4l) 
on trust what they find convenient and in fashiono" 
It is thus clear that the assumptions of the Americans appear to 
contain implications that we could consider dangerously undemocratico 
For those who are not capa~e of using 9 or who refuse to use, reason, 
not only have a very dubious claim to participate in a democratic 
process founded on reason, their constant pollution of the public 
life with the politics of unreason might threaten the survival of the 
republic itselfo Surely 9 we are not far from Lenin? Locke's latter 
quote could refer equally to Lenin's bourgeoisie 0 impelled either by 
moral degeneration, or 'class situation 1 9 or class interest, to deny 
the truths of Marxism; and how reminiscent of Lenin's complaints about 
the low cultural level of the masses is Locke's description of the 
labouring pood In this crucial, over-riding sense, then, both 
Jefferson and Lenin were children of the Age of Reason: claiming 
their authority on the basis of reason 9 and then driven to use reason 
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to halt the corrosive undermining of their own positions that reason 9 
once loose, may effect. Without pursuing the comparison any further 9 
we may simply suggest for consideration the effect of the following in 
producing the very different results of the two revolutions: firstly 9 
of course 9 the tasks that the American governments were subsequently to 
take upon themselves were minimal: the American populace lived in a 
state agreed by all as one already of 'prosperity', and it was a long 
time before industrialisation became the central objective of a 
revolutionary government. How to deal with the 'unreasonable' did not 
become a genuine political problem once the War of Independence was won, 
at least until the Civil War a century later. Secondly, inasmuch as 
the Americans were working within a tradition of avowedly moral 
philosophy, which did not claim to conquer and systemise the whole of 
human knowledge, or claim a fundamental rupture with all that had been 
previously thought, the imperious claims of reason were balanced by 
inheritances from a Christian tradition. Locke himself declined to 
write a handbook of ethics based upon his concept of reason because he 
considered these to be already presented in the New Testament, and thus 
already available, through faith, to the non-enlightened. Further, the 
Americans were probably far more concerned than later imitators to 
intellectually justify the form of government they had created, and 
there is evidence that in his later career Jefferson was prepared to 
admit the existence of a 'moral sense' that pre-existed the use of 
reason, although it was still the inescapable duty of reason to judge 
and verify these pre-rational responses. The existence of a 'moral 
sense' will admit to the political process those whose clumsiness in 
the field of reason might have excluded. 
Arguably we might be able to find a further parallel between the 
eighteenth century concept of moral sense and Lenin's concept of the 
'proletariat'. The attempt to introduce a 'proletarian' counterweight 
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to the burgeoning bureaucracy via Rabkrin and similar measures 
suggests Lenin's continuing acceptance of a proletarian moral 
sense. That isp he believed in an essential faculty of a 
sociological groupp that depended not upon their ability to absorb 
Marxism, but rather that makes it possible for the proletariat, or 
its best elements, to absorb and understand Marxism and avoid the 
corruptions of power. But Jefferson's 'moral sense' was a capacity 
endowed on people by a Creator; Lenin's being dependent upon an 
exclusive sociology, was rather more attenuated. Indeed, far more 
than Jefferson, Lenin lacked confidence in both the willingness to 
reason and the innate moral capacities of the people, and that itself 
could not be without consequences. 
The second theme where we may find parallels involves the 
conception of the purpose of the revolution. It was very far from 
the mind of both Lenin and Jefferson simply to remove a set of specific 
grievances that a tyrannical govern~ent imposed upon the people. It 
was not their aim merely to free people to once more live their lives 
as they might once have done, without a tyrannical government. Arendt 
argues that it was not simply the colonists' intention to regain 
liberties which were, or had been possessed by native Englishmen, and 
h . h d . d h d h . 1 . ( 42 ) w ~c1 were en1e t em ue tot elr status as co on~sts. That was 
no longer enough. The claim to the 'right to h::ppiness' was, for the 
Americans, not simply a right to private happiness, the happiness ·of 
the subject secure in his domestic and professional pursuits, un-
trammelled by arbitrary interference of unpredictable government. It 
was also, and most significantly, a claim to a new •public happiness'. 
This claim derived from the assumption that the right to participate 
in the affairs of government was a central element of the highest 
happiness at which men might aim. Participation in public affairs 
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was no longer, as in the past, a burden that some must bear in order 
that others might pursue unhindered their private happiness. l.Jhere 
critics might ascribe the happiness that the American legislators 
derived from their work simply to an 'inordinate passion for power'p 
those men would reply that their enjoyment merely confirmed that such 
activities would afford the same reward to all and any who engaged in 
them. Thus the entitlement of all citizens to participate in the 
public realm was a central motivating theme far the Americans. 
It is clear that Lenin conceives of the politics of the new 
society in terms similar to Jefferson. He also was not content that 
the new state should simply avoid the abuses of the old and allow the 
citizens a life free from material deprivation and political abuse. 
That, again, was his argument with the Social Democrats. He also 
wanted a state which would itself expressand encapsulate the new 
happiness of the people: the happiness that derives from running 
their own lives, from taking to themselves decisions that had previously, 
for good ~ ill, been made for them. 
Perhaps it is possible to speak of this aspect of the American 
Revolution being, in a sense, 'betrayed', just as were Lenin's 
aspirations for the new Russian state. Arendt points out that 
Jefferson failed to articulate the concept of public happiness clearly 
in the Declaration, as distinct from 'private happiness•. The two 
are, arguably, conflated in the term 'the pursuit of happiness'. 
For Arendt, the rapidity with which the specific concept of •public 
happiness' was forgotteng 
"• •• and the term used and understood without its original 
qualifying adjective may well be the standard by which to 
measure. In America no less than in France, the loss of the 
original meaning and the oblivion of the spirit that had been 
manifest in the Revolution. u(43) 
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For the concept of the pursuit of happinessg in its attenuated 
form of the pursuit of private happiness, can be seen as the basis 
for a culture of aggressive accumulation of personal wealth, of t.he 
elevation of material happiness at the expense of public goodp of 
the worship of the technology that promises the satisfaction - and 
the constant expansion - of those desires that may go under the name 
of private happiness. It can consequently be seen as one root of the 
transformation of public life from the field of highest happiness -
through sagely exercising respnsibility with the approbation of others -
into the instrument for the further accumulation of personal wealth -
and 'happiness•. Marcuse's maral critique of contemporary American 
society, is therefore, one with which the American revolutionaries 
would probably whole-heartedly agree. 
I would not want to pursue much further the parallels I have 
suggested between Lenin and Jefferson, although clearly the con-
siderations that they prompt go much further than the points that I 
have tentatively suggested. But the strikingly similar ideas that 
both the American and the Russian experiences contain suggest how 
relevant is the experience of the former to the sad story of the 
latter, a relevance that has certainly not been fully explored. 
Beyond that, it may for my purposes simply underline the relevance 
of the area I have suggested wherein the assumptions and the experi.ences 
of the two revolutions were markedly, and consciously, dissimilar, that 
of the rule of law. 
The Party Problem 
It is common in critiques of the Soviet state to attribute its 
deficiencies to the authoritarian structure of the Bolshevik Party 
from its earliest pre-revolutionary days. Its intolerance, its 
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exclusivity, its hierarchical structure, its concentration of 
effective power at the top can all be detected in the USSR not 
a process of organic growth as the authoritarian party creates the 
authoritarian state. My argument would not srek to deny this, but 
rather to relegate it to a subordinatestatus as an explanatory 
schema. The concentration on the responsibility of the Party allows 
the responsibility of the constitution to escape unexamined. Indeed, 
the absence of the Party from the pages of The State and Revolution 
has provided an argument for the innocence of that text, by implying 
to its ideas a viability and practicality that was simply corrupted 
or abolished by the democratic centralist organisation. In contrast, 
I would suggest that the regrettable features of the Bolshevik Party 
were not a world apart from features that all political parties tend 
to display; the fact that these features came to define the lineaments 
of the Russian state, whereas elsewhere they appear to have been kept 
under control, is due to Lenin's concept of state form, not his concept 
of party. 
The Leninist Party is accused of two ominous qualities. 
Internally, it has an excessively rigid and centralist character, 
denoted by the term 'democratic centralism•; and in its relations with 
the external political world, it claims a status of privilege over 
other political tendencies inasmuch as its politics claim to be 
'scientific'. The consequences of both these assumptions may then 
be identified in the subsequent authoritarian regime. 
Essentially, democratic centralism was intended' 
" ••• to make the local organisations the principle 
organisational units of the Party in fact and not merely 
in name, and to see to it that all the higher-standing ( 44 bodies are elected, accountable, and subject to recall." ) 
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In this it differs hardly at all from the aormal manner in which 
the internal life of political parties is organised except in one 
respect. But the differentia specifica of democratic centralism lay 
in its definition of conditions under which no democratic norms would 
be allowed to prevails 
"In the heat of the battle, when the proletarian army 
is straining every nerve, no criticism whatever can be 
permitted in its ranks. But before the call far action is 
issued, there should be the broadest and freest discussion 
and appraisal of the resolution, of its arguments and its 
various propositions."(45) 
The question acutely posed is therefore, who shall issue the 
'call far action' which will terminate discussion? Who is to decide 
what shall constitute such an 'action' and for how long shall its 
authority be deemed to have sway? Lenin proposed the simple answers 
the Party Congress, the highest and most representative authority of 
the Party. But if the •action' situation ever came to prevail for 
years, as it quite publicly did in the desperate post-revolutionary 
situation, the Party Congress will be composed of members elected 
under conditions where full democratic discussion has long since been 
absent. The Party Congress, under such conditions, contain no 
guarantee of expression of the arguments of the membership. 
The assumption of a 'scientific' status for the decisions of 
the Leninist Party suggests that in its relations with other political 
parties it will pursue a quite unique course. This assumption 
establishes that political differences with the Party may not be 
considered as differences of opinion, but as error. This clearly 
legitimises the dismissal and suppression of oppositional and critical 
political tendencies, and explains the course of events from the 
suppression of the Constituent Assembly in November 1917 to the 
eventual disappearance of all other parties, and then the eventual 
suppression of all political differences within the single surviving 
party. 
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The internal and external threats to democracy contained in the 
Leninist Party are thus clearly culpable in the subsequent developments 
of the dictatorship. But they can be only part of the explanationp 
and for this reason my argument does not place a great deal of 
emphasis on the implications of Lenin's thoughts of the party. 
Parties, after all, are voluntary institutions, and have the right to 
determine how they shall order their internal lifep no-one is obliged 
to join. Further, if 'democratic centralism' is overtly ominous in 
its implications for political life of a party, it may be that this 
hardly represents a more fundamental violation of the principles of 
free association and control than the situation that actually obtains 
within political parties that have not taken the pains to make their 
assumptions so explicit. The ability of political elites to determine 
the nature and course of debate, to minimise the effectiveness of 
their internal opponP~ts, to perpetuate their own rule and ideology 
are familiar elem~nts of the critique of oligarchical tendencies of 
mass parties. The power of such oligarchies may well be all the 
greater for being informal and unwritten. 
Michels summarised his analysis of such tendenciess 
"••• if we leave out of consideration the tendency 
of the leaders to organise themselves and to consolidate 
their interests, and if we ~ve also out of consideration 
the gratitude of the led toward the leaders, and the 
general immobility and passivity of the masses, we are 
led to conclude that the principle cause of oligarchy in 
the democratic parties is to be found in the ( 46) technical indispensability of leadership." 
Thus the simple existence of 'democratic centralism' is 
unconvincing as an explanation for the decline of democracy in 
the USSR. 
Similarly, it may be argued that every political party has 
the right to formulate its own ideology& and will necessarily 
assume a clear and rational superiority for its own ideas over those 
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of its opponents. The idea of civilised exchange of opinions is 
always to some degree at odds with the passions and interests 
involved in the issues that constitute the field of politics. The 
Leninists were not the first to fall to the temptation of sabotaging 
or, where possible, suppressing their political opponents. 
Bolshevism was, therefore, composed very largely of methods 
of internal organisation, and attitudes toward the external world, 
that favoured an absolutist outcome. Doubtless, a political party 
would do well to do without these features if at all possible. But 
inasmuch as political combat is very often about fiercely-hold views, 
it would be difficult to establish a set of prescriptions that would 
guarantee the absence of such natures. Whether or not these features 
are allowed to express themselves to the extent of constructing the 
authoritarian state, therefore, will depend upon whether there are 
institutions within the society that can balance and limit such 
tendencies. The problem of the Bolshevik dictatorship, therefore, 
is ultimately a question of the constitution of the state. 
Constitutions are rules for limiting the powers which any 
institution may aggregate to itself within a complex of institutions. 
The problem of the simple state of Lenin's model, simply put, is 
that the fewer institutions there are that make up the body politics, 
the greater the proportion of the total sum of power that will be 
lodged in each institution. If these institutions are reduced to 
one, or to a set of institutions that are not significantly separated, 
power is unitary, not distributed. This, of course, is the negation 
of the field of democratic politics. 
Conclusions The Guilt of The State and Revolution 
The problem of bureaucracy is thus only seriously confronted 
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when its roots are discovered at the depth that I have suggested. 
It is possible to control a bureaucracy only when its prerogatives 
and limits are defined by the process of legislation. In the 
absence of that it will either write its own laws and amplify its 
own powers~ or it will be victim of unrestrained political authority, 
performing its functions according to diktat, and consequently under 
pressure of haste, whim, expediency, and corruption. Since the 
absence of the rule of law plunges the administration into a sea 
of arbitrariness, there is no reason why it should not do both. 
A bureaucratic problem does not, therefore, only emerge when 
popular power is usurped by a ruling minority, as the Bolshevik coup 
might appear to. In reality, there may be little difference between 
the situation of party dictatorship and that of the popular power of 
Lenin's Commune State as far as their consequences on the problem of 
bureaucracy are concerned. Both illegitimately invade the domain of 
the administrative decision and distort its proceeding with a pervasive 
set of value=orientations. The distinction between the two domains 
collapses, and there ensures an unhealthy and chaotic osmosis whereby 
each domain comes to absorb approaches appropriate only to theother. 
Thus the 'political' institutions of the Soviet state- the factory 
committees, the party cells, takes on the culture of administrative 
apparatuses, forced to accept the limited powers and rights of 
knowledge and discussion more appropriate to the administration. 
And the bureaucracy becomes a Byzantine labyrinth of interest and 
intrigue. 
I am, therefore, suggesting that there is a conflation of 
politics and administration in The State and Revolution. Such a 
conflation must herald a disastrous cross-pollution of the two 
domains, and this is what underlies the enormous steering problems. 
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of Soviet society. The mechanism of social operations become 
inpenetrable and devoid of possibility of control. 
The arguments in Chapters 3 and 4, therefore, lead to a central 
suggestion» which may counter the collection of naive and distant 
interpretations of Lenin's text which were discussed in a previous 
chapter. The common thread of all those interpretations was the 
essentially innocent nature of Lenin's text. That is, the text is 
innocent of the subsequent destruction of democracy under the Bolsheviks. 
The text was a utopian document that could not be implemented in the 
harsh objective conditions; the text was an ambiguous document that 
contained the acceptable and the unacceptable - the Soviet as well as 
the terror; the text was a tactical work which really should not be 
asked to measure up to the actual strategic problems that faced the 
new governments; the text was part of an argument with the Social 
Democrats of Paris and Berlin, not a serious contribution to political 
theory; or, the text was the repository of genuine emancipatory politics, 
betrayed by the dull positivity of historical conditions or the ambitions 
of political careerists; and so on. My argument ~ld suggest, instead, 
that the text, in all its moments - libertarian and authoritarian - is 
guilty of subsequent developments' that is, the features of the 
authoritarian Soviet regime are present within every line and concept 
of the text. 1md it is not just a question of similarity between what 
was written and what later happeneds the cultural effect of The State 
and Rsvolution can be suggested as the causal link between the text and 
subsequent events. 
The central absence in Lenin's politics is a theory of 
political institutions. All political functions are collapsed into 
one institution, the Soviet, and even that institution itself will 
know no division of labour within itself according to different 
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functions. Lenin's state-form is one-dimensional. It allows for 
no distances, no spaces, no appeals, no checks, no balances, no 
processes, no delays. no interrogations~ and above all 9 no 
distribution of power. All such are ruthlessly and deliberately 
excluded, as precisely the articulations of the disease of corruption 
and mystification. The new state form will be transparent, monological 
and unilinear. It is, in sum, a gigantic gamble; the gambleis that 
it will be possible to set about constructing this state in 'the best 
of all possible worlds'. The odds against the gamble are astronomic. 
It does not simply demand the absence of the peculiarly unhelpful 
conditions of post-1917 Russia - although those conditions themselves 
have for a long time conspired to suggest the essential innocence of 
the model. It also demands a situation devoid of all political 
conflicts, of all economic problems, of all social contradictions, 
of all inadequate, selfish, or simply human emotions and motivations, 
of all singularity, of all negativity. It demands, in short, for 
Lenin's political structures to work, that there be an absence of 
politics. 
But the •crime' of Lenin's text is not that it did not work: 
it is that it did. The 'libertarian' Lenin bears equal responsibility 
for the Gulag with the 'authoritarian' Lenin. Lenin's theory of the 
state rigorously outlawed all and any version of those political 
institutions and relationships that can make the triumph of the Gulag 
less likely. In their place, The State and Revolution put a concept 
of the state that already, in August 1917, was monolithic, 
authoritarian, single-willed and uncheckable. It matters not what 
Lenin's intentions were. The extent of Lenin's responsibility is 
not defined by his intentions, but by his implications. Lenin's 
text was responsible for things Lenin, perhaps, never conceived. 
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The issue is not what the author intended» but whatthe text dictated. 
The text created a discourse x a field of ideas within WU.ch subsequent 
thinking had to take placep outside of which thought was not merely 
illegalp bu~ impossiblep a non-sense. The Cbeka, the Politburo 6 the 
Institute of Marxism Leninism were hardly needed to police the borders 
of that discourses a discourse has no need of border guards because 
the discourse is a 'world-view'. It colonises the whole planet of 
thought and leaves no enclaves from which resistance may be mounted. 
Only the passage of time can subvert such a discourse; reason can do 
nothing. 
References to Chapter 3 
(1) L. Colletti From Rousseau to Lenin (1972) p.65, Landon. 
(2) u. Santamaria & A. Manville Lenin and the Transition (1976) 
Telos 27. 
(3) P. Corrigan, H. Ramsay, D. Sayer Socialist Constnuction and 
Marxist Theory (1978) p.26, London. 
(4) Ibid, p.45, 46. 
(5) Ibid, p.46. 
(6) P. Corrigan, H. Ramsay, D. Sayer Bolshevism and the USSR (1981) 
New Left Review 125, p.58. 
(7) D. Lane Soviet Industrial Workers: Lack of a Legitimation 
Crisis? in B. Denitch (Ed.) Legitimation of Regimes, New York, 
0979), p. 190. 
(8) Lewin, op.cit, p.278. 
(9) Ibid, p.279, 280. 
(10) M. Horkheimer The Authoritarian State in Arato & Gebhardt The 
Essential Frankfurt School Reader, Oxford (1978), p.lOl. The 
precise translation used here, however 6 is taken from D.Howard 
The Marxian Legacy, london (1977) p.llO, as it seems to express 
the idea more clearly. 
(11) Ibid, p.99. 
(12) H. Marcuse The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian 
View of the State (1934) in Negations (1972) p.l9, London. 
-157-
(13) M. Jay The Dialectical Imagination (1973), p.l55, London. 
(14) Marcuse Negations (1972) pp.xii, xii, London. 
(15) Ibid, p.xvii. 
0.6) P • .Piccone 'lhe Crisis oi: Une-Dimensiunality (19/8) in Telos 35, p. 4"7. 
See also P. Piccone The Changing Function of Critical Theory 
in New German Critique 12 Fall 1977 pp.29-30; T.Luke Culture 
and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity, Telos 35, pp.55-72. 
(17) H. Marcuse Some Social Implications of Modern Technology (1941) 
in Arato & Beghardt op.cit, p.l55. 
(18) Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of 
Max Weber in Negations, p.203. 
(19) Piccone, op.cit, p.46. 
(20) s. Giner Mass Society (1976) p.209, London. 
(21) J. Habermas Towards a Rational Society (1971), p.63, London. 
(22) Horkheimer op.cit, p.98. 
(23) Ibid, pp.l04, 105. 
(24) Arato Political Sociology and the critique of Politics in Arato 
and Gebhardt op.cit, p.l9. 
(25) F. Pollock, State Capitalism: Its Possibilities end Limitations 
(1941) in Arato & Gebhardt op.cit, p.73. 
(26) Ibid, p.93. 
(27) J. Habermas Theory and Practice (1974), London, p.42. 
(28) R.J. Bernstein The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory 
Oxford (1976), p.l87. 
(29) J. Habermas Towards a Rational Society (1971), p.63, London. 
(30) J. Habermas Legitimation Crisis (1976) pp.l42,143, London. 
(31) J. Habermas Towards a Rational Society (1971), p.63, London. 
(32) Ibid, p.64. 
(33) Ibid, p.67. 
(34) Bendix op.cit, p.466. 
(35) Quoted in H. Arendt On Revolution, London (1964), p.l83. 
(36) Ibid, p.l63. 
(37) Ibid. 
-158-
(38) T. Jefferson Letter to Destutt de Tracy (1811) in Tbe 
Portable Thomas Jefferson (1977) p.524~ London. 
(39) Arendt op.cit, p.l65. 
(40) Liebman op.cit! p.51. 
(41) This is a quotation by John Adams from the work of a French 
Philosphep Babeyrac. C~ted in M.White The Philosophy of 
the American Revolutionp Oxfordp l978p p.49. 
(42) John Lockep Essay Concerning Human Understandingp Book IV g 
Chap.XX Section 2g Section 6. Cited in White op.cit.p.55. 
(43) Arendt op. cit. Chapter 3 "The Pursuit of Happiness" pp. 115-140. 
(44) Ibidg p.l32. 
(45) Liebman op.cit. p.5l. 
(46) Ibid. 
(47) R. Michels Political Parties New York 1959g p.400. 
=159= 
CHAPTER 4 
THE TEXT AND ITS CONTEXT: 
In Chapter 1 9 I discussed the judgements of Lenin's texts that 
have been attempted by historians, and one of the qualities that 
could be seen in their comments was a certain air of surpriseG 
That is, The State and Revolution was something of an 'absurd' or 
'impossible' text in the light of Lenin's extremely practical politics. 
At best, this absurdity could be reconciled to reality by attributing 
its writing to devious, or even dishonest, motives. 
Doubtless, there is a contradiction; such accounts of the text 
are not wrong in insisting on absurdity. If politicians may be 
criticised in contemporary discourse or in biographical analysis for 
their failures to fulfil the promises they make, there is no more 
outrageous example of 'bad faith' than the state that Lenin constructed 
after 1917. In the preceding chapter I have attempted to show, however, 
that the connection between the text and Lenin's subsequent activities 
is more intimate, and more rational, and more inevitable, than such 
criticisms would allow. I propose now to consider the problem from 
another angle: having estahlished the relationship between the text 
and the state that subsequently emerged in Russia, I will investigate 
the relationship between the text and Lenin. That is, I want to map 
Lenin's path to The State and Revolution. I do not intend a com-
prehensive intellectual biography; it will be more useful to highlight 
and focus on four domains, or four stages in Lenin's path, that were 
influential in determining the destination of his intellectual journeyo 
These four domains may be, loosely, termed those of Lenin's cosmology; 
Lenin's culture; Lenin's concept of Parliamentarism; and Lenin's 
theory of political motivation. 
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Lenin's Cosmoloar 
Much has been written in recent years to the effect that Marx's 
project was essentially scientific. Althusser prefaced his influential 
essay on 'Marxism and Humanism' with what he regards as a paradigmatic 
quotation from one of Marx's last writings: 
"My analytical method does not start from man (l) 
but from the economically given social periodo" 
In other words, Marxism is not a humanismo 
Althusser seeks to establish a straightforward opposition between 
the Marx who started from man, and the Marx who conceived man as a 
result of an 'economically given social period 1 o Accordingly, the 
early Marx consecutively adopted two assumptions that were undermined 
by the same philosophical erroro The common error was humanism, the 
suggestion that there existed a human 'essence' or 1 nature 1 9 and that 
history was anaccount of the effectivity of such essential themeso 
Marx's first version of this was "liberal-rationalist" 9 a theme 
derived directly from the enlightenmento This was later displaced by 
the concept of '1 communialist '' humanism, wherein such a human essence 
could only be expressed in "universal human relations, with men and 
with his objects". Here Marx's philosophy is already politics, a 
practical politics of social revolution. But for Althusser this was 
by no means the true scientific Marx. That could only appear when 
the coneept of man was abandoned and this unacceptable humanism was 
replaced at the centre of philosophy and politics by a different 
subject: the social formation constituted by the specific articulations 
of forces of production and relations of production, an ensemble which 
produces, not man, but simply different specific level of human practiceo( 2 ) 
It may indeed be possible to construct a Marxism that is purely 
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such a science of social formations. Such a project is entirely 
legitimate for those who wish to commit themselves to it. But the 
problems that Al thusser experiences in identify inq the wri tinos of Marx 
that are truly free of non-scientific (in other words 9 Hegelian) 
influences indicate that the assumptions that Marx held about his own 
work are rather different. If we are to understand Marxism 
sociologically (rather than understand Marxist sociology) we must 
attempt to define the impulses behind it. To ignore the origins of 
Marx's work is to fail to grasp its specific intent, and consequently 
to be left bereft of its significance within European culture, and its 
impact upon contemporary society. The early writings and the humanism 
that Althusser rejects illuminate Marx as a child of the Enlightenment, 
and in particular of that period of the enlightenment wherein reason 
was revealed as being not without profound costs;in this the work 
of Kant was of great importance. While Marx pays little or no 
attention to Kant's writings, it is clear that he was involved in 
working out an alternative to the answer which Hegel offered to the 
Kantian problem. This problem was how to resolve the impact of 
Kant's thought on the integrity of man. It has been said that 
Kant found man whole and left him internally shattered, the victim 
of the acutest of antinomies: 
"The prime tasks of thought and sensibility were seen as 
the overcoming of the profound oppositions which had been 
necessary, but which now had to be surmounted ••• These were; 
the opposition between thought, reason and morality on one 
side, and desire and sensibility on the other; the opposition 
between the fullest self-conscious freedom on one side, and life 
in the community on the other; the opposition between self-
consciousness and communion with nature; and beyond this the 
separation of finite subjectivity from the infinite life that 
flowed through nature ••• How was this great reunification to 
be accomplished? How to combine the greatest moral autonomy 
with a fully restored communion with the great current of life 
within us and without?" (3) 
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Appropriately translated, this amounts to a summary of the 
problems of modernity that have become a central concern of 
socioloqists and political philosophers over the past century. 
It expresses the costs of 9 rationalization 9 9 the roots of 'anomie 9 9 
and 9 of course 9 Marx's most powerful and evocative theme of alienation 9 
the feeling of a lack of completeness and sufficiency surrounding one's 
being in the world. For industrial man, Kant evoked potent themes, 
and, whatever the claims of Althusser and his school, it is indisputable 
that Marxism would have had little significance in the world as a 
politics did it not address itself centrally to these themes. A 
philosophy that can offer answers to the contemporary problem of being 
in ~e world of modernity will find adherents where a science of the 
development of social formations will remain forever lonelyJ &t is 
perhaps no surprise that Althusser accepted that he and his fellow 
scientists of Marxism would remain a distinct elite in his future 
society. It has been said of Hegel that: 
"His ideal, like that of most of his contemporaries, 
was that of the recreation of a whole man in an integrated 
cohesiv~ political community." (4) 
and Marx may clearly be said to have adopted this as the essential 
purpose of his work. Perhaps it would not be too much to suggest 
that Lenin in his own way was driven by such impulseso Hegel and 
Marx, of course, differed from later social critics of 1 dehumanisation' 
such as Weber and Durkheim by their willingness to embrace the project 
of discovering a comprehensive solution to the problem. But it is 
here that a philosophical assumption may become a political threat. 
I refer to the threat inherent in what Adorno calls 'identity 
theory'o That is the assumption of an identical structure of mind 
and matter, the actuality or the possibility of the identity of concept 
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and object. After Kant, it was hardly possible to maintain previous 
naive assumptions to the effed~ such identity already existed~ but 
similarly, after Kant 9 few were happy to reconcile themselves tn a 
universe which emphatically escaped the possibility of human control 0 
and which rendered inevitable the acute existential problems already 
referred too Thus identity was not rejected; rather its achievement 
became a historical project as opposed to a pre~existing feature of an 
ordered universee In Hegel this issued in the concept of the Absolute 
Idea,translated 9 in history, as the modern state: 
11
ooo the free individual must ultimately come to see 
himself as the vehicle of universalteason; and when the 
state comes to full development as the embodiment of this 
reason, the two are reconciledo" (5) 
For Marx, clearly, identity would become possible by the act of 
proletarian revolution, when the universal class, the proletariat, 
became identical with the object, with society and history, and 
rendered it transparent and rational. This would constitute the 1end 
of prehistory', that is the resolution of all those conflicts and 
torments that arise from a situation where man is confronted by 
society as something unknown and uncontrolled. Lukacs' later 
'subject-object identical' succinctly summed up this projecte( 6 ) 
What are the dangers of the search for identity? Adorno 
described the philosophical threat involved as follows: 
"Whenever something that is to be conceived flees 
from identity with the concept, the concept will be forced 
to take exaggerated steps to prevent any doub~of the un~ 
assailable validity, solidity, and acribia of the thought 
product from stirringo Great philosophy was accompanied by 
a paranoid zeal to tolerate nothing else, and to pursue 
everything else with all the cunning of reason, while the 
other kept retreating farther and farther from the pursuito 
The slightest remnant of non-identity sufficed to deny an 
identity conceived as total." (7) 
If the search for identity changes from being a philosophical 
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project to describe the world, into a political project to change the 
world, its consequences can be terrifying: 'exaggerated steps' and 
'paranoid zeal'. will be acted out in historys That which is oursued 
will be men 9 not just things. Thus the historicisation of the identity 
project makes permissable the treatment of human beings in a hitherto 
unprecedented manner. All singularity must be absorbed into unity; 
all singularity constitutes, not a mere opposition, but a mortal threat 
from an unreconciled and unabsorbed Other. Such an 'Other' will have 
few defences: it is illogical 9 meaningless, and ultimately ephemeralo 
As Adorno concluded: 
"Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity 
as death •o• Genocide is absolute integration." (8) 
Lenin, of course, was actually philosophically anachronistice 
Sartre condemned "Lenin's unthinkable pre-critical philosophical 
thought"(g~ demonstrated by his commitment to an eighteenth century 
version of mechanical and reflectionist materialism. Perhaps his 
belated appreciation of Hegel during the war years produced an 
epistemology more in keeping with the projects of Hegel and Marx; 
there is little specific evidence for this. Nevertheless, Lenin 
was a philsopher of identity, in the following sense. 
It is arguable that Leninism is an origini doctrine, not merely 
a technology of power, because it provided the necessary reworking 
of the identity project in the light of the problems that seemed to 
undermine Marx's versiono The simple problem was the apparent 
inability or reluctance of the proletariat to act as the self-conscious 
agency of revolutiono This profound absence in reality ruptured the 
classical simplicity of Marx's doctrineo There were several possible 
reactions to this absence. The Lukacsian project could proceed no 
further after its enunciation in 1922: it was simply incapable of 
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embracing the contemporary reality, (lO) and consequently produced a 
utopian and leftist brand of political tactics which could not con= 
struct a tactical domain of any viabilityo The Bolsheviks had already 
overcome this probLem by accepting the displacement of class by partyo 
The 'immanent class consciousness' thesis found its theoretical elision 
and practical subuersion in Lenin's introduction of the concept of the 
party = the interventionist 9 manoeuvring, tactic-seeking partyo This 
had to result in the impleit interment of the concept of the proletariat 
as the transcendental subject of history. 
Bolshevism accepted this displacement of class by party as 
historical subject. This resulted in the body of strategies and 
practices subsequently known as Stalinism, which internalised politics 
as manoeuvre and manipulation in a manner foreign - and indeed morally 
repugnant - to classical Marxist theory. There were still those who 
rejected the ethical implications of such a choice of party over class, 
and opted for the alternate pole of class-as-subject. The 'left 
communists' and 'Council Communists' who did so had to accept the 
consequences: 'utopian' politics and historical 1irrelevance 1 .(ll) 
Others came to accept, at least implicitly, the absence of a 
revolutionary subject, and on such a basis were able to develop 
sophisticated analyses of classes, individuals, and ideas in 
capitalist society. Such was the career of the 'Frankfurt School'. 
Trotskyism, whose career was to be as unrewarding as that of the left 
commun~s, refused th~ twentieth century. The moml strength (which 
accounts for its attractiveness among certain subcultures), but 
political weakness, of Trotskyism resided in its refusal to recognise 
the chasm between proletarian actuality and Marxian theory that opened 
up some time early in this century. Trotskyism insistently believed 
in the need to build parties; but the theory constantly attempted to 
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displace agency from party to proletariato Here, a spirit of 
liberation still exists, yet history becomes a source of embarrassmento 
Parties constantly manage to substitute, as the working class demonstrates 
it inability to progress without the partyo Trotsky's politics thus 
became impoverished beyond seriousness, a product of sheer incom= 
prehensiono On the one hand, theories of betrayal and treachery; 
on the other, organisation fetishism offering to the proletariat 
simplistic analyses and exhortions to actiono 
The paradox of the collapse of Marx's theory of agency is then 
this: Mass parties, that, fundamentally, do not believe that the 
masses have any right, or role, to play in their own liberation; 
and tiny collectivities that ground themselves in mass self-
emancipation but remain desperately devoid of mass support. 
All of Lenin's actions were ultimately motivated by this ruthless 
and unsparing search for~e agency that would overcome the apparently 
irreconcilable diffuseness of the experience of the human subjecte 
In 1902 his argument in 'What Is To Be Done' indicates the first 
assertion of the inadequacy of the proletariat for this task, and 
the elevated role of the party that resultse But he could be 
swayed. The 1905 Revolution, displaying the spontaneous combativity 
of the Russian people, resulted in a greater appreciation of the 
working class, and brought him to moderate his views about how 
easily workers could be allowed to join and control the party. 
The decline of the revolutionary wave sees Lenin in the subsequent 
years obsessively monitoring the purity of the party once again. 
The impact of the war 9 which will be considered in detail later 9 
was disorientatingo Working class support for the war was 
attributable to the betrayal of the parties of Western Europe. 
This necessitated the further purification of the 'international' 
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party by consumating the split with the 9opportunists 1 o But that 
experience, along with the none too impressive performance of the 
Bolshevik Party before Lenin's return in April, combined with the 
astounding activities of the Russian working class 9 must also have 
brought the possibility of class as subject once again to priority in 
Lenin's mindo The absence of the party from the pages of The State 
and Revolution is at least partly attributable to this. 
Thus the problems of the philosophy of identity may have a 
bearing upon the legacy of Lenin. This specific historical legacy for 
the Russian people consisted of, firstly, the rise to power of an 
absolute dictator, and, secondly, the horrendous loss of life 
associated with, or consequent upon, this. Part of this may perhaps 
be attributed to regrettable necessities of the industrialisation 
process or the demands of state survival in hostile conditions. But 
much of the violent history of the USSR seems to defy explanation in 
rational terms. Once the dictatorship of the Party was consolidated 
in the early twenties, there seems to be a remarkable disparity 
between the potential of any putative opposition (whether they were 
internal party groups, anti-Bolshevik political remnants, or hostile 
social classes) and the degree of violence and energy expended against 
them. Perhaps, therefore, the rise to power of the absolute dictator 
can be partially explained by the constant displacement of the 
transcendental subject of history: from class to Party to Central 
CommitteG to, finally, General Secretary, as each potential subject 
consecuti~ely demonstrated its inadequacy to the task assigned to it 
by history. And perhaps the violence against all real or potential 
opposition can be understood by realizing that those who fell victim 
to the terror machine were identifiable as elements of an unreconciled 
Other, a standing outrage to the claims and sensibilities of the 
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imperialism of identity theoryQ 
Such considerations may in fact be brought to bear upon Lenin 
himself 9 his role and his historical fate (and consequently upon the 
remarkable hegemony that Lenin°s ideas established within the culture 
of the USSR). 
Marx 0s original project possibly contained in nuce the seeds of 
its later power of enchantment. This is the ability to reconcile the 
irreconcilable. The axiom about philosophers now having the task of 
changing the world is also a statement that philosophers now possess 
that very power. It is the possibility of creating a body of thought 
that removes the separation between 'is' and 'ought', and establishes 
a doctrine that combines a science and an ethic. The world can be 
known, and that known world will be revealed as expressing the highest 
ideals of the human spirit. But within this 'possibility', Lenin is 
unique. Despite Marx's aspirations, his role was to be little 
different from the one commonly reserved for the philosopher and 
intellectual: to comment on and criticise from the sidelines those 
actually engaged in the practical tasks of movements and states. 
This is not to condemn Marx: the communist philosopher-politician 
is a unique animal in history. Within the communist movement as it 
has developed since Marx's time the difficulty of combining the two 
roles is demonstrated by the scarcity of those who could truly claim 
to have done so. The division of party labour into 'theoreticians' 
and 'functionaries' is one that has been replicated throughout Marxian 
parties and regimes. 
Thus the philosophical and political writings of those who have 
aspired to such a dual role = Stalin 9 Breshnev 9 Ho-Chi-Minh 9 
Kim-11-Sung, while assiduously published and propagated 
by the state regimes they themselves constructed, are devoid of real 
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content or intellectual significance. The functionary mode came 
easily to cancel other possibilitieso The reverse of this coin 
are those people who in the Russia of the 1920's found that their 
insistence on 'theoretical' debate as the foundations for state 
policy contributed in no small measure to their rapid elimination 
from practical politicso Bukharin is a case in point, but far more 
illustrative is Trotskye 
Trotsky appears to be the supreme example of the man of action 
capable of reflecting profoundly on.his every political deed and 
statement: a man of a highly intellectual cast of mind, cultured 
and philosophically rigorous, who at the same time achieved a role 
in state affairs equalled by few. 
But the truth is that Trotsky was hardly a success when con-
fronted with the practical tasks of politics: that is, of reaching 
administrative decisions capable of encompassing and reconciling con-
tradictory influences, pressures, and demands, in situations bounded 
by scarce resources and the demands or the moment. His moments of 
real power bear this out. Trotsky emerged into the mainstream of 
history on two occasions. The first time was his chairmanship of the 
St. Petersburg Soviet in 1905o This experience, however, has little 
to do with the problem under discussion. It was not an administrative 
post: the Soviet was rather a theatre for grandiose and heroic 
gestures, an exercise in the true romanticism of the powerless, and 
Trotsky in his accounts of the experiences revels in precisely those 
dramatic gestures.(l 2 ) 
When finally entrusted with the problems of state in the post= 
1917 government, he resolved the problems that he encountered with a 
singular lack of subtlety. As Lenin diplomatically suggested in his 
Testament, Trotsky's actual state practice was 'excessively 
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administrative' in charactero His baptism of fire was the Brest-
Litovsk negotiations, where he pursued a policy of 'no-war 9 no-peace' 
in anticipation of the spread of the revolution 9 a policy that earned 
him the strictures of Lenin and further advances by the German armies 
(!ln 'ethical' position) o It appears to have been an educational 
experience: this brief romanticism was subsequently replaced by a 
determination to pursue the most ruthless form of practical politics: 
the purely administrative mode displaced any more sophisticated 
political confectionso He had no compunctions about taking and 
executing hostages, not simply from the enemy but from among the ranks 
of the Red Army ,pour encourager les autres'; he scorned those who 
advocated a new 'revolutionary' form of military strategy and 
organisation, and insisted on the superiority of conventional warfare 
and disciplined and hierarchical formations; he could see no better 
solution to the problem of relations between the trade unions and the 
state than to turn the unions into the arms of the state under the 
slogan of the 'militarisation of labour'. Trotsky collapsed into 
the administrative mode with a vengeance, and rejected all criticisms 
as the vapourings of woolly-minded liberals (his 'scientific' mode )o 
This brief, and ultimately embarrassing, experience of the 
realities of power soon gave way to his role as inner-party critic. 
He could return to his books, his references,his superb arguments 
and debating skillso Now he was the theorist and dissector of other 
people's mistakes - that is, their failure to apply Marxist philosophy 
rigorously to the affairs of stateo And, not surprisingly, as his 
distance from tt-e .lEvers of pOl•Jer grew 9 as his responsibilities 
diminished, so grew the theological cast of his criticisms and the 
utopian flavour of his solutionso 
The list of those who managed to retain the leadership of party 
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and state while justifying their actions with a recourse to Marxian 
doctrine is therefore limited to two: Lenin and Mao~Tse-Tung. The 
latter is, howeverQ somewhat different from Lenin; perhaps he is so 
distanced from the original roots of Marxian philosophy and social 
theory that it is valueless to discuss him as a Marxiste It was, 
after all, Mao's lifetime project to achieve the 'sinification of 
Marxism'. (l3 ) Lenin's project was never the Russification of 
Marxism; he had too much contempt for Russian culture to dream of the 
idea. His project was the westernization of Russia, through the most 
western of doctrines, classical Marxism. He believed that, at most, he 
was doing no more than creating a 'sub-set' of classical Marxism to 
take into account the needs of transforming a semi-feudal society into 
the image of that studied by Marx. 
Lenin, therefore, achieved the symbiosis of science and ethics 
with unique success, embodied in his own person. He made the 
revolution according to the scientific mode, and that revolution was 
'ggod'. His person is therefore the paradigmatic character of the 
twentieth century lust for identity. His ability to sustain, to 
live, to reconcile,the tension between revolutionary elan and humanist 
vision, on the one hand, and, on the other, the brute necessities of 
success and power, transformed him from a political leader into some-
thing truly unique. Those who bemoan the creation of a 'cult of 
Lenin' after his death(l4 ) fail to realise the inevitability of such 
a process. 
According to the culture he had created, he was not simply the 
great and respected leader of the revolution, but a figure of trans= 
cendental significance, a person who had broken through the crude 
limitations of human character to become the living embodiment of the 
identical subject-object. How could, then, one do less than worship 
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him, and the successor who claimed his mantle? 
Lenin's Parliament 
Revolution an obvious step is to attempt to trace the origins and 
evolution of the themes in Lenin's earlier writings. Such an 
examination will in fact prove disappointing and yield little in 
the way of an explicit geneaology for the ideas of 1917o Indeed 9 
despite the fact that the problem of parliament and the role of 
socialist parliamentarians had been considered in all its nuances 
within the European movement, particularly in the German Party, 
there is in Lenin a practical absence of any considerations of a 
fundamental nature: his discussion is exclusively in the domain 
of tactics towards particular institutions at particular moments. 
What comments there are can not easily be brought to bear upon 
Lenin's later definitive statement on the issues. 
The socialist movement in nineteenth century Europe did not 
conceive democracy in general and parliamentary institutions in 
particular as ends in themselves. Their concern was the complex 
of issues that emerged in the wake of the paradigmatic revolution 
against autocratic power, the French Revolution. The 'social 
problem' remained, and indeed was perhaps for the fint time 
revealed as a problem of a different order and depth, inaccessible 
to the purely political and constitutional innovations that radical 
movements had so far achieved. An awareness of the social problem 
thus constitutes equality as an unsolved problem within political 
democracy and transforms constitutionalochievsments into a means as 
well as an end. 
Colletti proposes as Marx's most perceptive account of 
parliamentary democracy his discussion of the French Constitution 
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of 1848. This analysis is notable for its recognition of the 
ambiguity of the short-lived institutionp 
"The comprehensive contradiction of this constitution.~ 
however 9 consists in the following: the classes whose 
slavery it is to perpetuate 9 proletariat 9 peasantry 9 petty-
bourgeoisie9 it puts in possession of political power through 
universal suffrage. And from the class whose old social 
power it sanctions, the bourgeosie, it withdraws the political 
guarantees of this power. It forces the rule of the bourgeoisie 
into democratic conditions 9 which at every moment help the 
hostile classes to victory and jeopardise the very foundations 
of bourgeois society. From the one it demands that they should 
not go forward from political to social emancipation; from the 
others that they should not go back from social to political 
restoration." (15) 
Colletti uses this formulation to counter what he considers to be two 
major misinterpretations of the constitutional state. One sees 
political equality as a mere 'trap' and the other sees the 
representative state as a genuine expression of the'general interest'. 
Against these 'sectarian' and 'revisionist' positions, Colletti 
asserts an interpretation that refuses to pre-judge the institutions 
of democracy themselves. For him, they have a certain quality of 
neutrality: they are the 'best terrain' upon which the dimensions 
. (16) 
of the social problem and tbe struggle to resolve 1t may be revealed. 
But clearly we are still here talking the language oftactics. 
There is no serious consideration of the problem of democratic 
institutions per se and how these may best be constructed to achieve 
the maximum of popular power in a non-authoritarian form. On this 
problem, as in the rest of the Harxian tradition, there is only a 
practical silence. 
Engels certainly, in his 1894 introduction to 'The Class 
Struggles in France' 9 is famous for taking a more than positive 
attitude towards the parliamentary and electoral experience of the 
German Social Democratic Party. But this statement itself is fraught 
with dangers of interpretation, since Rosenberg had argued that itwas 
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incomplete due to reasons of censorship. (l7) 
The politicians of the Second International were, of course, 
forced to take a more precise position 9 aptly summed up by Kautsky 
in 1892 s 
"The bourgeoisie» with all sorts of talents at its 
command, has hitherto been able to manipulate parliaments 
to its own purpose. Therefore, small capitalists and 
farmers have in large numbers lost all faith in legislative 
action ••• The proletariat is, however,more favourably 
situated in regard to parliamentary activity ••• Whenever the 
proletariat engages in parliamentary activity as a self-
conscious class, parliamentarism begins to change its character. 
It ceases to be a mere tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie ••• 
It is the most powerful lever that can be utilized to raise 18 the proletariat out of its economic, social, and moral degradation • .,( ) 
Kautsky's estimate of parliamentary activity carries a positive 
message, intended as it was to justify the work of the Party. But 
it is interesting that the attitude to parliament expressed there is 
more manipulative, more tactical, a~d less categoricruthan Marx's 
comments on the constitution. Marx's comments did not contain the 
suggestion that, under certain circumstances, the constitution would 
be a 'mere tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie'. On the contrary, 
the constitution itself set limits on the freedom of both paries to 
manipulate the political sphere as freely as they might wish. Kautsky 
sees the constitutional form as perhaps solely determined by the 
character with l-.Jhich it is invested by particular social forces. He 
does not foresee any possibility that the progress he notes might ever 
be reversed; but he perhaps does open a door for quite a reverse and 
negative estimate of the parliamentary form to be made by other people, 
under other circumstances. 
Kautsky's attitude was of course never itself acceptable to the 
more radical elements of the socialist tradition. They rejected 
parliament as both a genuine democratic form and as any aid to the 
struggle for social emancipation. This conception was to gain weight 
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after 1914 given its ability to express the fury and frustration 
felt by radicals at the outbreak of war. The clear inability of 
parties and parliaments to control and subdue the tendencies that 
brought war for no very clear reasons could be at least partially 
laid at the door of parliaments - they were complicit in the disaster. 
A putative instrument for the rational and dignified control of human 
affairs was apparently revealed as impotent. The more radical a body 
of politics is, the greater the belief in the innate susceptibility 
of human affairs to rationalist discourses and practices. It was 
not, therefore, surprising that the failure of parliament to effect 
this control was blamed on certain inherent inadequacies of that system. 
The indeterminate nature of all these positions would have denied 
to Lenin any coherent and authoritative tradition upon which he might 
have based his thoughts on democracy in the Russian context. 
But his early estimate of parliamentary structures in the USA 
and Switzerland was not noticeably negative,Cl9) and his strategy 
for Russia certainly included the need for parliamentary developments 
in the European style. Writing in 1895, he asserted thats 
" the struggle of the working cla..ss for its 
emancipation is a political struggle, and its first 
aim is to achieve political liberty." (20) 
Political liberty is here defined as consisting of the convening 
of a Constituent Assembly under universal suffrage, and the standard 
freedoms of assembly, press, etc. These were required because: 
" ••• the worker needs the achievement of the 
general democratic demands only to clear the road to (2 l) 
vic tory over the peoples ' chief enemy • • • capital. •• " 
Both Lenin and Kautsky defined the positive role of 
parliamentarism as educational as well as legislative. Kautsky 
ar~ued that electoral activity was a means of bringing political 
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confidence to the working class: 
"This very participation of the proletariat proves 
to be the most effective means of shaking up the 
hitherto indifferent divisions of the proletariat 
and giving rhem hope ;tnrl confirle...nce," (22) 
For Lenin, the educational experience is didactic rather than 
mobilising: 
"It is far more advantageous to the workers for 
the bourgeoisie to openly influence policy than, as (23 ) it the case now, to exert a concealed influence. 11 
But Lenin is not discussing parliaments and democracy as a 
substantive issue; the above is an argument he derives from the 
need to seek allies against the autocracy. The 'democratic' 
struggle is one in which the proletariat can have an interest 
because it is a campaign in which it can ally with other social 
forces; the benefits of the democratic achievements themselves 
are secondary. Kautsky has the same feelings about the way in 
which democracy can clarify the processes of ruling class power, 
but in his argument it is in parliamentary activity that the 
proletariat can counter the activities of the bourgeoisie, not just 
observe them: 
"Great capitalists can influence rulers and legislators 
directly, but the workers can do so only through parliamentary 
activity ••• By electing representatives to parliament, 
therefore, the working class can exercise an influence over 
governmental powers. 11 (24) 
There are, therefore, nuances here which might indicate the 
seeds of the later violent disagreement between the two men on the 
issues of democratic institutions. But ~he texts will probably not 
bear that weight of significance. The significance of the positions 
of both writers in the 1890's is probably what they held in common, 
not what separated them. Lenin's estimate was bound to be less 
positive than Kautsky's, given that Kautsky's Party enjoyed the benefits 
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of parliamentary activity at the time, whereas the Russians had no 
such institutions and the bourgeoisie took a pusillanimous attitude 
towards creating them. What both men had in common was an almost 
inevitable tendency to relegate the problem of democracy to the 
sidelinesp a domain assessed in terms of its usefulness for the 
purpose of social emancipation. Certainly, for Kautsky, democracy 
had already been to an extent achieved, whereas for Lenin the issue 
of democracy was a minor issue among the sordid reality of Tsarist 
Russia. But it would be tendentious to construe any of this as 
indicating sigrl£icant differences between the two theorists. 
For Lenin, the Duma did not help matters. He argued against 
a boycott, because it was necessary to: 
" ••• explain to the people the impossibility of 
achieving political freedom by parliamentary means as 
long as the real power remains in the hands of the 
Tsarist government," 
and to show the peoples 
"·•• the utter uselessness of the Duma as a means of 
achieving the demands of the proletariat and revolutionary 
petty-bourgeoisie, pspecially the peasantry." (25) 
He could hardly be faulted for this. The Duma itself lacked 
meaningful powers; it was subordinate to an appointed second 
chamber, and had no prerogative at all over the key areas of state 
finance and military affairs. It was not seriously representative. 
The first electoral law ensured unequal representation of the social 
classes. Ninety thousand workers and two thousand landowners each 
enjoyed the representation of one deputy. Worker representation 
was organised, like the Soviets, on the basis of factories, and due 
to the fact that factories employing less than fifty workers were 
excluded from the franchise, along with building workers, casual 
labourers, and artisans, some 63 per cent of the utban male working 
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population had no vote. Nonetheless» the results proved less than 
satisfactory to the regime» and ~ochan points out that:= 
"From the outset the Duma clearly expressed all the 
forces disrupting Russian life." (26) 
The electoral system was consequently readjusted until it 
produced a Duma that the regime felt it could live with. 
Nevertheless, Lenin did not make the mistake of identifying the 
existing Duma with parliamentary institutions in general. The Duma 
was not taken to serve as a model of genuine constitutional forms. 
Lenin compared the Duma with what was possible under such genuine 
structures. The parliamentary form was not condemned, a priori, to 
be nothing more than a 'talking shop' serving to 'fool' and 'distract' 
the people. It could, indeed, be an institution that controlled the 
affairs of state. The problem of 'constitutional illusions' 
concerned only a situation where the parliament did not live up to 
its claims and responsibilities. 
"When a constitutional system has become firmly 
established, when, for a certain period, the constitutional 
struggle becomes the main form of the class struggle and of 
the political struggle generally, the task of dispelling 
constitutional illusions is not the special task of the Social 
Democrats, not the task of the moment. Why'? Because at 
such times affairs in constitutional states are administered 
in the very way that parliament decides. By constitutional 
illusions we mean deceptive faith in a constitution. 
Constitutional illusions prevail when a constitution seems 
to exist, but actually does not: in other words, when 
affairs of state are not administered in the way parliament 
decides. When actual political life diverges from its 
reflection in the parliamentary struggle, then, and only then, 
does the task of combatting constitutional illusions become 
the task of the advanced revolutionary class, the proletariat. 
The liberal bourgeois, dreading the extra-parliamentary struggle, 
spread constitutional illusions even when parliaments are 
impotent. The anarchists flatly reject participation in 
parliament under all circumstances. Social Democrats 
stand for utilising the parliamentary struggle, for exposing 
'parliamentary cretinism' , that is, the belief that parliamenu~y 
struggle is the sole or under all circumstances the main form 
of the political struggle." (27) 
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It is certainly instructive to comParethis formulation with 
Lenin's final attitude toward parliaments in the years after the 
revolution. In 'Left-Wing Communism' Lenin takes up the same 
debatep and his argument appears to be with the same schools of 
thought. The social-democrats spread constitutional illusions; 
the anarchists, who bear the main weight of the pamphlet's strictures, 
argue an abstentionist position. But Lenin's position will in fact 
have changed. In 1905 Lenin clearly entertained the notion that 
parliaments can be just what they claim to be, that "affairs in 
constitutional states are administered in the very way that parliament 
decides." In 1920 he sees the anarchists to be essentially right in 
their negative estimate of parliaments, and sees the virtue of 
participating to be a tactical one: facilitating the destruction 
of constitutional illusions. There is no possibility that parliament 
is other than a front or a sham, by its very nature expressly denied 
the ability to control the affairs of a state. 
Clearly Lenin's views on this issue in these years were rather 
incoherent and unimportant, dictated more by time and audience than 
real reflection. Certainly there is nothing in his characterisation 
of parliament that will determine a rejection of parliamentary forms 
within the socialist state; Similarly,however, he reveals no strang 
attachments to the idea and the institution that will place any 
particular barrier in the way of a passionate commitment to an 
alternative form. It is al far too vague and temporary to allow any 
more definite lineage to be established. What is perhaps interesting 
is the fact that Lenin's view of the Soviet as a governmental form was 
hardly more positive than his view of Parliament's. It may come as a 
surprise to realise(in 1982 with the weight of the Leninist claims 
upon us) that the Mensheviks adopted a far more positive attitude 
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toward the Soviets than did Lenin. Martov in particular viewed the 
widest establishment of local organs of self-government as crucialp 
at least to the revolutionary process itself. This reflected Martnv's 
longstanding suspicion of any Bolshevik-type conception of organising 
revolution from aboveD already made public in the 1903 argument over 
the form and role of the party, For himg the first obja:tiv•;;. wasg 
" the formation of revolutionary committees in this 
or that towng this or that regionp for the sole purpose of 
helping spread the rising and the disorganisation of the 
government," (28) 
The Menshevik conception of the Soviets could also have a 
clearly constructive role, In response to the government's first 
toyings with the ideas of limited representative institutionsp Martov 
rejected any idea of boycott; but he combined participation in 
whatever institution the autocracy devised with a more radical idea 
which would claim representation for those excluded by the electoral 
law. What he called "peoples' agitational committees" would be 
formed, ostensibly to mobilise participation in the official elections. 
But g 
"At the same time the committees strive to createD 
apart from the legal representationp an illegal representative 
organ which at a certain moment could appear before thecowntry 
as a temporary organ of the peoples' will. The committees 
would call the population to elect their representatives by 
universal voteD these representatives would at a given moment (29 ) 
meet in one town and proclaim themselves a constituent assembly." 
The sympathy forg and responsiveness top the possibilities of the 
new organisation which is obvious in Nartov is quite absent from Lenin. 
Lenin was not guilty of the crass suspicion with which his supporters 
regarded the Soviets. Convinced of the vi~tues of organisation and 
suspicious of spontaneous movements outside the control of party, they 
were tempted to boycott them altogetherp or else seduced by the idea of 
turning them into a section of the Bolshevik Party by compelling them to 
accept the Bolshevik programme and the authority of the Bolshevik 
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Central Committee. 
Lenin himself argued that the question of party and Soviets was not 
either/or but both. But the institution had little role in terms 
of administration as opposed to disruption. Lenin did not conceive 
of the Soviets' role as anything but temporary: its real weakness 
was not its possible politics - he had enough confidence in his own 
to be able to disregard that, but in its structure: 
"This reservation was due to the weakness that Lenin 
saw in the Soviet organisation, in particular its excessively 
dispersed character, the lack of a central authority." (30) 
What is clearly absent from Lenin even more than from the 
Menshevik Account is any conception of the Soviets as the actual 
institutional structure of a post-revolutionary state.~\ arguably 
there was no reason for Lenin to consider this problem, given that 
the coming post-revolutionary state in Russia could not be a 
socialist one. Inasmuch as the physiognomy of the post-Tsarist 
society would be determined not by a proletarian policy, but by some 
appropriate combinaion of a mixture of class forces, it was extremely 
unlikely that the definition of the state form would be a task that 
would fall to the Bolsheviks. Lenin's thoughts ae inevitably 
structured from the point of view of the proletariat as a less than 
hegemonic, and indeed, possibly subordinate class in the coming 
society. Lenin's responsibility was thus to a specific class 
interest, not to society as a whole. 
It would seem, therefore, that Lenin's pre-1914 attitude to 
both sides of the problem of state forms - to parliaments and to 
Soviets - amounted to little more than disinterest. Prior to the 
catastrophe of the 'split in Socialism' thereis no indication of any 
reason in Marxian principles ~ in contemporary revolutionary 
experience to reject one and elevate the other, and establish the 
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distinction as a fundamental of revolutionary ideology. What was 
to become the essential core of twentieth century revolutionary 
theory derived ab initio from Lenin's response to the disaster that 
he considered had been visited upon his movement in 1914. This is 
not to suggest that the whole theoretical reconstruction that foll~ed 
is no more than another moment in Lenin's permanent career of personal 
and political disputation. It obviously grew into more than that. 
But it does confirm the total nature of that reconstructions Lenin 
could derive from his prior political thinking practically nothing 
that might guide him in this reconstruction: he was forced back on 
those fragments of knowledge and understanding that might be termed 
his own 'culture'. 
Lenin's Culture 
At one point in his book on the problem of 'Beginnings', 
Edward W. Said discusses the acute prOblem posed for the reader by 
Milton's 'Paradise Loot'. Discussing the passage where the angel 
Raphael informs Adam of the events in heaven, he points out that: 
"The truth is at about five removes from the reader. 
First suppressed in night, suppressed once again by Raphael 
(who as an angel knows more than Adam), suppressed still 
further because Adam after all is the original man from whose 
priority we have all fallen, suppressed another time by 
Milton's use of English to convey the conversation in Eden, 
and finally suppressed by a poetic discourse to which we can 
relate only after a mediated act (of reading a seventeenth 
century epic) - the Truth is actually absent. Words stand 
for words which stand for other words ••• " (31) 
This is a vivid expression of the problems of textual analysis 
~..re have already discussed. It also highlights the problems inherent 
in Lenin •s reformulation of Narxism that produced The State and Revolution. 
The text represents an attempt to reveal the 'truth' of the political 
process called parliamentarism. Lenin certainly operated with a 
clear belief in the existence and accessibility of this truth, even 
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if such a concept seems increasingly inappropriate to researchers in 
the human disciplines. Yet, if we do not share Lenin's confidence 
in the existence of such apodictic truth, we cannot operate without 
a belief in the possibility of discriminating between the relative 
merits of competing explanations of social phenomena. I.Je must simply 
be aware of the historical and contingent nature of the adequacy of 
such truths. Here, we must try to judge the probability of Lenin's 
reformulation attaining an adequate insight into his object of study. 
This can be approached by analysing the removes that separated Lenin 
from his object, and the suppressionsthat tlhese involved. 
It is well known that the outbreak of war in 1914 was a moment 
of profound rupture in Lenin's life and politics. It occasioned a 
reformulation of his politics of the most fundamental character. 
To estimate how likely was this project to be successful, it is 
worth considering the resources that Lenin had at his disposal for 
the task. 
The events of August 1914 were a doubly debilitating blow far 
Lenin. Not only had events taken a startling and horrific new turn; 
his socialist colleagues, mentors, and leaders in the Second 
International had committed a gross act of 'betrayal'. He was 
bereft of both his political and personal moorings. Here was an 
undisputedly Marxist leadership which had gone back on its most 
fundamental word; which had transformed what had appeared to be 
sincere and strongly held principles into basest verbiage; which 
'knew the truth' and deliberately buried it. It was a stunning 
shock for Lenin because it amounted to, not least, a personal 
betrayal. Not surprising, then, that he thought the report of 
the SPD vote for war credits the work of police provocateurs. In 
his first writings after the terribletruth became clear he spoke of 
his "most bitter disappointment". 
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Lenin was thus thrown back on his OW'l resources, and these 
were meagre. His view of the world had always been structured 
through a series of suppressions. He had strictly disciplined his 
thought to exclude contamination from anything other than the Marxian 
tradition g Russian culture had long been dismissed as unworthy of 
much consideration, characterised by» for Lenin, that most devastating 
of handicaps, 'backwardness'. Russian culture had produced the con-
temporary mess of Russian society, and certainly could not contain a 
solution to that mess. But Lenin was no more comfortable with a 
foreign culture. The culture of Europe was 'their culture',the 
culture of the bourgeoisie. The European tradition was anathema. 
Marx inherited a cosmopolitan European education, and was able to 
draw on the whole tradition of classical enlightenment culture to 
focus on a problem. He could, at will, refer to Heraclitus, to 
Shakespeare, to Hegel, to any of the streams and shallows of 
European thought. 
Lenin was quite differ-ent. We know for certain that he had 
not read Shakespeare, Byron, Moliere, or Schiller. Dostoevsky 
was •rubbish'; he had respect only for the populist novel in the 
tradition of Chernyshevsky. "A contemporary of Ha:x Weber, of Freud, 
of English logic and German critical philosophy, he knew nothing of 
any of them." ()2) Even more surprising is his confessed ignorance 
until the war years of Hegel. A survey of his writings is a 
revealing activitys the meagreness of his referencesconfirms the 
philistinism of his intellectual formation. 
Consequently Lenin had, throughout his career, depended upon 
a knowledge of the world that was massively attenuated. It was 
the knowledge produced by Narx as transmitted through the parties 
and theoreticians of the Second International. And despite any 
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pretensions of the Marxian tradition to an encyclopaedic understanding 
of history and society, its legacy to Lenin was similarly stilted. 
Narx and Engels' discussions of specific and concrete social institutions 
>vas concerned almost exclusively with moments of rupture, destruction, 
and reconstructi~1 in European history - the years 1789, 1848 and 1871 
being the recurrent foci. Lenin Has transmitted no knowledge at all 
of the realities of stability, of the complex networks of instituaons 
and practices which constituted the body of Western Society. 
Therefore in all his agonisings and reconstructions subsequent 
to the split in the International, he was maneouvringwithin a universe 
of intellectual possibilities whose dimensions were microscopic. If 
his intellectual resources were limited so long as he had confidence 
in the thinkers of the Second International, it, at least, had a 
certain intellectual rigour. After 1914 his confidence shattered, he 
resembles nothing so much as the incredible shrinking man. 
If we focus on the specific problem of the critique of 
parliamentary democracy, a further handicap is r-evealed. Lenin's 
critique was crippled by its own situation in historical time. 
Perhaps he here only partook of a common human failing to pass judgement 
on historical developments before they have attained maturity. But 
his critique eas attempted at a time when the world was practically 
devoid of examples of parliaments that could, even formally, be called 
genuinely representative of the citizenry and untrammelled by the old 
class power. (33) According to Therborn , the first democracy without 
qualifications on suffrage was established in New Zealand in 1907, 
and Denmark and Norway in 1915. These were the only institutions 
that predated Lenin's remarks of 1917, although it must be conceded 
that male franchise did obtain in certain countries several years 
earlier - as in France in 1884, in Norway in 1898. Clearly these 
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facts amount to extenuating circumstances for Lenin's argument; 
although the subsequent spread of full formal democracy within 
and outside Europe underlines the paradox of The -~tate and Revolutiono 
Thus it can be said that 9 in a literal sense 9 Lenin did not 
know what he was talking about. The 'suppressions' embedded in 
his own thought are sufficient to render improbable any access to an 
adequate account of the object he was studying. Firstly, the 'truth' 
is indeed 'suppressed in night', the night of history not yet made, 
the night of the unknowable future. The second suppression is the 
assumption that the parliamentary form in fact has no future; the 
third suppression derives from the lack of any personal experience of 
a culture that contained such embryonic versions of the institution 
as did exist; the fourth suppression is the estimation of this lack 
as inconsequential; the fifth, the adherence to an understanding of 
parliament derived only from its relevance to the social question; 
the next, the assumption that the only meaningful discourse on that 
relevance was that of the theoreticians of the Second International; 
the next, the acceptance as legitimate only those elements of that 
discourse that fell indisputably within the nostrums of Marx and 
Engels; the next, Lenin's own entirely hypostatized appropriation 
of Marx and Engels derived from his own personal incapacity to 
estimate the degree of coincidence between the classical analysis and 
the object it surveyed, due to the final suppression; his own near-
absolute lack of any intellectual or cultural resources from which to 
judge that privileged discourse. 
which stand for other words ••• " 
Truly, "words stand for words, 
Lenin's Theory of Political Motivation 
It was from this background that Lenin was forced to attempt a 
reconstruction of his understanding of the world. The reconstruction 
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he achieved was considerable, inasmuch as it resulted in a world=view 
that was entirely coherent and consistently revolutionary. It was a 
rather less impressive achievement in terms of its complexity or 
subtlety 9 and 9 indeed, its adequacy. It comprised three basic 
organising principles: imperialism 9 the labour aristocracy, and the 
Soviet. Imperialism was the problem; the labour aristocracy accounted 
for the fact that no solution to this problem had yet been achieved; 
the Soviet encapsulated Lenin's new answer. Concisely, the develop= 
ment of capitalism into imperialism had provided the bourgeoisie in the 
metropolitan countries with the opportunity to undermine the proletarian 
progress to revolutionary politics that had previously been considered 
inevitable. The labour aristocracy was a section of the proletariat that 
had been detached from its true class allegiance, and consequently become 
enmeshed in the fabric and institutions of bourgeois society. 
Thus, the bourgeois state, in both its administrative and political 
forms, had become the core of the process whereby the organisations of 
the proletariat were delivered up to imperialist politics. I • L..Bn~n 
hinted at a fairly sophisticated model of this relationship when he 
coined the term "Lloyd-Georgeism 11 ( 34 ) to describe the impact of social 
reform upon the labour movement. This analytical avenue, however, 
remained emphatically underdeveloped, and in its place is an argument 
of a much simpler nature. Reformist politics were in this argument not 
a mass political phenomenon; they were confined to the labour aristocracy. 
This reduction is perhaps surprising, and certainly not necessary 
for Lenin's project of salvaging revolutionary politics. Lenin could 
have argued - as we have seen Colletti argue - that the institutional 
formsoof parliamentarism paralysed the revolutionary impulses of the 
proletariat by a combination of social atomisation, manipulation, and 
mystification. The Soviet form could have been offered as the counter 
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to all three processes. Such an argument would render redundant a 
concept of the labour aristocracy as specially significant in diverting 
the revolutionary process. There is no need to single out any distinct 
part of the working class as uniquely guilty of bearing, conspiring in 9 
or succumbing to, the culture of social peace and parliamentary progresso 
But the organising principle of Lenin's explanation for the split 
in socialism was not the rejection of parliamentarism, but the definition 
and critique of the labour aristocracy. It is possible to trace in the 
development of Lenin's analysis the gradual disappearance of the effects 
of peaceful decades, parliamentarism, legal organisations, etc; and their 
replacement by direct and crude material determinants on a small minority 
of the movement: crumbs, bribes, "lucrative and soft jobs".( 35 ) Lenin 
thus chose to pursue a far simpler analysis which, paradoxically, 
involves a far more complex and weaker chain of explanation if the Soviet 
form is to be justified. 
In that analysis, the proletariat constitute a 'silent majority', 
those who have simply not been heard from. But, if the masses do not 
appear to have succumbed to the charms of parliamentarism and social 
peace, it is hardly necessary to advocate the Soviet form to counter 
such dangers. At this point in the argument, therefore, there exists 
no necessary or useful connection between Lenin's analysis of the split 
in socialism and the Soviet alternative. What I shall seek to do is 
suggest the necessary connection that in fact does exist. For it 
seems to me that the institutions of the commune state that Lenin was 
to advocate in 1917 derive their viability from a theory of political 
motivation, and that this theory of motivation can be discovered as 
the fundamental assumption of the theory of the labour aristocracy. 
We can find a concise and representative statement of the analysis 
in the 1920 Preface to 'Imperialism': 
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"Capital exports yield an income of eight to ten thousand 
million francs per annum, at pre-war prices and according to 
pre-war bourgeois statistics. Now, of course, they yield much more 0 
Oviously, out of such enormous superprofits (since they are 
ubLdiiH:HJ uvu:...' c.Hld ... ibuve the p:eofits whict; Cdpitoliots ~..:111 squesza 
out of the workers of their 9 own 1 country) it is possible to 
bribe the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour 
aristocracy. And this is just what the capitalists of the 
'advanced countries' are doing, they are bribing them in a 
thousand different ways 9 direct and indirect, overt and covert. 
This stratum of workers-turned bourgeois, or the labour 
aristocracy who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in 
the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the 
princip~l prop of the Second International, and in our days 9 the 
princip~l social (not military) prop of the bourgeoisie. For 
they are the real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working class 
movement, the labour. lieutBnants of the capitalist class, real 
vehicles of reformism and chauvism." (36) 
I shall not seek to present a comprehensive critique of the 
theories of imperialism and the labour aristocracy. Although it 
should be clear from what follows that I find both of them inadequate 
as explanatory categories there already exists a varied literature to 
this effect, which it would be redundant to retail.( 3?) I shall seek 
only to register some points which may take us to the point where the 
theory of political motivation produced by these concepts is revealed. 
Firstly, Lenin's concept of imperialism is one that cannot be 
seriously sustained by the arguments that he presented. In "Imperialism 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism", written in 1916 9 Lenin outlined the 
general features of the imperialist stage of capitalism, and stresses 
what he considers to be the key factor - the export of capital from the 
metropolitan- countries to the colonies or semi-colonies. In Chapter 8 
he considers the effects of this on the metropolitan nations. An 
extensive quote from Hobson advocates the idea that the Western 
nations were becoming totally parasitic in their economic role, drawing 
all productive wealth from the Asian and African continents. The 
result, Lenin suggests, will be the transformation of the proletariat 
into "great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple 
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industries of agriculture and manufacture 9 but kept in the performance 
of personal or minor industrial services under the control of the new 
financial aristocracy."( 3B) The condition of Southern England is 
advanced as a foreshadow of what might come to pass. 
He then proceeds to offer evidence for Hobson's analysis. He 
seems to support the vision of the gradual disappearMnce of manufacturing 
capital from Western Europe. But his evidence is rather bizarre: 
an increasing proportion of land in England is being taken out of 
cultivation and used for sport and the diversion of the rich; England 
spends annually £14 million on horse racing and fox hunting; the number 
of rentiers in England is about one million. The corrollary of those 
tendencies is this: "The percentage of the productively employed 
population to the total population is declining" - from 23 per cent in 
1851 to 15 per cent in 1901. The surprising scale of these figures 
would have given anyone less committed to the thesis pause for thought. 
In fact Lenin is equating 'productively employed' with those 'employed 
in the basic industries', which by any economic theory is an in-
supportable device.< 39 ) 
Of course it is true that the capital structure of the country 
was undergoing change, but both Lenin and Hobson entirely misconstrued 
what was happening. An advanced stage of industrialisation produces 
tendencies for the service sector to undergo expansion at the expense 
of the primary and secondary sector. 
Together with the development of the service sector was the 
extension of the factory system into previously marginally involved 
sectors 9 and the transformation into a factory workforce of parts of 
the population whose situation was previously quite different. The 
decline in the numbers employed in domestic service and the reverse 
process of the increase in industnial employment of women, prefigured 
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by developments in the First World War, are indicative of this. 
Note should also be taken of the growing industrialisation of 
agriculture, and the growing productivity of labour within the 
manufacturing sect6r which must 9 on the one hand produce a tendency 
for slow or negative growth in employment in that sector, and growing 
employment amongst those sectors needed to service the technical 
developments that this rise in the productivity of labour reflects.( 4D) 
Lenin therefore constructed an entirely mythical sociological 
grouping under the category 'labour aristocracy' - 'great tame masses 
of retainers'. They lived off the 'crumbs' from the table of 
imperialism; they were directly bribed out of superprofits. Lenin 
even gave a rough estimate of the size of this bribe;( 4l) although 
no attempt is made to define the method of distribution of this sub-
vention. But what is clear is that Lenin nowhere considers this 
'bribe' as passing through, or deriving from 9 the process of 
production in the metropolitan countries. High wages do not come 
from the worker's position in the production process; they are purely 
the dividend of parasitism. The labour aristocrats have become the 
'coupon-clippers' of the working class. Clearly, such a mechanism 
can only have an utterly corrupting influence on those in receipt. 
Recipients of such an unearned and unjustified subsidy will surely 
fight to the death to defend the imperialism that provided it. The 
labour aristocrat becomes akin to the Roman proletarian, whose 
existence was subsidised by the slave economy, unlike the non-
aristocracy at whose expense society lives( 42 ). But what an absurd 
inversion of reality this constitutes, and its absurdity clashes 
more fundamentally with the assumptions of Marxian social theory 
than perhaps any other. 
The higher paid worker in Lenin's time achieved and maintained 
his position due to his skill - or rather the short supply of that 
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skill - or his organisation 9 and usually by a very specific combination 
of both. It is puzzling that such a simple fact should escape Lenin's 
analysis, but two factors may account for it. The first 9 of course 9 
is that Lenin's project excluded the realisation: he was not seeking 
to explain the origin ofthe higher paid worker 9 but to simply utilise 
it as a link in the chain of his explanation 9 proceeding from 
imperialism to the politics of the day. Secondly, there was little in 
Lenin's experience, as well as in his field of interest 9 to direct his 
attention to the simple explanation. 'Imperialism' is a remarkably 
one-sided study of early twentieth century capitalism. It concentrates 
exclusively on methods of ownership and finance and excludes any con-
sideration of the industrial process itself, i.e. what was being 
produced, and how. The remarkable changes in the techniques of 
production and the nature of finished products is entirely absento 
One may wonder precisely what image Lenin possessed of the twentieth 
century factory and those who worked there. 
Thus 9 if we read 'Imperialism' as at least in part directed to 
establishing the existence of a distinct social grouping which is 
essentially parasitic and unproductive, we have to register Lenin's 
attempt as a failure. He has failed to prove that such a group 
emerges as a consequence of economic development,in an imperialist 
phase. He has further consequently failed to demonstrate the existence 
of a social grouping who will be motivated to defend their native 
imperialism as a matter of automatic self-interest. 
My second point concerns the assumptions which would be necessary 
to sustain the argument for this postulated social group. Lenin 
makes a silent but necessary assumption that the wages of members 
of the proletariat have a historic tendency to maintain 9 and always 
return to, a certain physical minimum. Otherwise there is nothing 
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to explain in the particular condition of the labour aristocracy. 
This concept of an 'iron law of wages' is strangely resilient in 
the Marxian tradition. Bernstein made use of it as stick with which 
to beat Marxism and his criticisms were justified. He was castigating 
a belief that was widely held and articulated amongst the orthodox 
theoreticians of the movement. Kautsky included it in his popular 
explanation of the Erfurt Programme in 1892: 
"••• industrial development exhibits a tendencyp 
most pleasing to the capitalist, to lower the necessities (43 ) 
of the working man and to decrease his wages in proportion. 11 
It became a commonplace article of faith in the communist 
movement, in defiance of whatever evidence to the contrary might have 
suggested. Thus it was possible fifty years later to insist: 
11 on the fact ••• that conditions among the working 
class in Britain, on the average, did not improve during 
the second half of the nineteenth century ••• Whenever we are 
able to point to improvements we are at the same time, 
unfortunately, obliged to point to deteriorations which over-
compensate ths improvements in the conditions of tbe working 
class during the last fifty or hundred years. 11 (44) 
The author, the Marxist historian Kuczynski, could only support 
this statement by suggesting a picture of British capitalism which 
left little room for the development of forces and techniques of 
production. Thus, in a discussion of productivity changes, he 
ascribes by far the greatest importance to the aspect of the 'increased 
intensity of labour per worker', i.e. the workers working harder, and 
ascribes only a minor significance to the revolutionisation of the 
techniques of production.< 45 ) 
It has been argued( 46 ) that there is in fact no ambiguity on 
this issue in Marx's political economy. Nevertheless we can only 
note the frequent recurrence of this theme within the Marxian political 
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movemento Such an assumption could clearly play an important political 
role at moments when employers have enforced reductions in wages and 
conditions in specific conjunctures. It enables a political argument 
to make the transition from the problem of the moment to the problem of 
the systemo It is clearly a matter of some speculation how effective 
the theory of revolution remains when Marx's theory is substituted for 
the iron law of wages. When Colletti declares that: 
"It is the dependence which ties the workers to the will 
of the capitalist class, and not their absolute poverty ••• 
in other words, capitalist appropriation is not exclusively 
or primarily an appropriation of thin9s, but rather an 
appropriation of subjectivity ••• " (47) 
a theory of revolutionary action becomes markedly more problematic. 
The iron law of wages demands little empirical refutation. 
Rising living standards were common to the British working class in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. There was undoubtedly a 
minority that was better off than most, but the differential was modest. 
It should also be noted that the existence of differentials was in no 
way unique to the imperialist stage of capitalism. In the light of the 
long-standing nature of the phenomenon, and the relatively minor material 
differentiation between the skilled and the unskilled, imperialist super-
profits are an unnecessary import into the discussion. Far from the 
labour aristocracy being a creation of the bourgeoisie for political 
motives, made possible by their returns from the colonies, it is further 
arguable that such differential underwent a tendency to diminish for some 
time before Lenin wrote his book.( 4B) 
Thirdly, whatever the economic facts, Lenin's appreciation of 
the politics of the higher-paid worker wasm inversion of the truth. 
Clearly, ideas of respectability and conservatism could very easily 
flow from social stability and, more specifically, from the craftsman's 
elevated role in production. But very often situations of crisis or 
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structural change produced among such people a fabric of consciousness 
that made them extremely and uniquely amenable to radical ideas. The 
experience of the Communist Parties after the war testifies to this. 
In most Parties 9 workers from the skilled trades constituted the 
largest single elements of the membership, and if one considers the 
relatively small size of those groups in the working class a a whole~ 
the attraction of communist politics for such people is clearly 
markedly stronger than among unskilled workers.( 49 ) Nevertheless 9 
for Lenin 9 the primary task of the Communist P.arties after the war 
remained an: 
"immediate, systematic, comprehensive, and open 
struggle against this stratum." (50) 
The obverse of the dismissal of the 'top 10 per cent' was an 
exeeedingly sanguine picture of what Lenin terms the 'revolutionary 
masses'. In August 1914 he drew a sharp distinction between the 
opportunist leaders and the mass of the working class, insisting that 
it was: 
"••• imperative to appeal to the revolutionary consciousness 
of the working masses, who bear the entire burden of the ( 5l) 
war and are in most cases hostile to opportunism and chauvinism," 
and in 1915 he declared: 
"It is a falsehood for anybody ••• to say that the 'masses' 
of proletarians have turned towards chauvinism: nowhere have 
the masses been asked ••• " (52) 
Clearly, such assertions had very little relation to the reality of 
the time., Thus Lenin's political sociology of the working classes 
of luestern Europe, already theoretically dubious, can find no serious 
empirical support. 
My fourth point concerns the effects of the weaknesses outlined 
abo11e upon any more general theorisation of the sociology of class 
and politics e It will be remembered that early in his career, Lenin 
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advanced a particular version of the relationship between the two. 
He then asserted that, without the activity of political parties, the 
working class was incapable of developing a politics that eseaped 
from what he called 'trade union consciousness 1 .( 53 ) He had no 
reason to ascribe to the working class a mass politics that automatically 
reflected their class interests. Even later, during the 1905 
Revolution, his assertion that the working class was 'spontaneously 
social=democratic' was linked to the prior activities of political 
radicals within the labour movement, who had made the ideas available 
throughout the working class; and it should be noted that such a 
social democratic consciousness at that time for Lenin probably 
amounted to little more than a broad sympathy with the general aims 
of the overthrow of autocracy.( 54 ) When he suggested the existence 
of a similar spontaneous political ideology among the masses after 
1914, he was in fact suggesting the existence of ideas and sympathies 
considerably more sophisticated and rigorous: sympathy not merely for 
social reform, political democracy, and social justice, but for specific 
attitudes towards conjunctural political issues of the day. 
Lenin's~esis on 'trade union consciousness' was in itself not 
notably sophisticated, but it did contain the possibility of 
elaboration into a reasonably adequate statement of the culture of a 
subaltern class. It could, in other words, have been developed into 
a concept somewhat akin to Gramsci's idea of 'hegemony', wherein there 
is an appreciation of the complexity of the way in which society, class, 
and culture constitute the network of meAnings through which people see 
the world and experience their. activities. As long as Lenin did not 
assume political consciousness to be an automatic reflection of class 
position , the opportunity remained for him to appreciate the political 
domain in all its diversity and complexity. But it must be pointed out 
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that the 'trade union consciousness' theme itself was not even a 
simpler version of Gramsci's sophisticated sociology 0 In itself 9 
it remained true to Lenin's reflectionist epistemology 9 for trade 
union consciousness is little more than a reflection of the specific 
factory situation in which the worker is placed: it does not allow 
room to take into account the far more important determinations that 
existed 'outside' the workplace: national culture 9 religion 9 
socialisation 9 authority patterns etc. - not forgetting politics itself. 
Nevertheless 9 Lenin remained for some time aware of sociological 
tendencies that produced in the working class a resistance to his 
politics. He referred to Engels' castigation of the: 
11 o•• bourgeois respectability which has grown 
deep into the bones of the workers 9 " (55) 
in his discussion of England. 
In 1908 he suggested that the material locus of these tendencies 
lay in the "small producers {who are) being cast into the ranks of 
the proletariat11 ( 56 ) as capitalism develops. Two years later he made 
an attempt to define the causes of 'opportunism' in broader terms. 
The continued growth of the labour movement itself constantly introduced 
to its ranks those unschooled in its practices and ideology; the 
development of capitalism is uneven in pace and depth, recruiting to 
the labour movement many who were unable to make the break with the 
ideology of the enemy; the oppressive aspect of capitalist develop= 
ment - its degradation 9 its poverty - often counterbalanced the potential 
inscribed in the newly disciplined and organised workers; and the 
activities of the bourgeoisie itself must not be overlooked 9 as it had 
developed the tactic of conceding of political rights and reforms which 
hampered the revolutionary development of the class.( 5?) 
It is worth stressing at this point that even these relatively 
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sophisticated definitions of the origins of political differences in 
the working class do not legitimise politics. That is, political 
not 
ideas that are/sympathetic to Lenin's own are attributed to laqs~ 
and lacunae in the movement of history; they remain, for Lenin 9 both 
incorrect and transitory. Even at this early stage 9 the possibility 
that political disagreements might simply testify to different value 
orientations or to conflicting political strategies is absent. 
Nevertheless, even such an approach provided for an understanding 
that was considerably more complex than weat was to followo Lenin was 
to come to deny the very existence of problematic political ideas within 
the bulk of the working class, and replace it with the idea of a clean 
ideological break between aristocracy and mass. His Lenin's first 
reformulations of the problem after 1914 contain something of the old 
discussion. He referred to "peaceful decades which have not passed 
without leaving their mark"(SB) and the results of "the preceding 
peaceful period in the development of the labour movement ••• (which) 
taught the working class to utilise such important means of struggle 
as par liamentar ism and all legal opportunities e.. 11 ( 59 ) 
In these writin~from 1914 and 1915 there is a dimension that 
is missing from later works. While attention is already directed to 
the importance of the labour aristocracy in this process, their role 
is subordinate and not key in the analysis. But in his first major 
theoretical accounting with 'opportunism' "The Collapse of the Second 
International" written in the middle of 1915, Lenin begins to confine 
the roots of this political practice to much more directly material 
factors than the 'peaceful decades'. The opportunist ideas of the 
labour aristocracy are no longer simply different from those of the 
mass of the proletariat in degree - perhaps due to their greater 
access to political expression and material improvement - but are 
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directly counterposed to the rest of the class: A stratum of 
'working men' have become 'bourgeoisified' during the period of 
economic qrowth ~nd social stability~ and consequently are isolated 
from the problems and ideas that permeate the lower masses. It is 
here that the breeding ground of chauvinist and opportunist ideas 
may be found .. ( 6D) 
This is perhaps the first clear indication of the road that 
Lenin is to travelo The analysis has undergone what, even for 
Lenin, is a profound impoverishment. Almost ten years earlier he 
had already suggested a specific connection between 'opportunism' 
and the imperialist stage of capitalism, but he did not attempt to 
confine the effects of opportunism to a minority of the proletariat. 
He limited himself to the general suggestion that: 
" in certain countries there is created a 
material and economic basis for infecting the 
proletariat with colonial chauvinism." (61) 
But the development of the theory from 1914 onwards is to narrow 
doen the causes of opportunism to imperialist superprofits, and the 
extent of opportunism to a labour aristocracy. 
Various descriptions of the infected stratum are given. 
Initially the description is confined to 'leaders' parliamentarian, 
trade union, journalistic, and others.( 62 ) Then it is extended to 
"Parliamentarians, officials of the legal labour unions, and other 
intellectuals ••• some sections of the better paid workers, office 
employees etc .. "( 63 ) 
Lenin will be dissatisfied with such a definition. It con-
flates two distinct categories, the "labour aristocracy" and the 
"labour bureaucracy". 
He therefore attempts to more precisely define the sociology of 
this phenomenom 0 In later writings there are many attempts 
to identify the roots of opportunist politics in the labour 
aristocracyo What is this aristocracy? It variously includes 
"the better paid workers 11 9 a "petty-bourgeois 9 upper stratum' or 
aristocracy ooo of the working class" 9 "certain strata of the 
proletariat", "near=proletarian elements", "non-proletarian elements"~ 
a "stratum of workers=turned-bourgeois ••• who are quite philistine in 
their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and their entire 
outlook", the "upper stratum" that "furnishes the bulk of the 
membership of the cooperatives 9 of trade unions, of sporting clubs and 
of the numerous religious sects", "a section of the proletariat" that 
has "become bourgeois", "workers belonging to narrow craft unions", 
those infected by "bourgeois respectability", etc.< 64 ) 
A glance at these definitions reveals their remarkable variety -
and consequently their conceptual va:::~ueness. If Lenin were attempting 
to proceed from a general theory of the roots of opportunism to 
investigate the specificity of the phenomenom in various countries, 
such oscillations would not be remarkable. Precise analyses would 
show differentiation according to national context. But this is not 
a precise analysis. These definitions are taken from attempts to 
state a general theory of opportunism. In this context such vagueness 
of definition point to problems in the theoretical schema itself. 
Theoretically, we have reached a desperate pass. The 
sophisticated sociology offered by Marx has been rendered down to a 
conceptually attenuated and empirically ~nsupportable 'deus ex machina', 
a scapegoat upon whom all the sins are heaped. The concept of the 
labour aristocracy is made to serve as the explanatory category for 
the problems of a world that has become in Lenin's mind simplified 
beyond reason. But does the demonstration of this have any con-
sequences for the wider issues of political theory that have been 
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discussed in previous chapters? My fifth point brings us to the 
consequences of the problems highlighted in this section. 
It would seem that Lenin's reconstruction of revolutionAry 
theory after 1914 is a remarkable failure. I have argued that in 
many respects he was simply wrong; wrong on the nature of imperialism; 
he was wrong on the economic trends in the capitalist nations; he was 
wrong on the roots of 'opportunism'; he was wrong in his definition 
and understanding of the 'labour aristocracy'; he was wrong on the 
politics of the 'masses'; he was wrong in his understanding of Marxian 
political economy; he was wrong in his appreciation of the changing 
role of the European state. Is not the whole enterprise, therefore, 
essentially valueless, and an examination of it redundant? 
It is and it isn't. A reconstruction of Lenin's last problematic 
reveals the coherent structure of his world-view. All that remains to 
be done is to allow the silent parts of that problematic to ~peak. 
The importance of the concept of the 'labour aristocracy' is that it 
articulates Lenin's theory of political motivation. The concept of 
the labour aristocracy is the destination point of a two-way movement. 
The first movement is to construct the tabula ~ of human consciousness. 
That is, the anathema is pronounced on all and any points of view, 
whether in natural science or in political theory, that differ from 
Lenin's own version of the Marxian world-view. All such points of 
view are delegitimised a priori. They are not just 'wrong': that 
still casts the issue in terms of opinion. They are epiphenomenal and 
ephemeral. They are the productions of specific and demonstrable 
impurities in the historical stream 9 and their transience is ensured 
by the fact that history moves. It may be for this reason that 
Marxian politics has tended to enter on a crisis when confronted with 
the development of culture and institutions that legitimise difference. 
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Marx had written in a period where there was consensus between the 
radical and the reactionary forces about the impossibility of a 
pluralistic and consensual politics. The reactionaries hid 
behind a battery of privilege,restrictions,and exclusions even when 
allegedly in a democratic phase. The revolutionaries could not 
constitute democracy as an end in itself because its most positive 
role would be as midwife to the dismissal of their political enemies 
from the historical stage. The evolution of liberal democracy must 
thus occasion a horrendous confusion. The repeal of Bismarck's Anti= 
Socialist Law in 1890 was bound to produce a Bernstein by the end of 
the decade. The turn of the century iA Russia replicated that crisis. 
Traditional characterisations of Russian society and economy between 
1900 and 1914 as 'backward' have tended to exaggeration, as have the 
negative estimates of the policies of various 'reforming' ministries, 
notably of Witte and Stolypin. Political life was similarly subject 
to transformative impulses. Keep has suggested that this was the 
consequence of 1905: 
"When political repression was relaxed, as it was 
after 1905, the radicals ••• had to adjust to the 
unfamiliar world of competitive open politics, in which 
much of their traditional ~of thinking was exposed as 
shallow or Frelevant. They were led to consider their 
ideas in the light of fresh experience ••• '' (65) 
It is possible that 1905 itself was the consequence, as much 
as the cause, of the reformulation of culture and politics in Russia: 
"There now existed a society which was more subtly 
differentiated from the society of two classes = peasants 
and nobility ~ of earlier times; a cultural life which was 
in evidence in a rapidly expanding system of education, an 
extensive, varied press with a wide distribution and a 
fundamentally liberal orientation. ••• And finally , and most 66 impBrtantly, a Western=style politic~! life was beginning to emerge."( ) 
It would be wrong to exaggerate these developments; but even in 
their modest form they introduced confusions into the Marxian camp. 
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Russian Social Democracy had its Bernstein, in the form of Struve; 
the same tendencies launched Plekhanov on his slow journey toward 
'revisionism' a Even a minimal liberalisation and democratisation 
implies the possibility of evolution toward something more substantialo 
This must occasion fissures in any hermetic Marxian model of politics 
as the direct articulation of transp~rent class interests, a conflict 
between science and ideology, bodies of views buttressed by the whole 
armoury of uncompromising 'struggle'. Liberalisation in fact undermines 
the central metaphor of Marxian politics, the 'class struggle'. How 
can a process saturated with the features of direct physical con= 
frontation, mentally encapsulated in some image of brutal hand-to-
hand combat, be reconciled to an image of ordered, genteel, debate 
and negotiation? Such activities must be 'ploys' or instrumental 
and cynical tacticse 
Lenin's first move is, therefore, to eradicate politics. The 
development of liberal democracy carries the awful possibility that 
disagreement over political policies and negotiations over them, can 
become a legitimate activity. But to accept that is to accept that 
political positions are opinion, not fact; values, not science. 
Lenin must find this unacceptable. His ideas to be forced to 
'compete' as an equal wi~those of liberalism, Struvism, Populism, 
constitutionalism ••• ? It is inconceivable. 
The greatest embarrassment for Lenin is the politics of 
opposing tendencies within his own camp. The politics of the 
bourgeois and liberal parties can be attributed to uncomplicated 
class interests - whether they are being brutal in establishing 
dictatorships or conciliatory in introducing ameliorative and 
liberalising measures. The apparent distance of any measure 
from obvious class interests is a matter of subtlety, nothing else. 
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The politics of reformists, opportunists, mensheviks, revisionist~ 
are another problem. They clearly betray a transparent class interest. 
A soecific attribution must be found for this. But the only oossible 
attribution is a version of the sarne 9 interesto Politics is private 
self-interr'st made public. Thus Lenin's first move is to abolish any 
possible distance between the gross economic position of an individual 
and his motivations; to abolish any space for 'values', and consequently, 
disagreement over values. 
This first move~ent leads into the second in this manner. It 
is necessary only to construct a sub-set of interests for his 
political opponents in the working class camp. This is the labour 
aristocracy, who have specific incomes and conditions to protect. We 
have already seen how the concept of motivation by self-interest permeates 
the pages of The State and Revolution. The theory of the labour 
aristocracy is Lenin's most consummate expression of th~ theory of 
political motivation. For crassness, vulgarity, and inadequacy it 
perhaps has few competitors. But it achieves the necessary tasks. 
With this theory his Marxism is once again secured as science, not 
opinion. Its very success in this task will ensure its immunity from 
interrogation. 
It is important to appreciate what Lenin has achieved by this 
simple sociological reduction. He has ensured that politics is an 
ontological impossibility. That is, there can be no genuine 
differences of opinion within political life. He has pushed to the 
limit the possibilities of economic reductionism that Marxism might 
contain. Each And every disagreement with Lenin's version of Marxist 
principle and policy can now be revealed as simply disguising the material 
self-interest of its proponents. Clearly, the advent of a society in 
which the economic grounds for conflict have been removed is also the 
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advent of a society where there is no possibility of political 
disagreement and debate. Thus is grounded the theory of The State 
and Revolution, which promises the free society through institutions 
designed to cater for human beings who have no politics. And this 
is founded the actuality of Bolshevik police-socialism which implements 
those theories in a situation where human beings do, unfortunately, 
assert themselves politically. 
References to Chapter 4 
(1) L. Althusser For Marx, London 1977 9 p.219. 
(2) ~' pp.222-231. 
(3) C. Taylor Hegel and Modern Society, Cambridge 1979 9 pp.B,9 0 
(4) R. Plant Hegel, London 1973, p.25. 
(5) Taylor op.cit, p.51. 
(6) G. Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, London 1971 9 passim. 
(7) T. Adorno Negative Dialectics, London 1973, p.22. 
(B) ~' p.362. 
(9) Cited by Althuseer in Lenin and Philosophy, London 1971, p.34. 
(10) For a discussion of Lukacs demonstrating this see A. Cutler, 
B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain Marx's Capital and Capitalism 
Today, Vol. 1, London 1977, pp.l89-195. For the reception 
given to Lukacs' ideas see P. Breines Praxis and its Theorists 
Telos II, Spring 1982, pp.67-103. 
(11) For an account of the activities of the Left Communists in 
Germany by a participant see P. Mattick Anti-Bolshevist 
Communism in Germany Telos 26, Winter 1975-76 9 pp.57-69; 
Anti-Bolshevik Communism London 1978, passim. 
(12) L. Trotsky 1905 (1971) pp.220-223 for example (New York). 
(13) s. Schram Mao-Tse-Tung, London 1967, Conclusion. 
(14) For example M. Liebman Leninism Under Lenin,London 1975, p.433, 
Vo Gerratana Stalin, Lenin and Leninism (1977) NLR 103 0 
(15) K. Marx The Class Strugoles in F~~ in The Pelican Marx Library, 
Political Writings Vol.2 (1973) p.71, London. 
-206~ 
(16) L. Colletti From Rousseau to Lenin (1972), p.l08, London. 
(17) Ae Rosenberg Democracy and Socialism, Boston, 1965 9 p.3D6o 
(18) K. Kautsky The Class Struggle, p.l87 9 188 9 1971 9 New York. 
(19) Lenin CW 15 9 p.lB6o 
(20) Lenin CW 2 9 p.96 9 97o 
(21) Lenin CW 1 9 p.291. 
(22) Kautsky op.cit., p.l86. 
(23) Lenin CW 2 9 Poll9o 
(24) Kautsky ibid. 
(25) Lenin CW 13 9 p.l29. 
(26) L. Kochan Russia in Revolution, 1967, p.l27, London. 
(27) Lenin CW 10, pp.352, 353. 
(28) Cited in L. Getzler Martov, 1967, p.l05 9 Cambridge. 
(29) ~' p.lDB. 
(30) Liebman op.cit, p.89. 
(31) E.W. Said Beginnings, 1979, p.28D, Baltimore. 
(32) A. Besancon The Intellectual Origins of Leninism, 1981 9 p.192 9 Oxford. 
(33) G. Therborn The Rule of Capital and the Rise of De~~~' 
New Left Review 103 9 p.ll and passim, 1977. 
(34) Lloyd-Georgism was "••• a widely ramified, systematically 
managed well-equipped system of flattery, lies, fraud, 
juggling with fashionable and popular catchwords, and promising 
all manner of reforms and blessings to the workers ••• " Lenin CW 23, 
p.ll7. This is&ill crude, but does at least appro~ch the problem 
of a~ electoral politics. 
(35) Lenin CW 23, p.ll7. 
(36) Lenin CW 22, pp.l93,4. 
(37) On the weaknesses of Lenin's theory of imperialism there is a 
large literature, but the following are a sample: B. Warren 
Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism London 1980 9 M. Barratt 
Brown After Imperialism, London 1970 9 pp.ll-14, D.K.Fieldhouse 
Economics and Empire 1830-1914, London, 1973, pp.38-62, A.Cu~r, 
B. Hindess, P. Hirst, A. Hussain Marx's Capital and Capitalism 
Today, Vol.l 9 London 1977 9 p.l. On the labour aristocracy, the 
following works are relevant: 
~207= 
E.J. Hobsbawm Lenin and the Labour Aristocracy in Monthly 
Review April 1970, pp.47-56 ; The Labour Aristocracy in 
the 19th Century in Labouring Men London 1968 9 pp.272-315; 
H. Palling The Concept of the Labour Aristocracy in Popular 
Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, London, 
1960, ~~.Ji=Gl~ H.Qo Cray lh~ Labour Aristocracy in Victorian 
Edinburgh, Oxford, 1976 9 Jo Forster in Class Struggle and the 
Industrial Revolution, London, 1974 makes an original use of 
the concept, but the periodisation he adopts distances his 
concept from that of Lenin - the connection with imperialism 
is dispensed with. Nevertheless contributions to the debate 
opened by Foster often have relevance to Lenin's coneept as 
well, e.g. A.E. Musson Class Struggle and the Labour Aristocracy 
1930-1960 in Social History No.3 October 1976, p. 335-356; 
G. Stedman Jones Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution, 
New Left Review 90. 
(38) Lenin CW 22, p.2BD. 
(39) ~' pp. 281,282. 
(40) Between 1920 and 1938 the most resilient growth sectors in 
the UK in terms of numbers employed were distribution, 
insurance, and banking (+36%) and 'professional services' 
(+31%); the reverse was true of sectors like manufacturing 
and mining. In power supply the increase was 57%. S.Pollard 
The Development of the British Economy 1914-50, London, 1962, 
p.99. For a theoretical discussion of the impulses behind 
these changes E. Mandel Late Capitalism London 1975, Chapter 12, 
is of interest. For a discussion of how London and S.E.England 
developed in the twentieth century in a directly contracy direction 
to tha~ predicted by Hobson and Lenin, see Pollard op.cit, pp.l29, 
130. lheir image of 1 post-industrial 1 London derives from a 
failure to appreciate that at the end of the nineteenth century 
they were still hoking at an essentially ~-industrial London. 
The sociology of such a city is given in G. Stedman-Jones 
Outcast London, London 1971 passim. 
(41) "• •• a hundred million or so francs a year •• (out of) superprofits 
most likely to amount to about a thousand million." Lenin CW 23,p.ll5. 
(42) Lenin CW 23, p.lD7. 
(43) Ka~tsky op.cit.p.24. 
(44) J. Kuczynski A Short History of Labour Conditions u~ 
Industrial Capitalism, london 1972, Vol.l, pp.80 9 19D. 
(45) For a discussion of changing industrial techni~ues and 
products see D. Landes The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge, 1969, 
passim, but especially Chapter 5 9 "Short Breath and Second Wind." 
(46) Colletti offers his disproof of Marx's support for an iron law 
of wages in "Bernstein and the Marxism of the 2nd International" 
in op.cit. pp.lDl, 102. The presence of the law ~ be 
detected in the Marx of the Communist Manifesto, Marx & Engels, 
Selected Works, London 1968, p.43, but by the time of the 
Grundrisse Marx was arguing that the tendency for general living 
standards to rise under capitalism is "••• an essential civilizing 
moment, And on which the historic justification, but also the 
~208~ 
contemporary power, of capital rests." Marx Grundrisse, 
London 1973, p.287. A clear statement of the mature theory 
of wages is given in Marx Wages, Price and Profit in Marx & 
Engels: Selected Works London 1968, p.226. Nevertheless, 
Rosa Luxemburg 9 for example 9 lent credence to a version of 
the ~ron law in R. Luxemburg Reform or Revolution? in Hosa 
Luxemburg Speaks New York 19 9 p.5D 9 and Marx had to criticise 
its presence in the Gotha Programme of the German Social-
Democratic Party. Marx Critigue of the Gotha Programme in Marx 
& Engels Selected Works London 1968 9 p.328 9 329. 
(47) Colletti op.cit, p.lD2. 
(48) On rising living standards, see P. Matthias The First Industrial 
Nation London 1969, pp.378-80 9 who suggests a rise in real wages 
for the average urban male worker of some 60 per cent or more 
between 1860 and 1900. On differentials at the turn of the 
century see E. Hobsbawm Labouring Men London, 1964, pp.291-2, 
who argues that the skillea British worker received better wages 
than the unskilled in the ration of between 1.2:1 and 2:1. This 
may be contrasted with a ratio of 17.6:1 that obtains between the 
wages of white and black labour in the South African gold mining 
industry. Here a genuine labour aristocracy may be said to exist, 
where the white wage contains a surplus element over the actual 
calculated value of labour performed amounting to 67 per cent of 
the total wage (R. Davies The White Working Class in South Africa, 
New Left Review, 82 9 p.5o). On the longstanding character of 
differentials in the UK, Hobsbawm reports that in Macclesfield in 
1793 artisans earned 3 shillings, labourers l/8d; Portsmouth 
shipwrights' wages between 1793 and 1823 averaged about double 
their labourers'. Hobsbawm op.cit, p.291, 292. 
(4Y) In the KPD in 1927 9 skilled workers accounted for 40% of the 
membership; unskilled 28%; agricultural workers, independent 
craftsmen, and commercial employees, the rest. (F. 8okenau World 
Communism 1962, p.365). At the 1929 Congress of the CPGB 69% 
of the delegates were employed in coal, iron, steel, engineering, 
and shipbuilding- the 'metals' that were the home of the skilled 
worker. (K. Newton The Sociology of British Communism 1969, p.43). 
The skilled man was well represented in the early leadership of the 
British Party: Murphy, Gallacher, Bell, Stewart, Peet, Mann, and 
Inkpin were all engineers, Pollitt was a boilermaker, Jackson a 
printer. 
(50) Lenin CW 31, p.l94. 
(51) Lenin CW 21, p. 18. 
(52) Ibid, p.443. 
(53) Lenin CW 5 9 p.375o 
(54) Lenin CW 8 1 "New Tasks and New Forces" pp.2ll-222 articulates his 
tactical conceptions of the party question at the time. "In the 
beginning we had to teach the workers the ABC, both in the literal 
and figurative senses. Now the standard of political literacy has 
risen so gigantically that we can and should concentrate all our 
efforts on the more direct Social-Democratic objectives aimed at 
giving an organised direction to the revolutionary stream." Ibid, 
Pe216e 
-209= 
(55) Lenin cw 12 9 p.375. 
(56) Lenin cw 15, p.39 0 
(57) Lenin cw 16, po347-349o 
(58) Lenin cw 219 Po 161. 
(59) Ibid. 
(60) Lenin cw 219 p.241=244. 
(61) Lenin cw 13, p.77. 
(62) Lenin cw 21, Po9Bo 
(63) Ibid 9 po109o 
(64) Lenin, cw 21, p .. l09 9 243, 250, 444, 109. 
cw 22 9 p.,l94, 282, 284. 
cw 23, Po 115, 120. 
(65) JoHoLo Keep The Debate on Soviet Power, Oxford 1979 9 Po18o 
(66) Besancon op.cit 9 pp.172 9 173. 
=210~ 
CHAPTER 5 
THE TEXT ANO D~S SECRET: 
A POLITICS FOR THE END OF TIME 
Michel Foucault has expressed concern at the uses to which his 
work on internment may be put; in particular: 
"A certain use which consists in saying 'Everyone has 
their own Gulag, the Gulag is here at our door, in our cities, 
our hospitals, our prisons, it's here in our heads: I fear 
that under the pretext of a 'systematic denunciation' a sort 
of open-ended eclecticism will be installed •• o 11 (1) 
The temptation is obvious. The outstanding feature of the 
twentieth century appears to be a persistent violence against the human 
individual, either in overtly physical or in more subtle forms. The 
temptation is to ascribe all these to a common, supra-historical cause, 
in the hope of thereby making some sense out of it all, once and for 
all. But such an approach, however understandable, may ultimately 
only serve to obscure the crimes of the powerful. 
Sociologists have certainly, if perhaps inadvertently, provided 
the appropriate concepts for such approaches. Secularization and 
democracy in de Tocqueville, rationalisation in Weber, isolation and 
anomie in Durkheim, even, indeed, alienation in Marx, all contain the 
possibility of infinite extension until they may, separately, or some 
timestogethsr, both explain our ills and convince us of an inescapable, 
inhuman, destiny. I have pointed out previously the possibility of a 
less pessimistic interpretation of Weber, although it must be admitted 
that he himself was hardly a convinced optimist in these matters. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to attempt whatever discrimination is 
possible between human ills and evils, and in the case of the Gulag, 
to refuse a "universalising dissolution of the problem" ( 2 ) by asserting 
the specificity of historical events. This, for example, is the 
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reservation that one feels impelled to register about the conclusions 
of the classical Frankfurt theories, wherein the 'frantic expansion of 
totalitarian mass democracy' becomes little different from the expansion 
of totalitarianism itself. Habermas' rejection of the totalising 
thesis rof the 'dialectic of enlightenment' in favour of an argument 
which accepts the necessity of the concepts of 'science' and 'progress', 
in their appropriate place, seems to be a necessary return to the 
exercise of such intellectual discrimination. 
To the extent, therefore, that I have attempted to examine the 
roots of the Gulag in the previous chapters of this argument, I have 
done so in the spirit advocated by Foucault. Specifically, this means: 
"Refusing to question the Gulag on the basis of the texts 
of Marx and Lenin or to ask oneself how, through what error, 
deviation, misunderstanding, or distortion of speculation or 
practice, their theory could have been betrayed to such a degree. 
On the contrary, it means questioning all these theoretical texts, 
however old, from the standpoint of the reality of the Gulag. 
Rather than searching in those texts for a condemnation in advance 
of the Gulag, it is a matter of asking what in those texts could 
have made the Gulag possible, what mioht even now continue to 
justify it, and what makes it intolerable truth still accepted 
today. The Gulag question must be posed not in terms of error (3 ) (reduction of the problem to one of theory) but in terms of reality." 
My argument was not intended to explain the history of the twentieth 
century in terms of the consequences of one text, but to ask what in 
this one text could have "made the Gulag possible". And such an 
attempt must, in principle, remain a partial explanation. I have in 
passing acknowledged, and indeed made much use of, the contributions 
to such an understanding that is provided by the varying approaches of 
many different, and differing, analysts. But, despite all this, there 
is perhaps a need to move to a more general level of discussion. 
For a problem remains: that is the continuing power and seductive= 
ness of Lenin's themes in contemporary history, inasmuch as their 
prescriptions may still be advocated, and their consequences defended, 
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at the cost of human suffering. And further, if the seductiveness 
of Leninism lies, as I have suggested, in ~e way in which the libertarian 
themes of The State and Revolution coincide with aspirations that may 
be found in many places and at many times, how is it that the dead 
positivity of authoritarianism proves so successful in conquering its 
opposite? Why was it that 9 whatever the presuppositions of Bolshevik 
theories, those aspirations were never powerful enough to say 9 at one 
of the many crucial points of Soviet history, "enough!"? It is, 
therefore, necessary to complete this argument by considering the nature 
and consequences of the desire for 'real freedom' that underlies Lenin's, 
and by implication, other Utopian and libertarian arguments. 
It is in the work of Sartre that we may find the necessary depth 
to approach this question. Sartre lived in the political world defined 
by Merleau-Ponty's aphorism to the effect that "it is impossible to be 
an anti-Communist and it is not possible to be a Communist."( 4 ) Merle au-
Panty was writing in 1947, and Sartre wrote the Critique of Dialectical 
reason in 1960. Despite the difference in the two dates, they are both 
contained within a single political period, defined by the outcome of the 
Second World War and the development of the Cold War. At the same 
time, therefore, that both were conscious of the impossibility of not 
taking sides with the war-time Communist Resistance, and of not taking 
a similar side in a decisively bi-polar world, there was too much in 
the experience of Communist politics to make such a choice one that 
could easily be lived with. It would seem, therefore, inevitable that 
Sartre mould conclude that an existentialism that did not imply a 
specific political commitment was hardly adequate to the task of 
being in the world of post-war Europe. But there can be no doubt 
that the attempted reconciliation of existentialism and Marxism 
reached no final and satisfactory solution; in the light of Marleau-
Panty's assertion, it was impossible that such a resolution could be 
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conjured out of abstract .ttought. The significance of the Critique 9 
therefore, is that it attempts an investigation into the nature and 
possibility of freedom in R 1~n~lrl that is rR~n~ni~~M ~c ~lmost in 
conceivably more complex and intractable to the dictates of thought 
than that of Lenin. 
Thus the Critique is an attempt to define the nature and 
possibility of freedom. In this, Sartre is hardly unique; many 
before him have made the attempt. The difference of Sartre's attempt 
lies in the way in which his disoussion honestly lays itself open to 
all the results of the twentieth century, and confronts the experience 
of freedom-becoming=authoritarianism. He does not take the easy path 
of counterposing his 'freedom' to the really existing varieties, thereby 
maintaining the purity of his model at the expense of saying nothing 
about the real world. His freedom is permeated with the awareness at 
every point of how close to unfreedom it lies, of how this threat is a 
condition of existence of that freedom itself. Sartre, therefore, 
honestly construes freedom as a gamble of the sort to which we have 
referred earlier. 
The foundation of Sartre's argument is a fundamental phenomenology, 
that is, an attempt to structure a social theory around a concept of 
the individual that contains a minimum of assumptions. Where Marx 
assumes some version of ontology - according to interpretation the 
necessity to labour, the necessity to cooperate, the necessity to 
objectify etc., Sartre is only prepared to accept such drives on the 
understanding that they are products of history: they do not precede 
the fact of being human in the world. Sartre will accept no such 
assumptions because of his insistence thRt the only essential quality 
of man is that of being free. 
This stance will allow Sartre to attemot a definition of human 
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freedom, and consequently of the nature of revolution, that escapes 
the one-dimensional logic and the naive optimism of the ontologically-
based traditional Marxian theories. 
A phenomenology places the individual at the centre of the 
project of understanding. It signifies not simply that individuals 
are important in the scheme of things 9 but that the objects which 
appear to constitute the social world are expressions of human 
intentionality, and represent~tempts to inscribe meaning in the 
environment in which men liveo To examine social institutions is 
to attempt to map the achievements and failings of human intentionalitye 
Any individual is confronted most fundamentally with the task of making 
sense of the world; this cannot be done by pure interpretations$ 
Inasmuch as men are beings in the world, the attempt to make sense 
of the world is an attempt to ~ in the world in a particular manner. 
Such attempts constitute the projects which the individual adopts. 
Because they are intimately connected with the search for meaning, 
such projects are greater than the simple acts themselves, they are 
attempted totalisations. Each and every project, being an attempt 
to make sense of the world, derives from the individual's larger 
project of living in the world at a certain time and place. 
A project thus totalizes the world for the human subject, giving 
it a coherence and order. But inasmuch as they are attempts to be 
in the world, totalisations must run the risk of failureo Most 
totalizations are failures, and history is the account of such failed 
attempts at totalisations. The litter of failed or past totalisations 
is what constitu~ the world of dull and resistant positivity that 
appears to confront each individual. Inasmuch as individuals all 
pursue their own projects, each representing differing totalisations, 
the search for totalisation appears fruitless. The conflict of human 
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intentions produces results which appear to match nobody's original 
project - the situation described in Engels' famed 'parallelogram of 
forces'. 
In "Being and Nothingness" Sartre found that the ultimate 
value of the human project was questionable: 
"Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man 
the real goal of his pursuit, which is being as a synthetic 
fusion of the in-itself with the for-itself; existential 
psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his passion. 
But ••• men ••• are condemned to despair; for they discover 
that all human activities are equivalent and that all 
are on principle doomed to failure." (5) 
Since all life is ultimately a failure to be, a profound 
ontological lack against which all efforts must ultimately founder, 
history could contain little hope of progress. But the "Critique" 
does admit of such a concept of progress. If projects can escape 
from being irredeemably the intentions of isolated individuals, and 
become the common property of larger groups, there may be a way to 
escape the ultimate failure. If a single 'meaning', or totalisation 
might come to characterise the whole of society, then a totalisation 
might be achieved that would remove the fractious conflict that exists 
between a myriad of individual projects. History may be reinterpreted 
in this light. The rise of a world system and world economy dissolves 
the differences of meaning that separates societies and cultures and 
suggests their absorption into a single totalisation. 
But history is most definitely not imbued with an automatic 
and irresistable logic. Along with the barriers to totalisation that 
are erected by distance and simple cultural difference , there are con-
flicts within any given society 9 between classes, and indeed, within 
classes. The path towards totalisation is thus not evolutionary 9 but 
revolutionary. Classes are represented by conflicting partial 
totalisations, expressing their different intentions, or perhaps 
interests. Revolution is the unique path to successful totalisation. 
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Thus Sartre gives an account of history as the terrain of 
conflicting projects and failed totalisationsD Human life has 
been lived in a condition of 'scarcity'. History is a history of 
shortage 9 and of a bitter struggle against this shortage 9 which has 
determined the relationships between mene 
Scarcity necessitates collective arrangements and efforts to 
extract the means of survival from an 'inert' nature. Yet the 
advantages of such cooperation are not unalloyed; it is, after all 9 
only the existence of the others in the group that produces scarcity 
in the first place. 
of group: the series. 
and mutual hostility. 
Such a contradiction produces a specific type 
Each is bound to the other by mutual need 
Each lives in a state of hostility to nature 
the inert - and further in hostility to his fellows. He is subjected 
to the practical arrangements sedimented by history and its institutions, 
and the competing needs of other people. The possibility of freedom, 
therefore, is negated by the domination of the 'practice-inert'. 
In contrast, the paradigm of freedom is the fused group at the 
moment of 'apocalypse', typified for Sartre by the crowd that stormed 
the Bastille. It exists only on the basis of a common purpose, and 
that common purpose is identical to the personal project of every 
individual involved. No-one's project is subordinated to it, because 
each has realised a new project, the success of which depends upon the 
participation of all the others. 
leaders. 
Such a group has no structure and no 
Sartre is under no illusions that such supremely free groups can 
be created at will and maintained in permanence. In "Being and 
Nothingess" he explained the willingness of people to accept oppression 
and misery in terms of a lack of imagination: 
"It is on the day that we can conceive of a different 
state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles ( 6 ) 
and our suffering and we decide th2t these are unbearable." 
Thus a worker in 1830 will only be impelled to revolt against 
his brutal conditions if those conditions are worsened, if his meagre 
wages are reduced, because he can then conceive of a situation where 
his suffering is less than it has become. The analysis in the 
'Critique' reinforces this suggestion. A revolt is not produced by 
the simple existence of hunger, oppression, and injustice. These 
are common and permanent features of many societies. The group that 
is resigned to such an objectionable practice-inert can only be trans-
formed into a fused group by the arrival of a threatarn a promise. 
The crowd that stormed the Bastille was produced by such a combination. 
The St.-Antoine district of Paris was threatened because it lay 
in the path of the obvious route for the rumoured advance of the King's 
troops. "This possibility actualized the threat of the Bastille: it 
was possible that the districts' inhabitants would be caught in~the 
crossfire." (?} But the Bastille also contained a promise that would 
negate the threat: in fact it contained cannons and rifles with which 
the people might defend themselves. It would appear that it is only 
when the practico-inert presents not simply the promise of the con-
tinued 'hell of daily life', but the threat of personal extinction, 
that the fused group is born to resist ito 
By placing the individual at the centre of his philosophical 
project, Sartre has captured the depth of meaning that the revolutionary 
act produces for an in its participants. Anyone who has ever been 
involved in a meaningful collective project can testify to the trans= 
formation in human relationships and in daily experience that such a 
project achieves. The apocalyptic group, devoid of all complications 
and hesitations derived from the myriad complexities of daily life, can 
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transact its business and pursue its goal with a speed, efficiency, 
willingness 9 and comradeship that makes formal structures and pro-
cedures practically redundant. Such a collective draws on an almost 
electric field of common assumptions and shared norms that allows the 
participants an almost superhuman insight into what other members of 
the eollective wish to communicate and achieve. 
Sartre 1 s description of such a group is not dissimilar to what 
Durkheim described as moments of "collective effervescence", rare 
moments when: 
"••• men are brought into more intimate relations with one 
another, when meetings and assemblies are more frequent, ( 8 ) 
relationships more solid, FJnd the exchange of ideas more active ••• " 
The nature of such groups has been often discussed in the sociology 
of religions and crowd psychology. But Sartre 1 s analysis offers an 
important insight into the process of revolution. 
The fact that such a profoundly joyous moment can be experienced, 
and the further fact that a large number of people, particularly those 
involved in politics, have intimations of such moments at least once 
in their lives, is important. Political theories can be constructed to 
suggest that lives, not moments, may be lived this way. In particular, 
in the aftermath and complications ofrusry revolution there exists the 
yearning to return to the moment of primitive and uncomplicated solidarity. 
Not a little of this enters into all post-revolutionary oppositional 
movements, when the return to the routine tasks of daily life must 
occasion some feeling of 'betrayal', a deep sense of loss. The romantics, 
from the Levellers to the Trotskyists, are shot through with this nostalgia 9 
whatever the practical merits of their oppositional programmes. 
But the apocalypse cannot be maintained. After the immediate 
object of the fused group has been achieved, threats emerge which are 
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capable of undermining the solidarity of the group. The apocolypitic 
group depends upon the existence of an enemy = not a theoretical or 
ideological one, above all not a distant one, but one that is real in 
the sense that it is present and immediate as a threat to the physical 
existence of each individualo The removal of this threat, or even its 
distancing,is likely to produce some kind of diversification in the 
ptojects of the group members. The assault on the enemy is after all 
a strictly limited task, and one likely to occasion few disagreements. 
Such disagreements will be tactical at most, and swept away in the 
rushing tide of events. What guarantee is there that the group will 
be recreated in the morning, to continue the struggle against the 
enemy? The enemy is both more distant and more abstract. It is a 
ruling class and a social system, not a company of troops in the next 
street. 
Thus the fused group of the ftpocolypse is a moment, not a 
condition. It creates no guarantees of its own permanence. It is 
guaranteed by no ontological status. Man has not entered the realm 
of freedom because no such objective kingdom of the free exists. Nor 
has any human essence been uncovered or liberated: there is no such 
essence. Freedom exists only to the extent that it is constantly 
recreated by the commitment of each to the common project. The 
return to seriality remains a possibility because only the relation-
ship that humans adopt to their world can banish the practice-inert 
and seriality. 
The moment of apocalypse is thus followed by the Pledge, as a 
means of preserving the 'surviving' groupo Each member must make a 
commitment to maintain the common project in the changed conditions. 
This is a defence against the internal danger brought about precisely 
by the fact that the individuals are now free. They are free to leave 
the group and change their project. The pledge is given in a moment 
before such defections become real, but when their possibility can 
be envisaged. The possibility is made obvious to all by the fact 
that the enemy is still unvanquished. Defection, if it be not treason 9 
is tantamount to treason because the logic of the fused group works in 
reverse: if all are necessary to prevent the extermination of any 9 
then the defection of any one threatens the ability of all others to 
survive. 
A choice to defect cannot be construed as a real choice: it is a 
choice to return to the practico=inert, and is therefore an abandonment 
of freedom. Such individuals must be forced to be free by the common 
group. The pledge, therefore, is freely taken, and is a demand for 
violence to be used against oneself if one breaks one's word. 
The possibility of one's defection cannot be countered by a 
moral commitment. Tomorrow one's commitment may have changed and 
one's past be rejectede The pledge is a recognition of this 
possibility, and an agreement by all that such a change would be 
evidence of the recon~uest of the practico=inert. All give the 
group the right to use terror against those who threaten its integrity 9 
and by direct implication, the right to use terror against themselves. 
The terror may not save the individual - although it will certainly 
save many who might otherwise defect - but it will save the group 
and therefore safeguard the conditions of freedom. 
The apocalyptic group does not only fade due to the passage of 
time; it must in fact be consciously displaced by something elsee 
The practico=inert is not a place or a time but a relationship between 
man and the world. It remains, and remains until a future which can 
be no more than speculative. It must be combatted, constantly, with 
will and reason, it must be worked on. The insurrectionary crowd 
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must become an instrument for effective social change. The Apocalypse 
is a necessary rupture with the practio-inert; it is not a considered 
renegotiation of the relationship between man and the world, but a 
practical abolition of one pole of the relationshipo The rupture 
frees the people of all chains - both those that are part of the 
prior social and political arrangements, which it is the task of the 
revolution to destroy; and those that are part of insuperable historical 
conditions, or even the biological limits of the human organism itselfo 
This group, then, is by definition utopian and impractical. The 
revolutionary crowd is saturated by a spirit far removed from any 
'materialism'. The cry of 'tout est possible' echoes from 1917 to 1968. 
But the enemy must still be destroyed, priorities established, 
resources allocated, fields ploughed. Sartre underlines the transience 
of the apocalypse by insisting on the necessity for such considerations, 
and by refusing to ignore the dangers of seriality produced by the 
performance of such tasks. The group that successfully confronts such 
tasks cannot be the same group that stormed the Bastille or top~d the 
Czar. The group must change,and to this extent it matters not how this 
change is brought about. Sartre argues against a common mistake: 
"It is common - fbr example, in periods of revolution - to 
contrast a centralising, authoritarian tendency coming ~ 
above, that is to say, from the elements who hold power for 
the time being, with a democratic, spontaneous tendency which 
grows from the base ••• I am not denying that politically it 
is of the greatest importance whether organisation is impbsed 
from above or produced from below ••• the regime itself will be 
different in the two cases, as well as the relations of 
reciprocity between individuals. But the important point 
here is ••• that the mode of regroupment and organisation is 
not fundamentally different according to whether it depends on 
centralisation from above or spontaneous liquidation of 
seriality within the series itself and on the common organisation 
which follows. In short, this is not and cannot be an issue 
about Blanqui 9 Jaures, Lenin, Rosa Luxembur.g, Stalin or Trotsky 
eo• the type of formal intelligibility and rationality can be 
the same with organisation from above as with organisation from 
below." (9) 
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It is, therefore, crucial to understand that however democratic 
or spontaneous is the process of the formalisation of the new 
organisation 9 such a formalisation is inescapable. and such a 
formalisation is not without costs. 
In this way Sartre distinguishes his analysis of the revolutionary 
process from the assumptions of the tradition of The State and Revolution. 
The apocalyptic group - expressed in the commune-state - cannot but 
disappear. This is due not to the treachery of leaders, the strategy 
of a bureaucracy, or the straitjacket of adverse conditions. It is 
inherent in the nature of the revolutionary process, because that 
process is itself simply a collective project pursued by human beings. 
Sartre, therefore, has ruptured the discourse which has previously 
prevented revolutionaries from grasping the consequences of acting in 
the world. As we have previously suggested, a utopianism that does 
not accept the existence of humans living and acting in a world of 
time, place, and change, does not have to be betrayed to usher in 
authoritarianism. It itself betrays the reality of the human actors, 
it is a violation of the most fundamental fact of being human, the fact 
of being in the world. Being in the world compels the following changes. 
Firstly, an internal differentiation takes place, to allow for 
the performance of different tasks. A division of labour emerges, 
and the group becomes an organisation. But the .organisation does not 
destroy freedom but creates a new freedom whereby individuals pursue 
the common end indirectly through their particular functions. Sartre 
uses the metaphor of a football team to illustrate the diverse functions 
moving toward a common goal, individual talents expressed in a common 
struggle. Thus even groups with a complex division of labour are com= 
patible with freedom. While, compared with the apocalyptic group, 
there is clearly a loss, this does not signify a return to seriality. 
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But what happens in the case of a disagreement within the group? 
One point of view will be implemented, the other defeatedo Those who 
lose will find themselves in a position where the project of the group 
has to some degree become outside and against their own project. The 
common project is no longer their own. Seriality has been reintroduced. 
The dissidents' position in the group is now one of passivity. Inertia 
has become part of the collectivity. The condition of the group is 
'degraded' in comparison to the situation where everyone's praxis was 
freely expressed. 
lven so, all is not lost. If the group has decided one way, it 
can,in its own sovereignty, decide another. So long as the processes 
involved are reversible, the situation is not one of seriality. If the 
number of those lost to inertia becomes threatening, a change can be 
agreed ono 
This remains possible so long as memberscr the group value their 
freedom above all else. But another solution is possible. Out of 
the organisation may emerge the institution. As conflicts and dis-
agreements multiply, as they inevitably will, they may be resolved by 
the transference of the right to decide between them to a body - or 
leader = standing outside and above the group. Great temptations 
exist to opt for this solution, especially in a situation where the 
group is still threatened by an enemy. Excessive discussion, and 
repeated tactical and strategic twists and turns in response to that 
discussion, threatens the efficacy of the struggle against the mortal 
enemy. Individuals are already ~artially serialised, and engrossed 
in their particular and vital functions. A transference of the common 
praxis to a leader is a slight step 9 legitimised by urgencye The 
leader does not seize power, he is the willing recipient of a willing 
abandonment of freedom by the members of the group. The return to 
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seriality is complete as the institution establishes itself as a 
frozen and irreversible source of authority. 
Sartre's analysis presents an incisive account of the process 
of revolutionary transformation, and then revolutionary degeneration. 
Each step can be illustrated by events and processes from the Russian 
experience. But the real virtue of Sartre's account lies in the 
fact that it does not pretend to be a history of a particular 
revolution , and the Russian revolution, while present in every line 
of the argument, is practically absent from the text. The 
significance of this is simple. Sartre calls on historical example 
only as illustrative aids. But the analysis is not an account of a 
revolution, of a particular problem in historiography, but of the 
process of revolution itself, as created by human beings. All such 
revolutions are made by human beings faced with the challenge of 
creating their own freedom. All such human beings determine the 
outcome of their acts. Revolutions will always take place in 
conditions constrained by historical limits, by unforeseen con-
tingencies, by material and cultural shortages, by particular 
personalities, by specific inheritances, by problems that demand 
urgent solution. Without such, history would contain no revolutions, 
for what would there be to revolt against? Revolution does not 
solve these problems, rather it puts individuals in a position 
where they can choose hmw they are to be solved. And the most 
fundamental choice involved is simply this: will we solve them by 
means which reaffirm and recreate our freedom, and make it possible 
for us to unmake the choices we have made if we subsequently decide 
that they were wrong? Dr do we solve them by means which recreate 
their dominion over us, which readmit the practice-inert as the 
determining element of our lives? Do we replnce ore set of frozen 
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relations with another? Do we use our freedom to remain free, or 
do we use that freedom to decide to become, once again, unfree? 
Revolution is no more and no less than simply the first real choice 
that people have made in their lives. The unfree have been shown 
that they can be free. And if one free decision may be made, it 
follows that this freedom can structure every other decision that 
subsequently confronts the individual. And so the gamble is not a 
once for all attempt at liberty, but the constant nature of man's 
negotiation of his relationship to the world and his fellows. 
Implications 
Sartre's discussion is ontological, not empirical. That is, 
it is not a model of stages derived from an examination of concrete 
history like Comte's three stages or Marx's succession of modes of 
production. It is an attempt, by starting from the individual 
conceived with a minimum of assumptions- assumptions~at would have 
to be derived from history - of the field of human actions in history, 
and the limits of that field. While this account has inevitably ignored, 
and perhaps inexcusably simplified, the complex regiment of concepts 
and purposes underlying Sartre's argument, we can nevertheless make 
some comments about its implications for revolution and freedom in the 
contemporary world. 
It may well be that circumstances conspire against freedom in 
contemporary revolutions. Rather than revolution providing the ground 
for freedom, a divergence emerges between freedom and the security of 
the revolution. If that is the case, it is not yet necessarily an 
argument for rejecting revolutiono We may 9 instead, consider the 
concept of the 'transitional period'. That is, the revolution may 
provoke inevitable costs in freedom, i.e. the inevitable emergence of 
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the institution, along the road to the abolition of scarcitye If 
such abolition is 9 however, possible, we may be prepared to bear the 
costs of the absence of freedom for a period. It may well be 9 
however 9 that this abundance which will bring the end of scarcity~ 
and therefore the end of the practico=inert 9 and therefore the dis= 
appearance of serialit~ is a chimerao 
Let us first consider the relationship, or the tension, between 
revolution and freedome The postulates of contemporary revolutions 
seem to emphasise the possibility of the degradation of the free 
group. In other words, there is clearly a conflict between apocalypse 
and security. Sartre has already indicated how, after the apocalyptic 
moment, the enemy does not disappear, but certainly recedes. The 
enemy is no longer the troops that threaten immediate massacre, but 
the troops outside the city that threaten massacre some time in the 
future; or the continued existence of the power complex that can raise 
such threatening bodies in the future; of the social system that 
provides the basis for such a power complex to contemplate such an 
act in the future. This distance loosesn the bonds that held the 
group in such uncomplicated solidarity, but it does not lessen the 
need for such a solidarity, because the threat of annihilation remainso 
Thus the need for the Pledge and the Terror. Their importance is 
greatly increased in revolutions of a more modern nature and purpose 
than the French Revolutiono There the defeat of the enemy could be 
regarded in terms that were military and the establishment of the new 
regime of freedom in terms that were constitutional. The modern 
revolution, however, must refuse such a simple definition of its 
tasks: it proposes nothing less than the restructuring of an entire 
society and aD. its institutions. Far more than in the past, the 
revolutionary act itself is only the beginning, not the end: because 
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its only success will be when it completes a global conquest. The 
revolution will be complete when it has transported society beyond 
the borders of scarcity and beyond all possible external threat. 
Only then is the enemy finally defeated. 
The Pledge, then, is the contract that will last for decades, 
and the Terror its permanent instrument. The threat of the external 
world conferred legitimacy on the Stalinist institution through not 
only the wars of intervention 9 but also through the period of the rise 
offascism, through the cold war and 'peaceful coexistence' to detente, 
and again today 9 to cold waro Against this threat all claims of 
freedom are negated. 
The history of the USSR shows the incompatibility between the 
surviving group, given coherence by the pledge, and the organisation 
which possesses democratic qualities. This does not simply refer to 
the rise of Stalin; for the majority of the population, even for the 
majority of the Party, the 'institution' was established within, at 
most. three years of the October insurrection. In fact the period 
of the Russian Revolution that most clearly shows the development and 
free interplay of fused groups and organisations came before the 
October insurrection, not after it. This was the time when Lenin, 
rightly, called Russia the ;freest country in the world', and the 
period is saturated with demonstrations, political parties, voluntary 
associations, and, above all, Soviets, pursuing their independent 
projects in a common field of totalisations. This could not last, 
and October is the moment where the institution begins its creep to 
power, not the moment of apocalypse, however much it may have been 
reinterpreted as such in the subsequent state ideology. 
There is little doubt that the move to the Pledge after the 
revolutionary act is necessary; in fact, the apocalyptic group is 
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an embarrassment; it cannot in its simplicity and impracticality 
cope with the practical tasks of mobilization and reconstructiono 
The division of labour is urgently needed. This involves a cost 
to the group 9 a cost to freedom 9 if the apocalyptic group is the 
paradigm of freedom. But it is not a cost to the revolution. 
Those features characterised by the term 9 organisation 1 9 however 9 
are problematic from both standpoints: that of freedom and that of 
the security of the revolution. The football team is free and 
efficient eo long as every member agrees upon the tactics to be 
pursued; once there is 9isagreement, however, the efficacy of the 
group effort obviously suffers. Discussion, disagreement, 
opposition mean diversion of effort by every member of the group 
~nd withdrawal of effort by those in a defeated minority. Un-
freedom is ominously close; for when does a minority that has by 
such means distanced itself from the common project become a group 
which has broken the pledge, and thus, by its own prior agreement, 
a subject of Terror? Herein may be discerned at least some of the 
fateful history of the USSR in the 1920's and 1 3Ds. For what is it 
we read in the rejection of the various oppositions by party and 
populace but an accusation of s~botage in the form of dissent? And 
what is it that makes those oppositions so impotent, so reluctant to 
pursue an open political argument, but the guilty conscience of those 
who are breaking a promise? 
Clearly, the more radical the tasks of the revolution, the 
more close to being One and the same thing are the Pledge and the 
Institution. In fact that the Pledge and the organisation appear 
to be logically and historically incompatible. The rise of the 
Institution is further aided by the fact that people - even, or 
especially, those that have made a revolution = are often more than 
-229-
ready to resign the freedom so recently won. At least part of 
the 'institutionalization' of the USSR derived from the fact that 
the population was exhausted by the battle for freedom and survival 
through almost ten years of war and revolution. Trotsky's advocacy 
of 'permanent revolution' may have been a fatal misnomer for that 
which he actually intended: but in public discourse it summed up 
for the population all that they had been through and from which 
they now wanted a respite. Berger has deftly summed up the con-
sequences of the ideal of 'full participation' in every decision 
affecting one's life as "a nightmare comparable to unending 
sleeplessness."(lD) At some point after the revolutionary festival 
the average individual retreats from constant participation to a 
necessary quietude. And the institution awaits. 
But if the rule of the institution for a period of history is 
the price of the abolition of the roots of alienation- scarcity 
it may be a price which societies are prepared to pay. But the 
problem here is that for Sartre to assume that it is possible to 
abolish scarcity, and for him to further assume that this will entail 
the final resolution of the problems of being, makes little sense in 
terms of the rest of his system. In fact, such assumptions lead to 
a complete subversion of his revolutionary phenomenology and a return 
to an orthodox Marxism. This is what Aronson, for example, has 
attempted. 
If scarcity is an exhaustive definition of the source of human 
suffering, it is possible to define the conditions for the end of 
such suffering. The scarcity that has conditioned life under all 
social formations so far will be negated by the achievement of 
material abundance that a socialist revolution will bring. If 
scarcity is taken as the a priori that gives rise to the existence of 
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multiple, diverse, and conflicting individual projects, abundance 
will remove the root of divisions between human individuals. This 
interpretation sees the diffusion of projects as merely the con-
sequences of the "war of all against all" that arises due to the 
threat of the other to consume that which the individual heeds in 
order to survive~ The abolition of material scarcity may allow 
the emergence of some common human essence that will signify a 
permanent commonality of projects. 
To establish this possibility beyond doubt, however, Aronson 
insists on a reinterpretation of Sartre's scarcity. He construes 
scarcity as a result of a historical human choice: 
II Sartre fails to explore the historical choice ( 11) 
which makes there be scarcity in the first place." 
He cites the work of Sahlins on hunter-gatherers societies to 
suggest that the original human state was that of collectivities of 
humans who lived: 
"••• amid peace and leisure, amiq a plenty based 
upon a systematic minimization of ti1eir needs." (12) 
At some point in the life of societies, what amounts to a 
decision, a "historical act", is taken to create new needs, which 
results in the need to labour to overcome what is now experienced 
as scarcity,. 
This, of course, also coincides with the creation of classes, 
inequality, and the struggle over the surplus - in other words the 
beginning of the violence of history. The practice-inert 
immediately becomes a less ominous concept, easily subsumed under 
the traditional Marxian strategies: 
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"••• if workers controlled the labour process itself, 
if they worked fewer hours and freely exchanged functions, 
if they were assured of a secure level of subsistence and 
co-operated in socially meaningful work = then at some 
point the grim rule of necessity might be brought to an 
3nd 9 dnd tl:E: f-1•-"c:~L.i.Gu~.i.n8L i:. oubjer.:i. decisively tu human 
control." (13) 
This is a familiar road 9 and it can lead to only one destination. 
Poster has expressed his disappointment at the way in which Sartre's 
radical reconstruction of social theory appears to produce such a 
return to classical Marxism: 
"Labour and the workplace are reaffirmed as the vortex 
of historical time and the only form of domination that is 
included in the final totalisation is that of exploited 
wage labour ooo By reaffirming the primacy of labour and 
the mode of production, Sartre has missed the chance to 
transcend the limits of traditional Marxism so as to account 
for forms of domination that play a significant role in 
contemporary radical thought." (14) 
If Sartre himself does not even need the corrections of an 
Aronson to return to the traditional Marxian political strategies, 
something appears to have slipped in the theory. It may be that 
this is due to the incompatibility of Sartre's original project 
with the discoveries he has presented in the course of attempting 
it. But perhaps it would be possible to describe Sartre's conclusions 
about political strategies as descriptive rather than normative. 
As Poster himself elsewhere points out(lS) the claims made for the 
power of Marxism to achieve the end of history, the final totalisation, 
are conditional. They are conditional upon concrete history and upon 
existential choice. 
The title of the 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' defines the 
book as an attempt to establish the possibilities and limits of this 
form of thought. It is an attempt to define what sort of theoretical 
system is necessRry if the assumption that history is ultimately 
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intelligible is to be verified. For this purpose the prospect of a 
single totalisation is necessary 9 to achieve a resolution and 
congruence of previously conflicting or overlapping partial 
totalisations. It is thus necessary to conceive of a 1 totaliser 9 9 
an agency which through its praxis is capable of encompassing the 
abolition of the practice-inert and the final defeat of seriality. 
It is not possible to argue with the conclusion that Sartre reaches: 
if history is to be intelligible, then it will be only through the 
agency of the only possible candidate for the role of totaliser, the 
working class. There is no escape from this conclusion, and Poster's 
regret that the Criti~ue does not allow alternative paths to 
emancipation - those of women, or children, or national minorities, 
is simply not relevant to Sartre's project. The totaliser must be 
the working class, because it is impossible to replace the 'subject= 
object identical', as described by Lukacs,with any other candidate for 
the role of 'universal class'. 
Thus the project of intelligibility is placed in doubt: firstly 
because the working class has not played the role of totaliser, and 
gives less and less evidence, as history proceeds - in its increasing 
fragmentation and incoherence of displaying such a capability. 
Secondly, the nomination of the working class to the role of totaliser 
carries with it all the philosophically unacceptable and sociologically 
inadequate implications that permeated Lukacs' original unwieldy conception. 
But the return of Sartre's project to this too-familiar terminus 
does not render the whole enterprise futile. What Sartre has done at 
every point in the theory is to distinguish the assumptions that must 
be made if the project of dialectical reason is to be consumated. But 
his procedure has still left open the possibility of choosing to follow 
the logic of the system, or to dissent from it where its consequences 
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become unacceptable. It may be possible to prevent Sartre 1 s theory 
from leading to its own dissolution. For this~ it is necessary to 
resist the temptation to embrace an assumption of the availability 
of a totalised historyo 
Thus it is entirely possible to approach Sartre's theory by 
assessing his categories, the coherence of his system 9 its legitimacy 
within the Marxian or radical tradition. All this can be done with 
the objective of establishing more securely the prospect of a successful 
outcome to the enterprise: the end of history in the final totalisation. 
Such approaches would 9 however~ evacuate Sartre's efforts of any value 
And significance. The importance of his system lies in its ability to 
grasp the real world 9 not in the extent to which it satisfies demands 
for a perfectly coherent theoretical and strategic system. It is 
valuable to the extent that it manages to say something about our 
present condition that is signally different and more appealing than 
any other representations of the world that might be offered for our 
consideration. In other words a more valid criterion of assessment 
would be: as a commentary on the history of the twentieth century, 
does it offer an account which, by its relevance, demands our 
attention? It is my contention that the sociology of groups 9 the 
dialectic of revolution and freedom that it presents does precisely this. 
If we work back, so to speak, from this achievement we can 
distinguish the dichotomies and antimonies of Sartre's system 9 
which themselves express the agonising relationship between revolution 
and freedom. Sartre does not map an unambiguous path to the final 
totalis2tion; he demonstrates the conflicts, contradictions 9 and 
assumptions that constitute such a path. If he himself then chooses 
that path, that is his existential choice. But what he refuses is a 
theoretical 'soft option' that neatly erases the anguish of such a 
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choiceo This is expressed in his much-criticised acceptance of 
violence as inherent in revolution. What he refuses is the attempt 
of those like Aronson who would dissolve the antinomies and return 
us to a simple and comforting world of certainties, of limited 
problems and neat answers. 
Aronson 9 who wishes to enforce the reconciliation of Sartre 
with classical Marxism, engages in no significant discussion of the 
theory of groups and the evolution from fused group to institutiono 
Of this he offers merely a descriptive account. The problems 
raised by this discussion do not appear to him as real problems at 
all. This is the consequence of his redefinition of scarcity. 
That reinterpreation was clearly intended to defend the possibility 
of socialism and the transcendence of alienation, and he appears to 
refuse any suggestion that the concept of socialism itself might 
have been problematised by the history of the twentieth century. 
Sartre 1 s project in fact resists Aronson's optimistic 
interpretation a By considering their origin and their inherent 
uncertainties, we can detect some incompatibility between the 
assumptions embodied in the original concepts (of scarcity 9 the 
practice-inert, the project and the totality) and the legitimation 
of the traditional Marxian centrality of the economic 9 and the 
process of economic development as the road to freedom. Even on 
the level of the economist interpretation of scarcity, Sartre lacked 
such optimism, and affirmed that: 
"••• this scarcity is a fundamental determination of 
man: as is well known, the socialisation of production 
does not put an end to it, except possibly through a long (l6 ) dialectical process of which we cannot yet know the outcome." 
Thus it may only be possible to enter a domain of relatively 
less scarcity, and such domains may already exist. Poster points 
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out that after 1968 Sartre himself "accepted that elementary, material 
needs were by and large satisfied" in advanced capitalism 9 
effectively dissociating his philosophy of revolution from 
reductionist versions of 'scarcity'. (l?) Thus a distinction be made 
between what could be said one hundred years ago and what may be 
said today: empiric2l history has deprived socialism the certainty 
of its claim to solve the problem of scarcity, and has provided 
capitalism with some mitigation to the accusation that it provides 
for the majority of its populations a situation of permanent scarcity. 
For Sartre, the unambiguous virtue of socialist revolution lies 
in its possibility of reconciling scarcity and needs in terms of the 
basic facts of hunger and survival. It is no accident that his 
latter-day political concerns were predominantly connected with the 
colonial revolution. He reminds us that: 
"The fact is that after thousands of years of history (l8 ) three-quarters of the world's population are undernourished. 11 
The establishment of a socialist regime may lead to the 
elimination of this form of scarcity (or at least this is assumed 
to be the case, although even yet it must remain as an assumption and 
an assertion, not a proven fact of experience). Yet this is a very 
primitive formulation of the concept of~· Standing beyond this 
domain of biological need, there is a whole domain of needs that 
historically have developed once the biological is satisfied. The 
Soviet Union is impelled to consider the development of consumer goods 
industries in order to meet some of these 'needs' that appear to arise 
inexorably once 'biologica~ needs are satisfied. These may be 
attributed to the delayed emergence of the 'new man' under socialism, 
to remnants of unreconstructed culture, even to the penetration of 
western ideology. However, one may believe that it is absurd and 
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brutalising to suggest that every need beyond the biological is 
unnecessary and degenerate: such a view would dismiss Beethoven's 
Symphonies alona with motor cars. hooks along with central heatinq. 
To select one and reject the other implies the 'dictatorship over 
. 
needs' that some theorists have suggested(lg) in a move that implies 
a return to the centralised and authoritarian plan so familiar from 
contemporary history. For those societies, then, that have passed 
beyond Aronson's very basic situation of scarcity, the problem of 
continuing and developing needs remains: and this very problem will 
confront those post-revolutionary societies that have fulfilled this 
basic task. 
Thus, in the absence of the establishment of a 'dictatorship 
over needs', the problem of a disparity between needs and resources 
remains even on the economic level, however far we may envisage the 
process of economic development and technologic9l control proceeding. 
Further, the modern awareness of the finitude of planetary resources 
may restore an appreciation of the natural components of scarcity, 
above and beyond those social and historical components which may be 
deemed to be subject to human interventiono What this 
dictates, therefore, is not the necessity to achieve or enter some 
domain wherein the problem of scarcity will be gradually eliminated; 
rather, the necessity to construct processes of discussion and 
determination that can provide a democratic means to effect the 
allocation of finite resources between conflicting needs. 
But a concept of 'need' that is reduced to the biological is 
absurd; one that is only reduced to the 'material' is exceptionally 
dubious. It is probably just as dubious to attempt to define human 
need in any positive and technical sense at all. While it is 
possible to view the development of civilisation as the unnecessary 
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invention of ever more infinite and redundant needs, it is also 
possible to reject such an attitude for its presumption. Given 
the existence of those human faculties about which we know, and the 
possible existence of some such about which we have as yet no 
knowledge 9 it is exceedingly dangerous to predict in advance - or 
even at some past point in history, as Aronson does ~ a break point 
where humanity moves from a situation of 'genuine' needs to ones that 
may be condemned as 'artificial'. Artificiality is the nature of 
human existence, and concepts of a golden age prior to such a situation 
cannot be seriously entertained. The definition of scarcity given in 
the glossary of the tritique seems to provide the necessary open= 
endedness to take account of this: the contingent impossibility of 
satisfying all the needs of an ensemble.( 2D) 
Thus, to bring Sartre's insights back to life again it is 
necessary to reject the Marxian concept of need that Aronson attempts 
to reintroduce. Sartre's concept does not derive from Marxism; 
rather it is a reinterpretation of the concept of lack developed in 
his pre-Marxist works. There,~ is an 'ontological privation' ( 21 ), 
the very structure of the human being. It expresses the ultimate 
disparity between the human subject and the world of facticity 9 and 
the helpless dominion of the former by the latter. In the Marxian 
version, lack is replaced by need and "the resistance of fue world to 
man is now defined in terms of scarcity. 11 ( 22 ) 
Sartre 1 s discussion groups, and his tragic awareness of the 
transience of situations of perfection as summed up in the apocalyptic 
group is hardly compatible with a scarcity defined in terms of 
economics, of the material needs for biological survival. It makes 
more sense to regard the situation of scarcity as a subset of a more 
profound human condition, his already given ontological lack. The 
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problem of scarcity may well be the terrain for much of what has been 
brutal and regrettable in human history, and consequently may define 
the site wherein human action may minimise these consequences once-
for-all. This is the site of political action, where human actions 
combined with developing technology may reduce the problem of material 
scarcity to nothing more than the inevitable contingency that follows 
from living in a world that is ultimately natural. But this is not to 
enter the kingdom of the blessed. Jameson stresses that: 
"It is here th2t the continuity of the Sartre of 'Being 
and Nothingness' and the Sartre of the critique is most 
striking, and I insist on the point because it is crucial and 
because most studies of the Critique gloss over it. Just as 
the being of the individual is in reality a lack of being, an 
inability to be, to reach some ultimate and definitive stability 
and ontological plenitude, so also the group is characterised 
not as a substance or a hyperorganism, but as a set of individuals 
trying in vain to become a substance, straining toward some 11 ( 23 ) 
ultimate hyper-organic status which they can never attain. 
Thus we may interpret Sartre in a less categoric manner than might 
appear necessary onfue surface of the the~ry. A more considered picture 
can emerge_. It would s e~m that th~ condl tion of scarcity is just one 
~ 
expression of man's condition.: it is the~expression that is, by and 
large, in history and available to historical change. 
- '-
Such historical 
change will doubtless remove sourc~il ~of alienation, as it will remove 
. ' 
sources of hunger. This is the argument, under some circumstances, for 
revolution. But revolution does not bring absolute abundance and 
material security, and it further does not bring the end of alienation 
as it cannot resolve those asp~cts of alienation that are locked in the 
condition of being humans in time. 
Thus, post-revolutionary life does not consist of a permanent 
end to alienation through a permanent common project: 
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11 there is no synthetic unity of the multiplicity 
of totalisations, in the sense of a hypersynthesis which ( 24 ) 
would become 9 in transcendence 9 a synthesis of syntheses o 11 
Sirni1~~1y; ~rR-rRvnlution~rv lifR mRy not be the oermanent hell 
of serial confrontation with every Other. 
The extreme pessimism surrounding the consequences of scarcity 
is subject to modification in the discussion on groupso Sartre in 
fact avoids an extreme and simplistic dichotomy which would place humans 
under pre~revolutionary conditions in a situation of total mutuam 
hostility, held together only by the brute demands of survival, yet 
permeated with a cultural loathing and fear of one for each Other; 
with the post-revolutionary situation signifying a total reversal of 
such a state of affairs. It is much more a matter of degree. A 
group at any one time is of a distinct type: either a fused group, 
an organisation, series, etc. But such groups are both inserted in 
temporality and located within an assembly of many groups. Each 
group may shift between seriality and other forms over time; each 
group is involved with other groups which will be of a different form 
at the time. Thus it is difficult to conceive of an entity as large 
as a nation as a group in Sartre's terms; it consists of a large 
number of groups, and in as much as itself is a group is characterised 
by a permanent and shifting reconstitution of its constituent parts. 
"The important thing, therefore, is to find out how 
far the multiplicity of individual syntheses can, as such, be ( 2S) the basis for a community of objectives and actions." 
Individual totalisations, therefore, contain the possibility of 9 
if not being identical to, at least overlapping the totalisations of 
others, just as much as they contain the possibility of conflictingo 
Otherwise, surely, it would not be possible to speak of people as 
being part of a common culture, and this concept of culture is necessary 
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if we are not to be forced to reject Sartre's approach out of hand: 
a society based only upon the dictates of survival would be chaotic 
indeed, and life would be 'nasty, brutish and short'. 
There is consequently 9 a danger in Sartre's theory of groups: 
the danger is th~ the apocalyptic group may be read as the state most 
earnestly to be desired, and therefore to be preserved at all costs. 
There is a danger, in Jameson's words( 26 ) of a 'mystique of apocalypse'. 
But, to this, Sartre might reply: "There always was". If Sartre has 
spelled out to us the seductive qualities of the apocalyptic ~tate, he 
cannot automatically be condemned as its high priest. For he has also 
told us of its transcience, its impossibility as an objective, rather 
than a moment. Sartre is in fact identifying and forcing the reader 
to recognise the danger that already exists in reality, and has already 
been witnessed in history itself. The danger is that people will be 
impelled to preserve what can only be a transient condition, and this 
is what gives the Pledge and the Terror their significance: as 
attempts to preserve the ephemeral. Thus Merleau-Ponty was wrong to 
accuse Sartre of 1 ultra-bolshevism 1 ( 2?) for his account of the terror 
in the revolutionary process. Sartre has no more than analysed history 
and stated facts: he has justified nothing. 
Thus we have a disquietingly honest account of the real limits 
of politics. Political action cannot satisfy the ultimate ontological 
lack of the individual, and the experience of the apocalyptic group is 
dangerous inasmuch as it suggests that politics can do precisely that. 
Those who object to Sartre's honest statement of this reality objecting: 
" in reality to time itself. For to say that consciousness 
of human life is a lack of being, an emptiness striving towards 
stasis and plenitude, toward being itself, is only in effect 
to give a definition of time. Thus Sartre's description of 
the failure of group action, like that of the failure of the 
individual human relationships, is to be understood in 
ontological rather than empirical terms. When Sartre says in 
'Being and Nothingness' that the project to Dve is an ontological 
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failure 9 this means neither that there is 'really' no such 
thing as love, as a lived experience, nor that love cannot 
last, but merely that love as such never succeeds in 
fulfilling the ontological function it sets for itself 9 
namely to bring about some ultimate plenitude, or in other 
words, to achieve the very end of time itself. On the 
level of groups, therefore, the doctrine or ontological 
failure lays emphasis on the passage of time, on constant 
change 9 both in group and in situation 9 and on the succession 
of the generations. As in 'Being and Nothingness' it has what 
is essentially an ethical function: it aims at dispelling the 
illusions of an ethic of being, and at reconciling us to our 
life in time." (28) -
The 'myth of the apocalypse' may be the greatest specifically 
political threat of our age. In the light of Sartre's elucidation 
of the difficulty of maintaining hold of freedom, of the dangers of 
placing one's freedom irrevocably in the hands of others, we may wish 
to avoid the pursuit of such absolute freedom. Sartre has shown that 
the connection between revolution and freedom is tenuous, and possibly 
negative. He has shown that the fundamental ontological privation of 
being is not accessible to solution by the act of political revolution. 
He has shown the Terror as the fury that is visited upon a society that 
is forced to confront this, a terror that is invited by the very act of 
the 'pledge' necessary to maintain the original purity of the 
revolutionary freedom. At last, perhaps, we are, therefore, able to 
consider the question of revolution as a choice, fully informed of its 
nature and consequences, of its benefits and losses. 
The State and Revolution, to return tc our starting point, is the 
constitutional theory of the attempt to ontologise the apocalypse. 
In other words, it describes the appropriate institutional 
arrangements for a group which has achieved totalisation: a single 
common project in the world, where the possibility of differences 
within the group does not arise. Lenin's measures for the control 
of bureaucracy, and for the extension of democracy, as argued in 
Chapter 2, are strikingly appropriate for the revolutionary group at 
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the moment of apocalypse. Such a group has no need for bureaucracy 9 
indeed the concept of bureaucracy is an absurd irrelevancy to such a 
group. This is because such a group is at the hour of its existence 
fulfilling tasks and solving problems that in such a way that the 
grounds for a bureaucratic structure are not invoked: in other words 9 
there is a minimal division of labour 9 and that which is necessary is 
highly flexible - no-one is irreplaceable. Similarly, such a group 
has no need to confront and consider the question of democratic forms 9 
because the simplicity and urgency of the tasks confronting the 
collective establish a necessarily narrow area of discussion and dis-
agreement. This will be an area of technical issues, about how best 
to achieve a commonly agreed short-term objective, the defence of the 
people and the securing of power. Thcre who disagree with that aim, i.e. 
who adhere to a difference in values, rather than techniques, are by 
definition not p8rt of the group. They constitute a different, and 
probably mortally hostile, ensemble of individuals and the differences 
between two such groups, obviously, are hardly the grounds for 
discussion and debate. Here, rather, we are in the domain of force 
and violence. 
But Sartre's sociology has demonstrated that bureaucracy and 
democracy do become matters of substance within a relatively brief 
period of time, wherein the group must reconstitute itself to deal 
with new tasks. These tasks 9 it will be remembered are the need to 
tackle diverse questions of economic and social reconstruction and 
transformation; and the need to accommodate the development of 
differences between members of the group over substantive issues 
that embrace more than technical problems. The first task produces 
the institutions of a bureaucracy, the second the institutions of a 
democracy. 
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Lenin's whole thesis, therefore 9 is startlingly irrelevant to 
the question of The State and Revolution. His measures for the 
abolition of bureaucracy and the extension of democracy are irrelevant 
tothe revolutionary moment 9 inasmuch as these are the natural 9 in= 
evitable 9 components of such a moment. And his measures are 
similarly irrelevant to the period that succeeds the revolutionary 
moment, inasmuch as they are simply non-functional, they cannot be 
applied successfully to a situation whose sociological constitution 
is fundamentally different from that of the revolutionary moment. 
Regret at the inevitability of such a 'degrading' of the initial 
freedom is pointless; regret is only appropriate to the extent that 
attempts were made to institutionalise the assumptions of the apocalyptic 
group. Far such attempts, as I have tried to show, themselves negate 
the possibility of establishing securely the freedom and human dignity 
that is possible. That which is possible may indeed be a pale shadow 
of the moment of the apocalypse, but it is a possibility of something 
real. 
We can, therefore, perhaps begin to understand the depth of the 
seductiveness of The State and Revolution: it speaks to the con-
sciousness of lack, and translates it into a consciousness of lass: 
that is, it promises an end to the fundamental anguish of being, that 
of being in time. It achieves this by promising an end to time itself. 
And, so, we can see what must follow. The termination of time is only 
possible if it coincides with the end of human beings, with the end of 
the time-laden universe of change. I have said that Lenin's 
problematic ensured that politics is.an ontological impossibility. Yet 
politics is a product of living in time: of changing circumstances and 
changing interpretations of what it is to live. In those states that 
have been, and may yet be, built on Lenin's model it is assumed that 
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politics is abolished as a result of~e abolition of time. In 
fact, the abolition of time is briefly, and ludicrously, and 
tragically, secured by the abolition of politics. 
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